SCM Core Text Sociology of Religion. Andrew Dawson
substantive definitions of religion tend to downplay, if not entirely overlook, explanations of what religion actually does relative to the socio-cultural context through which it is expressed. As a result, substantive definitions of religion tend to be sociologically thin in that they fail adequately to capture the social influence which religious practices and beliefs exert by means of their concrete expression through individual behaviour and corporate action. It is in this respect that ‘functional’ definitions of religion make an important contribution to sociological understanding.
Functional definitions
As the term implies, functional definitions of religion strive to express the social role or function which religious belief and practice play within the broader societal context.1 French sociologist of religion Hervieu-Léger offers the following functional definition of religion:
[R]eligion is a mode of imposing a social construction on reality, a system of references to which actors spontaneously have recourse in order to conceive the universe in which they live . . . religion is an ideological, practical and symbolic system through which consciousness, both individual and collective, of belonging to a particular chain of belief is constituted, maintained, developed and controlled. (2000, pp. 16, 82)
Hervieu-Léger hereby defines religion as a form of symbolic understanding through and by which humanity makes sense of both its surroundings and experience thereof. In effect, religion enables individuals and communities to function in the world by way of rendering their existence meaningful. For Hervieu-Léger, religion does this by drawing upon a range of theories, principles and practices which are inherited from and authorized by past generations in the form of tradition (here, ‘chain of belief’).
As with substantive definitions of religion, functional approaches have their limitations. If the strength of functional definitions lies in their ability to communicate the role played by religion relative to its social context, their weakness resides in their inability to identify with any meaningful precision the differences between religion and other non-religious modes of life which fulfil the same functions. If the social role of religion is that of making existence meaningful, for example, in what manner is religion different from the myriad other ways in which people render their world significant? Likewise, if the social role of religion is that of engendering societal cohesion, just what is it about religion which makes it different from other means which fulfil the same function?
By stressing functionality over substance, functional definitions of religion inevitably sacrifice attention to the precise details about religion which enable its differentiation from similar, but non-religious, modes of thinking, feeling, judging and doing. Consequently, functional definitions are unable to furnish sufficient substance to make possible sociological explorations of the precise differences between, for example, regular religious adherence and committed support of a football team. While participation in religious activities might have the same functional consequences as impassioned football support, the simple identification of shared social outcomes is not enough to tease out the precise differences between these two forms of commitment-orientated social behaviour. If substantive definitions of religion can be sociologically myopic, functional definitions are susceptible to analytical vacuity. Lacking the specificity necessary for fruitful critical analysis, functional definitions tell us what religion does without communicating what religion is; and, by extension, what it is not.
Mixed definitions
Setting aside typical distinctions between substantive and functional definitions of religion, the reality is that most social scientists tend to work with a mixture of the two; albeit a mixture which, in most instances, tilts towards one typical extreme rather than another. This mixture of emphases is exemplified by what are, perhaps, two of the most quoted sociological definitions of religion – those of Karl Marx and Émile Durkheim. According to Marx:
Religious suffering is at the same time an expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the feeling of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless circumstances. It is the opium of the people. (McLellan, 1977, p. 63)
The substantive element in Marx’s definition resides in his understanding of religion as an outward manifestation (‘expression’) of an inner state of being. Be it the suffering of the proletariat or the satisfaction of the bourgeoisie, religion expresses the longings and preoccupations of the individual. At the same time, however, the inner state which religion expresses is, for Marx, a reflection of external processes which impact upon the self. Consequently, the externalization undertaken by religion inevitably involves the symbolic and practical representation of prevailing social forces and dynamics. In so being, the expressive dynamic of religion assumes a functional quality as its representation of internalized social forces in the form of religious symbols and rites serves, in effect, both to pacify the working classes (hence, ‘opium’) and reinforce the hand of those already in power. For Marx, religion functions as an inherently conservative force which underwrites existing (conflictual) social relations and prevailing (unequal) structures of power.
As will be seen in the next chapter, Durkheim shares Marx’s belief that religion expresses internal states of being whose ultimate origins lie in external social processes. In his most famous definition of religion, however, Durkheim chooses to emphasize other things. Religion, he says:
is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and surrounded by prohibitions – beliefs and practices that unite its adherents in a single moral community called a church. (2001, p. 46)
The substantive character of Durkheim’s definition rests in his identification of religion as a ‘system of beliefs and practices’ orientated to ‘things’ (material and immaterial) held to be ‘sacred’. Underlying the first part of this definition is Durkheim’s understanding of religion as a kind of classificatory system by which different kinds of objects, practices, values and beliefs are labelled and the most appropriate dispositions towards them identified. As with Marx, however, the functional nature of Durkheim’s understanding of religion eventually comes to the fore. Unlike Marx, though, the function which Durkheim holds religion to undertake is that of reinforcing social cohesion rather than underwriting social division. First and foremost, religion unites. Religion does so by generating among its followers a shared range of dispositions (attachment, obedience, awe) in respect of a given set of beliefs and practices. Taking the word religion at its most literal (from the Latin re-ligare, meaning ‘to bind’), Durkheim regards religion’s fundamental function as that of binding individuals together through its orchestration of their mutual association, common beliefs and shared practices. Importantly for Durkheim, and mediated through the ‘single moral community called a church’, the mutuality engendered by religion reinforces social cohesion and is thereby conducive to wider societal harmony.
Practitioner perspectives
The challenging nature of studying religion in its sociological contexts is further highlighted when we move beyond consideration of established academic definitions and their conceptual preferences. What about religious practitioners themselves? Surely they’re best placed to offer a balanced definition of the word ‘religion’? Well, not exactly. Take the case of Spiritism, for example. Known also as Kardecism, after its founder Allan Kardec (1804–69), Spiritism arose in the mid-1800s as Europe underwent large-scale and rapid modernization thanks to the ongoing industrial revolution and emergence of modern capitalism.2 Reflecting the aspirations of its age, Spiritism styled itself as the modern-day successor to pre-scientific and overly superstitious religions such as Christianity, Judaism and Islam. Spreading from France to other parts of the world (particularly Latin America), it was not long before Spiritism assumed many of the reportorial ingredients which characterize the traditional religions it aspired to supersede.
Today, the overwhelming majority of Spiritists gather in purpose-built locations, at scheduled times of the week, in which