Upper Canada Preserved — War of 1812 6-Book Bundle. Richard Feltoe
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*Also referred to in original documents by the name: Scoijoiquoides, Scajaquadies, Scadjaquada, Conjocketty, Conjecitors, Conguichity, Conjocta, and Unnekuga Creek.
Onshore, the crews of the shore batteries heard the firing and, once the noise subsided, hailed the vessels, demanding to know what had happened. Upon receiving no response, they assumed the worst and opened fire.
Whiz comes a shot over our heads. John Bull always aims too high. This went about 20 feet over us, ricocheh’d and as our shore was lined with friends anxiously waiting … killed Major Cuyler of the Militia whilst sitting on horseback … Bang! Went my battery of 6 pounders, Up Helm Boys! Stand by that cable with the axe.[10]
After cutting the anchor cables, the prize crews steered the two vessels toward safety at Buffalo. Unluckily, as they manoeuvred the prevailing wind died and the two ships were caught and dragged downstream by the Niagara River’s strong current, thus coming under additional heavy fire from the British artillery batteries lining the shore. In attempting to break away from this damaging barrage, the Detroit ran aground on Squaw Island, giving the British the opportunity to send a boatload of troops to recapture the vessel, but without success. After much cannonading by both sides and repeated attempts to possess the vessel made by parties from both armies, the Americans finally set it on fire, leaving it a gutted wreck. Similarly, while the Caledonia was towed under the cover of Winfield Scott’s artillery battery at Black Rock, preventing its recapture, it came under a heavy cannonade from the British guns and suffered significant damage while tied up at the dock, making it unseaworthy for the foreseeable future.
Hearing of this success, Van Rensselaer’s subordinates called on him to match the events at Buffalo; threatening that unless their men received orders to go into action they would desert and that he could find himself under suspicion of deliberately sabotaging the American war effort.[11] Consequently, Van Rensselaer ordered the invasion for the night of October 11–12.*[12] Leaving their respective encampments around Fort Niagara under conditions of freezing rain, gale force winds, and hail, the troops marched in strict silence along the single mud-choked trackway that led to Lewiston. Upon arriving at the embarkation point, however, they learned that the officer in charge of the boats had disappeared, supposedly taking with him a boat and all the available oars for the flotilla. Left with no means of propelling themselves across the river, the men were forced to endure a further gruelling march back to their encampments before attempting to dry off and await further orders. Despite this debacle and fearing that further delays would result in the complete disintegration of his military force, Van Rensselaer determined to mount his attack the following night — once some oars had been found.
Meanwhile, on the British side of the river, Major General Brock was well pleased with his level of preparedness in case of invasion. Following his victory at Detroit, much of the pro-American element of the Upper Canada population had been temporarily silenced, and numbers of the more vocal critics of Brock’s administration had deemed it prudent to leave the province altogether. At the same time, the local militias and Native allies were heartened by the victory and expressed an increased willingness to join the affray. Brock also ensured that his limited number of regular troops were disposed to those points deemed under threat and additional defensive positions were prepared at strategic points along the riverbank.*[13]
Since the beginning of the month, reconnaissance reports had noted substantial increases in the size of the American troop encampments on the opposite shore. There was also evidence of preparations within Fort Niagara, where the sloped roof of the old three-storey “Mess House” had been removed and the top floor converted into a raised artillery platform. Elsewhere, several new gun batteries were being constructed between Fort Niagara and a position that stood on top of the escarpment overlooking Lewiston (Fort Gray). Initially expecting that any American landing would take place at the mouth of the river and under the cover of the guns at Fort Niagara, the attack at Queenston was uncovered by Major Thomas Evans (8th [King’s] Regiment), whilst delivering a message from Brock under a flag of truce.
(Above) Fort Niagara, J.E. Woolford, artist, circa 1821. Fort Niagara, as seen from alongside a Canadian battery position located at Newark. (Below) The same view in 2012.
Library and Archives Canada, C-99561. and Library and Archives Canada, C-42570.
Initially considering Evans as an alarmist, General Brock later decided to take no chances and ordered the various positions around Queenston to be fully alert for an imminent attack. He also sought to increase his militia forces, although he had little confidence in their military value due to American sympathizers within their ranks:
The vast number of troops which have been added this day to the strong force previously collected on the opposite side convinces me, with other indications, that an attack is not far distant. I have in consequence directed every exertion to be made to complete the militia to two thousand men, but I fear I shall not be able to effect my object with willing, well-disposed characters. Were it not for the number of Americans in our ranks we might defy all their efforts against this part of the Province.[14]
— Major General Brock to Sir George Prevost, October 12, 1812
(Above): Fort Niagara, H. Slade, artist. This postwar view of Fort Niagara shows the garrison as it appeared during the war, with the roofs of the “French Castle” and blockhouses removed to facilitate the mounting of artillery. The main (riverside) gate of the fort from 1812–15 can be clearly seen, as can the (by then collapsing) perimeter picket walls. (Below) The same view in 2012.
From the American perspective, preparations for the crossing were not proceeding smoothly. First, although the invasion force of regulars had been supplemented with several regiments of New York State militia,*[15] the reality was that the Sixteenth N.Y. (Lieutenant Colonel Farrand Stranahan) and Seventeenth N.Y. (Lieutenant Colonel Thompson Mead) were almost entirely without ammunition, or even cartridge boxes to carry any ammunition. Furthermore, detachments of men from the Eighteenth N.Y. (Major John Morrison) and Twentieth N.Y. (Lieutenant Colonel Peter Allen) regiments were standing on their constitutional rights not to be used outside of the boundaries of the state, and refusing to cross into Canada. Second, while over sixty boats were within transportation range, only thirteen, each able to carry around twenty-five men, had been assembled to carry the troops across the river. In consequence, a shuttle service would be required to ferry the troops in waves, thus weakening the assault capability of the attackers. Third, what were conspicuous by their absence were the regular troops of Brigadier General Smyth. These units had begun their movement toward Lewiston, but had been turned back when the initial landing was cancelled. Now they were ordered by Smyth to remain at Buffalo. Finally, although a plan of embarkation had been devised, and was under the supervision of Lieutenant Colonel Solomon Van Rensselaer (a cousin to Stephen Van Rensselaer), the need for silence, coupled with the confusion of multiple units arriving in the darkness, led to a situation where the men of several companies from the Thirteenth Regiment simply loaded en masse, pushing aside many of the militia actually scheduled for the initial embarkation.