SCM Core Text Sociology of Religion. Andrew Dawson
These expressions are the products of social interactions, structures and processes and, in turn, they influence social life and cultural meanings to varying degrees. The social scientific study of religion, including social theory, aims to interpret and explain these products and processes. (2003, p. 2) [emphasis added]
Whether employing the term ‘atheistic’ or ‘agnostic’ to describe the methodological bracketing employed, the weight of academic opinion holds that the sociology of religion does not concern itself with seeking to prove or disprove the veracity or falsity of religious worldviews.
As the sociology of religion is an academic discipline, adherents of a religious worldview are challenged to reach a point of critical distance from which they are able to engage religion in a manner conducive to prevailing academic standards and disciplinary expectations. At the same time, the peculiar subject matter of the discipline requires those of an agnostic or atheistic persuasion to reach a point of empathetic understanding from which they are able to engage religion with an awareness of and appreciation for its volitional, affective, practical, intellectual and evaluative particularities. In effect, the challenge to develop the critical empathy required to make the most of the sociological study of religion entails that the perspective of the typical believer, agnostic or atheist is neither more nor less privileged than any other.
The kind of self-critical reflection undertaken in respect of the sociologist’s encounter with religion is typical of what is often called ‘reflexivity’. Although reflexivity has a number of technical meanings, its most common usage refers to the need for social scientists to reflect upon the influence which their personal experience and academic approach have upon their research. Consequently, the principle of reflexivity combines two elements. First, it includes critical reflection ‘upon the ways in which our own values, experiences, interests, beliefs, political commitments, wider aims in life and social identities’ shape our research. Second, the principle of reflexivity calls for reflection ‘upon the assumptions (about the world, about knowledge) that we have made in the course of the research, and . . . the implications of such assumptions for the research and its findings’ (Willig, 2001, p. 10). Sociologically speaking, then, reflexivity encourages those who engage religion to be aware of the particular point from which religion is approached and the respective impact which this given perspective has upon, for example, the definitions used, theories employed, methods applied, analyses undertaken and interpretations preferred.
Religion in social context
Applying the tripartite model outlined in Chapter 1, relevant data pertaining to religion are to be found in the macro-structural, mid-range institutional and micro-social dimensions of society.3
Micro-social dimension
When treating the micro-social dimension of religion, sociology turns its gaze upon both individual believers and the interpersonal practices through which individual belief is expressed. Although a philosopher and not a sociologist, Wittgenstein’s definition of religious belief provides a useful summary of some key features of religion’s individual dimension.
It strikes me that a religious belief could only be something like a passionate commitment to a system of reference. Hence, although it’s belief, it’s really a way of living, or a way of assessing life. It’s passionately seizing hold of this interpretation. (1980, p. 64)
Emphasizing the symbolic aspects of faith, Wittgenstein captures the irreducibly subjective and non-vicarious character of religion’s individual dimension. He also furnishes a succinct representation of religious belief’s volitional, affective, evaluative, signifying and commitment-orientated nature. Although by no means a favoured topic of traditional sociology of religion, contemporary treatment of the individual dimension of belief draws support from established interpretative (also called ‘hermeneutical’) approaches. Such is the case because the micro-sociological focus of these approaches lends itself to engaging the subjective dynamics of such things as meaning-making, motivation and intent. For example, the individual dimension of belief may be engaged by sociologists wishing to explore the subjective dynamics informing the participation of women or homosexuals within conservative religious repertoires which both seemingly reject gender equality and apparently give nothing by way of affirmation to gay identity (see Chapter 6). At the same time, the subjective dimension of belief may be explored by asking individuals to explain the significance for them of religious practices and beliefs such as meditation, prayer, reincarnation and salvation (Spickard, 2007, pp. 121–43; Voas, 2007, pp. 144–66).
As Durkheim remarks, ‘religion is something eminently social’ (2001, p. 11). Consequently, talk of individual religiosity in isolation from the other dimensions which inform it can only ever be regarded as an abstraction by which religion’s subjective sphere is artificially isolated (‘bracketed’) for the purposes of analytical clarity. In actuality, an individual’s religious beliefs (along with the values and practices they inform and are informed by) are held, affirmed, challenged or modified relative to ongoing association with other human beings. From the formal interactions of religious ritual to informal encounters with friends and family (religious or otherwise), individual religiosity is informed by and expressed through associational activity. At the same time, associational modes of religious expression do not occur at random. The religious interaction of individuals, objects and events occurs at set times, with specific formats in given places because it is orchestrated by a particular constellation of organizational processes, ideational dynamics and social forces. Compare and contrast, for example, the Shabbat service of a Hasidic synagogue with that of a Liberal Jewish community. In each case, the physical use of sacred space, the oral and literary contents of the liturgical act and the distribution of ritual responsibilities will be different because they reflect varying institutional contexts and divergent theological construals – not least those treating the respective relations both of tradition and modernity and of men and women.
Institutional dimension
Large or small, new or established, mainstream or alternative, every religious group or movement embodies some form of institutional dynamic. Indeed, it is something of a sociological truism that no form of associational activity endures through time and space without assuming some degree of organizational formality. As Moburg notes:
Every religious organization has some degree of formalism or institutionalization. This is true even of groups that claim to be ‘merely a fellowship, not a denomination’, and of those so informally and loosely organized that they claim to lack organization altogether . . . This means that, like other institutions, it is subject to the play of social forces in both its formation and its operation. (1984, p. 6)
As an object of sociological scrutiny, the institutional dimension of religion has two important components: the organizational and the ideational.
The organizational dimension of religious institutions pertains to their concrete structures and formalized processes. From goal-setting through finance management to conflict resolution and identity maintenance, formalized organizational processes determine priorities, channel resources and entrench authority. For example, when engaging the organizational dimension of religious institutions, sociologists may focus upon variations in structural dynamics or the different ways in which particular groups and movements mobilize available resources. In the first instance, the different organizational structures in force can be examined to the end of determining the manner in which they facilitate or inhibit institutional adaptability in an increasingly fluid social landscape. For example, whereas established religious institutions enjoy a number of advantages which new religious movements do not, when it comes to institutional adaptability, traditional religions struggle in changing societal environments. This is the case because established organizations find it much harder to evolve and adopt novel structures as quickly and easily as newer groups who do not suffer under the inertial weight of inherited structures which are, by their nature, more resistant to rapid modification. In the second