Upper Canada Preserved — War of 1812 6-Book Bundle. Richard Feltoe
comparison, the American war effort, while getting off to a bad start, had the strategic advantage of being waged on its own continent. Furthermore, despite logistical difficulties and equally poor roads, each of the fronts could be supplied with men and equipment by several distinct and relatively secure routes. In addition, the larger base population, coupled with a relatively strong industrial and agricultural sector, provided the resources needed to supply the armies on an ongoing and timely basis. Having gone to the trouble of declaring war, the American administration naturally looked to its military to supply it with victories to justify its action.
Unfortunately, these American laurels were not to appear for some time, as General Henry Dearborn found that his goal for an immediate four-pronged assault on the Canadas was stalled before it had even begun. His proposed main thrust (toward Montreal from Albany) failed to recruit men; while the New England states of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island refused outright to acknowledge the national call to arms and raised the question of seceding from the Union rather than have their men “dragged out of the State to fight Indians or die before the walls of Quebec.”[1] Further inland, his planned second thrust (from Sackets Harbor against Kingston) was woefully short of weapons and ammunition, thus preventing any significant offensive from that base for some time. It was therefore up to Dearborn’s commanders on the Niagara and Detroit frontiers, respectively Major General Stephen Van Rensselaer and Brigadier General William Hull, to press the American cause. Of the two, it was General Hull, who was also the governor of the Michigan Territory, who made the first move.
THE DETROIT CAMPAIGN,
JULY TO AUGUST 1812
Even before war had been declared, the Detroit frontier, although the most isolated of the potential war zones, had been given particular attention by the military planners of both Britain and the United States. As early as February 1812, General Brock had set down his “Plans for the Defence of Canada.” In this memorandum he outlined the vital need to secure the alliance of as many of the First Nations tribes as possible to counteract the American advantages of men and logistics. To this end, Michilamackinac was to be seized, followed by the forwarding of as many troops as could be spared from York and the Niagara to commence a direct offensive from Amherstburg against Detroit. By these bold thrusts and hopefully quick victories, Brock hoped to secure the Native tribes as allies of the Crown. In support of this, Brock made a flying visit to Amherstburg from June 14–17, 1812. While he brought supplies and around a hundred reinforcements for the post, he also paid particular attention to solidifying the tacit pact between the Native leaders and himself. He even went so far as to commit himself and his government to press for the establishment of a formal Native homeland that would act as a buffer zone between the two expansionist nations following a successful conclusion of the war.
The “Detroit frontier” in 1812.
From Major John Richardson, Richardson’s War of 1812, 1842.
In a similar fashion, the United States took steps before war became a reality to bolster their military position on the Detroit frontier. On May 25, General Hull was in Dayton, Ohio, massing his regular and militia forces for an expedition to reinforce the small garrison at Detroit, some two hundred miles (340 kilometres) away. By July 1, unaware of the declaration of war, Hull’s army was at the Maumee Rapids, where he decided to lighten his baggage train by placing a portion of his equipment and supplies, as well as his own personal baggage and correspondence, onboard the Cuyahoga Packet. The intention being that they would be waiting for him when he and his army completed the journey along the shore. The next day word of the declaration of war arrived, but it was too late to prevent the capture of the Cuyahoga Packet and the vital stash of military paperwork by the British. Hastening on, Hull’s army of around 2,500 men arrived at Detroit on July 6 and immediately set about strengthening the post’s defences, while equally making preparations to conduct an offensive campaign against Fort Amherstburg, some fourteen miles (22.4 kilometres) downriver from Detroit and on the other side of the river in Upper Canada. Commanding that small garrison was Lieutenant Colonel Thomas St. George (63rd Regiment), a sixty-year-old veteran soldier of the European wars. Under his command, including the latest reinforcements, he only had around 250 regular troops. In addition, while there were, on paper, at least 600 Essex and Kent County Embodied Militia that could be called upon, most were, at best, half-hearted in their enthusiasms. Finally, there were the crews of the various vessels stationed at Amherstburg and around two hundred Native warriors under the command of Tecumseh.
On July 12th, 1812, an American invasion force of between 1,500 and 2,000 men (depending on whose account you read) crossed the Detroit River, landing a little above the village of Sandwich (Windsor). Despite the fact that there were some four hundred Canadian militia detailed to defend that position, backed by small detachments of regulars and artillery, nothing was done to oppose the landings, as the militia made it clear that if they were attacked they would retire, with or without orders! Left with no alternative and hoping to maintain some kind of fighting force, St. George ordered the withdrawal of all troops toward Amherstburg and the destruction of the bridges across the various creeks. The way was now open for a dynamic thrust by the Americans that would secure the entire western end of the province and provide Washington with its demanded victory. Instead, apart from sending out reconnaissance patrols as far south as the Canard River, and a large foraging (looting) expedition up the line of the Thames River, Hull ordered his army into a defensive posture around the village of Sandwich, still within sight of Detroit. To confirm his victory, he then sent out copies of a bombastic proclamation to espouse his role as the liberator of Upper Canada:
Inhabitants of Canada! After thirty years of Peace and prosperity, the United States have been driven to Arms. The injuries and aggressions, the insults and indignities have once more left them no alternative but manly resistance or unconditional submission. The army under my command has invaded your country and the standard of the United States waves on the territory of Canada. To the peaceable unoffending inhabitants, it brings neither danger nor difficulty. I come to find enemies not make them, I come to protect you not injure you…. You have felt [Great Britain’s] tyranny, you have seen her injustice, but I do not ask you to avenge the one or redress the other. The United States are sufficiently powerful to afford you every security … I tender you the invaluable blessings of Civil, Political, & Religious Liberty….[2]
On the other hand, he also warned of extreme retaliation if those loyal to the Crown took up arms or fought alongside the Natives, who were to be particularly targeted for imminent destruction.
I have a force which will look down all opposition and that force is but the vanguard of a much greater. If contrary to your own interest & the just expectation of my country, you should take part in the approaching contest, you will be considered and treated as enemies and the horrors and calamities of war will stalk before you. If the barbarous … savages are let loose to murder our citizens and butcher our women and children, this war will be a war of extermination…. No white man found fighting by the side of an Indian will be taken prisoner. Instant destruction will be his lot…. The United States offer you Peace, Liberty, and Security your choice lies between these and War, Slavery, and Destruction. Choose then, but choose wisely….[3]
Hull’s failure to advance with his decisive superiority of numbers was later decried as wanton cowardice by some historians, and it must be conceded that the man was strongly beset by indecision and doubts on the way to press his campaign. But beyond this he was confounded by the fact that in addition to chronic shortages of supplies and military equipment, his command was anything but unified. In fact, prior to the commencement of the invasion, several units of U.S. State militias had stood upon their constitutional and legal rights to only serve within the borders of the United States and had refused to cross the river. In addition, internecine rivalry between his junior commanders and questions of rank and privilege between the regular army and militia officers had turned Hull’s force into a collection of feuding