Japan's Total Empire. Louise Young
alt="images"/> shob, 1987), p. 121.
10. Michael Lewis, Rioters and Citizens: Mass Protest in Imperial Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 35.
11. Yamamoto Taketoshi, p. 271.
12. The original survey is: DaiNippon renmei seinendan, Zenkoku seinendan kihon chsa (1934). Cited in Yamamoto Taketoshi, p. 242.
13. T
yama's remark was made in a roundtable discussion on the Manchurian Incident originally published as “Manshu jihen gojunen no zadankai,” Keizai (September 1981). Quoted in Eguchi, jgonen sens no kaimaku, pp. 107–108.14. D. Eleanor Westney, Imitation and Innovation: The Transfer of Western Organizational Patterns to Meiji Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 180–206, and Donald Keene, “The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 and Japanese Culture,” in Donald Keene, Landscapes and Portraits: Appreciations of Japanese Culture (Tokyo: K
dansha International, 1971), pp. 259–299.15. I am indebted to Eguchi Keiichi for pointing out to me the central role of the big dailies in whipping up the war fever. See his “Mansh
jihen to daishinbun,” Shis, no. 583 (January 1973), pp. 100–103.16. The Osaka Asahi and Osaka Mainichi had long held the national lead in circulation figures, but not until the 1920s did their Tokyo editions overtake the decisive lead of the Hchi shinbun. The campaign to take over the Tokyo market followed both companies’ transformation from limited partnerships into joint stock companies after World War I, and was empowered by huge increases in capitalization. For example, Mainichi's capital rose from 500 thousand yen in 1919 to 5 million yen in 1924. For circulation figures of the major Osaka and Tokyo dailies, see Yamamoto Taketoshi, p. 412. For an account of the Mainichi and Asahi campaign against the Hchi shinbun, see Minami et al., Taish bunka, p. 127.
17. Ikei Masaru, “1930 nendai no masu media: Mansh
o chseiki, 1981), p. 144.18. Minami Hiroshi and Shakai shinri kenky
shob, 1987), p. 262.19. Abe Shingo, “Mansh
jihen o meguru shinbungai,” Kaiz (November 1931), PP-36; Eguchi, “Mansh jihen to daishinbun,” p. 100.20. Westney, p. 192.
21. Minami et al., Shwa bunka, p. 258.
22. Ikei, “1930 nendai,” pp. 143–144.
23. Abe Shingo, “Mansh
jihen o meguru shinbungai,” Kaiz (November 1931), PP- 36–37.24. Ikei, “1930 nendai,” pp. 146–147. For founding of NHK see Gregory J. Kasza, The State and Mass Media in ]apan, 1918–1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 72–101.
25. Ikei, “1930 nendai,” p. 146.
26. Ibid., p. 148.
27. The price of a receiver was prohibitive for most working-class people, who often earned less than 1 yen a day. The monthly salary of a maid, for example, was 15 yen. It was within reach for some white-collar employees, such as an assistant clerk at the Communications Ministry who earned 56 yen per month. Prices and wages from K
dansha, ed., Shwa e no kitai: Shwa gannen-3 nen, vol. 1 of Shwa nimannichi no zenkiroku (Kdansha, 1989), pp. 143, 149, 151, 153.28. Nihon h
s kykai, Nihon hsshi, vol. 1 (Nihon hs kykai, 1961), p. 281. Once interest in radio was boosted by battlefield coverage during the Man-churian Incident, numbers of new radio contracts continued to rise. Total contracts in 1934 were 1,979,000; in 1935, 2,422,000; in 1936, 2,905,000; in 1937, 3,584,000; in 1938, 4,166,000; and in 1939, 4,862,000: Kdansha, ed., Nitch sens e no michi: Shwa 10 nen-12 nen, vol. 4 of Shwa nimannichi no zenkiroku (Kdansha, 1989), p. 169.29. Other prefectures with more than 10 percent of radio-listening households included Nara, Hiroshima, Okayama, Gifu, Ishikawa, Saitama, and Chiba: K
dan-sha, Nitch sens e no michi, pp. 32–33.30. Westney, pp. 187–190; Yamamoto Taketoshi, pp. 313–319.
31. Eguchi, “Mansh
jihen to daishinbun,” pp. 100–103; Ikei, “1930 nendai,” p. 171.32. Eguchi Keiichi, “Mansh
in: Nagoya-shi o chbunkan, 1984), pp. 141–143-33. Eguchi, “Mansh
8 jihen to daishinbun,” pp. 100–103.34. Ibid., p. 102.
35. Nihon h
s kykai, Rajio nenkan: Shwa 8 nen (Nihon hs