The Atlas of Climate Change. Professor Kirstin Dow
Around the world, the predictions of climate change – that we would much rather dismiss – are now all too obvious. The backdrop of climate policy has changed dramatically in the past five years. Decades of economic growth and stability (for some) have been overturned with global recession, shrinking budgets and volatile markets. As we write, European governments are contemplating a second $100 billion bailout of Greece in hopes of stabilizing the Euro-zone and avoiding a cascade of defaults that could capture Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and even Italy. While commitments for development assistance and climate change are by and large protected, no one believes major new and additional funding for climate change will be easy to mobilize. Financial crisis has clear impacts on real people, across the world. The vision of our connected world captured at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 seems more dangerous. In this edition, we include a new spread based on the limits of prediction and responses. The conjuncture of shocks in biogeophysical processes (often referred to as tipping elements), fragility in governance and large-scale impacts could have alarming consequences. For instance, collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet and deglaciation of Greenland would raise sea levels by some 12 meters. Retrenchment of poverty and civil strife in poor countries would swamp nascent efforts to avoid additional climate impacts. Population displacement due to climate-related disasters, sea-level rise, and collapse of regional production systems destabilizes governments and accelerates vulnerability. Climate as an issue of security has gained the attention of several forums. Not all climate-related changes will be negative! The Arab Spring, in some ways related to high food prices and the impacts of climate extremes, caught us by surprise. Greater awareness of climate change is leading to new opportunities for development too. Action is gaining ground, but is hardly adequate The changes already in evidence severely challenge environmental management and international governance. As we approach Rio +20, we still lack effective agreements to stabilize the level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and to protect the most vulnerable populations. Commitments under the Kyoto Protocol and the more recent round of voluntary targets are only the beginning of the 60 percent to 80 percent reductions required. Dependence on fossil fuels is deeply embedded in our economies and political regimes. Higher oil prices have sparked a boom in shale oil, and pushed forward more hazardous technologies. It seems we are going to have to make decisions to limit fossil-fuel use rather than rely on prices or peak oil to achieve drastic reductions. At the same time, the Deepwater Horizon and Fukushima disasters have pushed many people and some governments to promote renewable energy. Globalization, with its impacts on industrial location, economic development, and extensive transport demands, is influencing future patterns of emissions. Negotiating reductions is complicated by the combination of historical versus anticipated contributions associated with economic development, and export relations that result in one country producing goods and emissions for markets in another. Climate change is as much a humanitarian and human development concern as it is an environmental one. The most vulnerable populations are not the people driving climate change. Of those living on less than a dollar a day, few have electricity, cars, refrigerators, or water heaters. But, because their lives are tied to climate conditions and they have few resources to buffer against bad or progressively difficult conditions, they are likely to bear the highest human costs. It is encouraging to see approaches based on human rights continue to be influential in negotiations. Connections are also being made between adaptation and mitigation. The cost of responding to disasters may mean cutting other budgets. New Orleans cut funding for education, police, social, legal, and other services after Hurricane Katrina. In the UK, assistance for peacekeeping and humanitarian emergencies is 10 percent of official development assistance. Even wealthy, well prepared countries will face trade-offs between action at home and abroad, between risk reduction and emergency responses, and possibly between adaptation and mitigation. Responding to climate change and the threatened consequences is a serious and sobering business, but it is not hopeless, nor are all foreseeable outcomes inevitable. There are feasible, effective solutions. Many of these actions save money and make good sense for other reasons as they also address the broader issues of sustainability through reducing dependency on increasingly scarce petroleum supplies, cutting air pollution, and preserving the ecosystems that help maintain the ecological processes we rely on. Although it is tempting to focus on technological solutions, it is essential also to address the issues of consumption and lifestyle that drive technologies. Technological change alone cannot achieve the necessary levels of emissions reductions; many currently available technologies can, however, make a substantial difference. Renewable energy technologies are becoming more diverse, affordable, and widely adopted. These
12
technologies offer great potential for greenhouse gas reduction as they currently account for less than 5 percent of global energy production. Greater efficiencies are possible in other manufacturing and power production systems as well. Interest in nuclear power has also risen, but its future role in addressing climate change issues is less certain. Concerns over safety and long-term storage of radioactive wastes remain, and it is not clear that its potential value as a response to climate change offers sufficiently strong justification to overcome other economic barriers. We have moved beyond the notion that installing energy-saving lightbulbs is all it takes: every bit helps, but all the bits need to be in play. Achieving needed reductions will involve adjustments to infrastructure and institutional practices, such as new building designs and training of architects and engineers. Yet, without changes in consumer demand, such as reducing the desire for ever larger homes and more powerful cars, these advances and opportunities could be fruitless. The necessary institutional innovations also depend on finance. Carbon trading is growing: markets such as the EU trading scheme and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the USA are fully functioning. The level of trade is growing rapidly, but still represents a very small percentage of world carbon emissions. Pricing carbon in forests and terrestrial stores, as proposed in the REDD+ initiative, could transform local communities. Caution is warranted to ensure finance is secure and benefits those most dependent on forest resources. International parlance calls this the issue of leakage; empowerment, transparency and accountability are stronger watch-words to ensure corruption and control by the state does not overwhelm the global environmental benefits. Action will take new institutional strategies and forms of cooperation, and a willingness to deal with longer time frames in decision making. As scientists who for years have been studying the consequences of climate and other environmental changes on people and livelihoods, we believe climate change and its potential impacts are extremely serious issues. The required changes will involve us all deeply, but that social vision of a path to the future is not fully articulated. We seem to bounce between divided notions of fragmented communities preserving their own ideals and lifestyles and a global, shared vision of collective responsibility and action. Adaptation is an imperative, not a substitute for mitigation The commitment to warming is already in place – nothing we do now will alter global warming until the 2040s at best. Another two generations will be born, and the global population is likely to have added 2 billion people before our actions take effect. While the legacy of inaction and latent forcing of accumulated greenhouse gases are well-known features of climate change, the imperative to adapt with foresight and reduce the risks associated with the climate commitment has gained momentum only in the past decade or so. An odd feature of international negotiations has been that environmental campaigners resisted any mention of adaptation as a solution, fearing it would be seen as an alternative to mitigation and let the world off the hook of reducing emissions. This view restricted efforts to develop international adaptation funds and programmes. With growing understanding of the commitments and possible impacts, the IPCC fourth assessment clearly stated that adaptation and mitigation are policy complements, that is, they must both be pursued, and one does not substitute for inaction on the other. People, economies, and ecosystems are at serious risk from current climate patterns. Across large parts of Africa and Asia the timing and the abundance of rains determines whether crops will support households, or whether hungry people will need to search for alternative sources of food and income. Some coastal shorelines have limited protection from storms. Events of the past decade have reminded us that even the most advanced industrialized countries have an adaptation deficit, a lack of preparedness in the ability to deal with the present, much less the future. Those at risk are not randomly distributed; nor is risk accidental. Looking ahead, while there will be benefits for some, there will be severe consequences for others. Poverty is an enduring feature of how we organize our economies and societies. Those presently most vulnerable – poor