Upper Canada Preserved — War of 1812 6-Book Bundle. Richard Feltoe
was applied, BANG! went the gun. The ball struck where we intended. The British were so completely enveloped in smoke and dust that not one of them could be seen, but as soon as they could be, we found them running in every direction…. To complete the mortification on their part, we took off our chapeaux and gave them three cheers. When our officers made inquiries who had disobeyed orders, no one knew anything about it. They did not try very hard to find out…. Now as each party was waiting for the other, the restraint was removed. The next morning, the British opened upon us with long guns. The balls that went over our battery would take out our barracks, which were in the rear. They were built of poles, and before night not one pole was left upon the other….[2]
— Lieutenant Archer Galloway, New York Militia Artillery
The upper (southern) end of the Niagara River as it flows out from Lake Erie and the various military positions established in 1812.
Fortunately for the Americans, Prevost’s directives on maintaining a defensive posture, the temporary armistice, and the limited number of troops at his disposal compelled Brock to remain on his own side of the river, thus giving Van Rensselaer time to receive substantial reinforcements.*[3] Upon arrival, however, these new units found the local command structure in a shambles, as were the arrangements for accommodations, supplies of food, ammunition, weapons, and almost every other necessity of campaign life. As a result, increased levels of insubordination and dissatisfaction led to desertions and outbreaks of mutiny within the various regiments.
Brigadier General Alexander Smyth, the self-proclaimed military “expert” who made considerable contributions to the failures experienced by the American military on the Niagara frontier in 1812.
From the Conger Goodyear Manuscript Collection, Vol. 9. Courtesy of the Buffalo and Erie County Historical Society Research Library, Buffalo, NY.
Nor were things better at the top of the command structure as Quartermaster General Peter B. Porter and the local representative of the governor, Nicholas Gray, (both of whom were War Hawks and held political and personal animosity toward Van Rensselaer) repeatedly sought to undermine his authority. This schism was further widened when Brigadier General Alexander Smyth arrived at Buffalo in late September, with over 1,600 regular troops. Technically, Smyth was under the command of Van Rensselaer, and should have reported his arrival in person to his commanding officer. Instead, Smyth’s ego refused to acknowledge the authority of a militiaman over a regular and he defiantly set up a rival command headquarters of his own at Buffalo.
I had intended to have reported myself personally; but the conclusions I have drawn as to the interests of the service have determined me to stop at this place for the present … I am of the opinion that our crossing should be effected between Fort Erie and Chippawa. It has therefore seemed to me proper to encamp the U.S. troops near Buffalo, there to prepare for offensive operations.[4]
— Brigadier General Smyth to Major General Van Renssalaer, Buffalo, September 29, 1812
In the days that followed, Smyth repeatedly ignored Van Rensselaer’s calls for a conference with the other military commanders so as to decide how the campaign would be prosecuted, citing as his justification the superiority of his own judgement as to where the proposed invasion should occur. Nor was Van Rensselaer receiving any support from General Dearborn, who wrote several communications stressing the political expectations of Washington for a victory, while at the same time leaving no doubt that additional military assistance could not be expected in the near future. He also added the codicil that in the event of a British attack, Van Rensselaer should “be prepared to make good a secure retreat as the last resort.”[5] Little wonder then that Van Rensselaer replied with the following communication less than a week before the planned attack:
Our best troops are raw: many of them dejected by the distress their families suffer by their absence, and many have not necessary clothing…. The blow must be struck soon or all the toil and expense of the campaign will go for nothing; or worse than nothing, for the whole will be tinged with dishonour. With my present force it would be rash to attempt an offensive operation….[6]
Whether he thought an attack was rash or not, however, Van Rensselaer was left with little alternative but to continue planning his offensive and put on a brave face to his troops and commander. His initial plan was to
… immediately concentrate the regular force in the neighbourhood of Niagara, and the militia here; make the best possible dispositions, and, at the same time that the regulars shall pass from the Four Mile Creek to a point in the rear of Fort George, and take it by storm; I will pass the river here [Lewiston] and carry the heights of Queenston. Should we succeed, we shall effect a great discomfiture of the enemy, by breaking their line of communication, driving their shipping from the mouth of the river, leaving them no rallying point in this part of the country, appalling the minds of the Canadians, and opening a wide and safe communication for our supplies….[7]
However, this plan never progressed beyond the proposal stage as Smyth’s continued insubordinate attitude and refusal to submit to Van Rensselaer’s authority effectively restricted the planned expedition to that segment proposed for Queenston.
As the days passed, pressure mounted on Van Rensselaer, especially when news arrived from Buffalo of a small but significant American military success made on the night of October 8–9 by the capture of two British brigs, the Detroit (formerly the Adams, captured from the Americans at Detroit) and the Caledonia, both of which had just moored off Fort Erie, laden with weapons and prisoners from Brock’s victory at Detroit. The American boarding parties consisted of a combined force of regular soldiers (Fifth Regiment), volunteers from the Second Artillery Regiment, volunteers from the local Buffalo militias (under Dr. Cyrenius Chapin), and seamen (led by Lieutenant Jesse Elliot, USN).*[8]
The lower (northern) half of the Niagara River.
Around eight o’clock in the evening of the 8th, the boats, manned by the naval volunteers, left the Scajaquada Creek* and rowed upriver under the cover of the American shoreline and into the Buffalo Creek, where the volunteer troops embarked. However, upon setting off, the now heavily laden boats were unable to pass over the sandbar at the entrance of the creek. The only recourse was for the majority of the men to strip off their equipment and climb over the side, wade alongside the boats, and push them into the deeper water so they could re-board. Soaking wet and shivering with the cold, the only way the men were able to keep warm was by rowing for the next few hours as the boats slowly edged out into Lake Erie and passed entirely around the enemy vessels in order to come at them from the Fort Erie side of the lake. Approaching the Detroit and Caledonia in silence, the Americans were challenged and then fired on by the British crews. Rapidly coming alongside, the American troops swarmed aboard and, after a brief but intense hand-to-hand fight, overwhelmed the two ship’s crews. According to the later recollections of Lieutenant Roach (Second Artillery), a member of the boarding party attacking the Detroit:
In five minutes we were in possession and our prisoners driven below, and the hatchways secured. Some hands were sent aloft to loose the Topsails whilst I examined the Brig’s guns and found them loaded … I ordered them all hauled over to the starboard side … to be ready for an attack from the shore.