Upper Canada Preserved — War of 1812 6-Book Bundle. Richard Feltoe
within the ranks and senior subordinate officers actively making plans to stage a coup.
Reacting to the Americans retreat, Proctor ordered an advance of his own smaller forces beyond the Canard River and occupied Sandwich on August 12, 1813. He then set about constructing new artillery positions at the riverbank fronting Detroit that were subsequently armed with one 18-pounder, two 12-pounders, and two 5½-inch mortars. To man these works he assigned the first of the detachments of newly arrived reinforcements sent by Brock, men from the Norfolk Militia units at Long Point under Lieutenant George Ryerson. During this same period, although isolated from the scene of action and increasingly concerned about the paucity of intelligence and information that was reaching him at York, Major-General Brock was actively pursuing a policy of preparing to meet the American invasion with force. He had already effectively ignored Prevost’s previous orders on the need to act with circumspection, and now added to this by discounting a new dispatch informing him that Prevost was in the process of negotiating with General Dearborn for the implementation of an armistice.
Brock’s initial plan had been to mobilize all his forces of militia and Natives and march them to Amherstburg. However, the Six Nations Native tribes on the Grand River now declared their determination to remain neutral, while several units of the militia likewise refused to come forward as ordered. With a disturbingly sparse reserve of regular troops*[4] and only a half-hearted support from the provincial legislature, Brock was left with no choice but to mobilize the local Embodied Militia Regiments, who did turn out, and send what detachments he could forward to reinforce Proctor. Unfortunately, he did this without ensuring that he had the means to pay them, which greatly alarmed the army bureaucrats:
I have this morning received a letter from Deputy General Commissary Couche, which occasions me the greatest alarm, he informs me that Major General Brock has ordered out one-third of the Militia of Upper Canada / about 4000 men / and he begs to be informed in what manner they are to be paid. The expense attending this measure will be about fifteen thousand Pounds a month, a sum which it will be impracticable to find in that country. Nor have I the means of affording effectual assistance at this moment, and if the Militia are not regularly paid, great evil will ensue, indeed, Mr. Couche represents some symptoms of discontent have already appeared.[5]
— William Robinson, Commissary General’s Office to Sir George Prevost, July 30, 1812
Proroguing the Upper Canada Parliament on August 5th, Brock was encouraged to see that, heartened by the news of the capture of Michilimackinac, virtually the entire corps of the York militia had volunteered for action. However, including this force along with the regulars in an expedition to Amherstburg would leave the position at York effectively undefended. As a result, Brock only selected around one hundred men from this regiment to make the trip. He was also assisted in his plans by the arrival of two experienced senior regular officers from Lower Canada in the persons of Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Myers and Major General Roger H. Sheaffe. With these two available to take over the respective commands of quartermaster general and senior commander for the Niagara frontier, Brock now felt himself free to personally advance to Amherstburg to take command of whatever situation he found upon his arrival.
Departing York that same day, Brock and his composite force of some forty regulars (41st Regiment) and 240 militia set out to march overland the over seventy-five miles to Port Dover. Arriving there on August 8th, Brock personally addressed a gathering of over 500 local militiamen with such dynamism that, contrary to their earlier reluctance, the men volunteered en masse to follow Brock into battle. With only sufficient vessels to transport 400, however, Brock chose to sail down the lake with whatever force could be crammed into the barely seaworthy boats, while the remainder would begin the long march along the Talbot Road. Contending with atrocious weather, rough waters, and dangerous rock shoals, the small flotilla of boats eventually landed at Amherstburg on August 13, 1812.
Reviewing the captured documents from the Cuyahoga Packet, Brock was able to accurately assess the growing and widespread disaffection within the American army from a stash of private letters captured at the Brownstown engagement. These came from several senior officers within Hull’s corps of officers and gave clear indications of the weakness of the enemy. In response, General Brock, despite the reservations and advice of Proctor and St. George, entered into negotiations with Chief Tecumseh for a substantial counterattack on the American position at Detroit. Encouraged by Brock’s aggressive stance and keen to see the Americans defeated, Tecumseh agreed to the plan.
On August 14, Brock issued a general order that firstly congratulated Proctor, St. George, and the men of the militias who had remained steadfast in the defence of their colony, while secondly expressing surprise at those of the militias who had deserted their duties. He then directed that all absentees immediately return to the colours or face the prospect of being punished according to the rules outlined in the new Militia Act passed earlier in the year.
Meanwhile on the American side of the river, General Hull, well aware of the growing groundswell of opposition and even the conspiracy against him, was restrained from moving against its chief plotters by the threat of it precipitating an open mutiny by the entire army. Instead, he detailed the two senior-ranking conspirators, Colonel Duncan McArthur and Colonel Lewis Cass, both of the Ohio State militia, to take a force of over 350 men and march by a circuitous inland route to link up with the supply convoy. Coincidentally, both armies began their respective operations at dawn the following day. As a result, the American’s lost their most aggressive commanders and a sizeable body of troops, while the British, further reinforced by detachments that had just completed the exhausting march overland from Long Point, advanced on Sandwich. By sunset of the 15th, the American detachment was some twenty-four miles away, while the British were looking across the Detroit River as their already emplaced artillery began a bombardment of the American troop encampments at Detroit. Also during the course of that day, General Brock sent an ultimatum to Hull calling for his surrender and using a carrot and stick address to reinforce his position:
The force at my disposal authorises me to require of you the immediate surrender of Detroit. It is far from my intention to join in a war of extermination, but you must be aware of that the numerous body of Indians who have attached themselves to my troops will be beyond control the moment the contest commences. You will find me disposed to enter into such conditions as will satisfy the most scrupulous sense of honour … that will lead to any unnecessary effusion of blood.[6]
Faced with this threat, Hull replied with a seemingly brave and defiant rebuff:
I have received your letter of this date. I have no other reply to make, than to inform you that I am prepared to meet any force which may be at your disposal, and any consequences which may result from any exertion of it you may think proper to make.[7]
At the same time he sent urgent orders for McArthur and Cass to immediately march back to defend Detroit, and placed his Detroit garrison on full alert for an imminent British attack. Before dawn on August 16, 1812, six hundred of Brock’s Native allies crossed the Detroit River and landed at Spring Wells, three miles south of Detroit, to secure a landing ground. Shortly thereafter, a flotilla of small boats containing Brock’s main force of some 330 regulars, 400 militia, and five cannon made their own crossing, all under the protective screen of ships from the Provincial Marine department.*[8] Seeking to further magnify the apparent strength of his small invasion force, Brock had previously directed that as many of the militia as possible were to be issued cast-off or spare regular redcoat uniforms to make them look like “real” soldiers to the Americans. Landing unopposed and forming their column-of-march, Brock received intelligence that some of McArthur and Cass’s troops were only three miles to his south. Faced with the prospect of being caught in a vice between two enemy forces, Brock would have been entirely justified in retreating