Upper Canada Preserved — War of 1812 6-Book Bundle. Richard Feltoe
campaign into enemy territory.
During the next two weeks, U.S. outposts and pickets along the Canard River frequently skirmished with their British counterparts, with small numbers of casualties being recorded on both sides; but, beyond a moderate probe of the British line on the Canard on July 16th, the Americans made no serious effort to advance or attack Amherstburg. Even so, the initial invasion and ongoing presence and threat of the Americans caused nearly half of the Canadian militia at Amherstburg to desert to their homes or worse, to offer a promise of refusing to do military service if the Americans attacked. However, by July 25 this ongoing lack of offensive enemy action was enough to encourage a number of Native warriors to ambush an American outpost, inflicting several casualties. Instead of causing the Americans to renew their offensive, this minor incident prompted the invaders to withdraw their outposts north and concentrate their strength at their main lines around Sandwich.
Surprised and pleased with this event, St. George recognized that he was still significantly outnumbered and outgunned and that any direct military confrontation or conflict would inevitably result in the entire destruction of his command. He therefore decided to await further developments and remain at Amherstburg. The following day, General Brock’s second-in command, Colonel Henry Proctor, arrived from his previous post as senior officer on the Niagara frontier. Taking command of operations on the Detroit frontier, Proctor did not bring a significant number of additional troops or supplies, but he did bring a definite change in how future military activities were undertaken in the face of the American invasion. Reviewing the strategic and tactical situation with St. George, Proctor concurred that an all-out frontal assault on the Americans would be futile and probably catastrophic without substantial reinforcements. He therefore sent dispatches to General Brock, calling for an immediate concentration of all available regular and militia forces on the Detroit frontier and a subsequent campaign against the invaders. In the meantime, he sought to revive the morale and fighting spirit of his militias and Native allies by undertaking a show of offensive aggression. Having already learned from Hull’s captured papers that the U.S. troops were short of supplies and that a large supply convoy was on its way north from the River Raisin, Proctor looked to strike at his enemy where he was weakest — behind their lines on the U.S. side of the river.
Battles of Brownston and Maguaga, August 1812
Sending across a small composite force of around one hundred regulars and militia, under the command of Captain Adam Muir (41st Regiment), Proctor looked to cut off Hull’s lines of communications and possibly intercept the approaching convoy. Supporting this force were a body of Native warriors, led by Tecumseh, who initially moved south and located the expected convoy before returning and blockading the road that the convoy would have to follow. Learning of this British movement from a Canadian deserter, Hull countered by sending over two hundred Ohio State militia, commanded by Major Thomas Van Horne, with orders to link up with the convoy and escort it through to Detroit. On the morning of August 5, 1812, this relief force was marching through a section of thick woodland at the ford crossing Brownstown Creek, some fifteen miles south of Detroit. Enveloped by a thick fog, they failed to perceive their danger until it was too late when they were aggressively attacked by Tecumseh’s warriors. In a matter of moments, the Americans were routed for a recorded loss of some seventeen killed and twelve wounded, while the Natives suffered only one man killed. Fleeing back to Detroit, the militiamen brought with them exaggerated tales that the British had landed large bodies of troops behind the American lines and had now cut off all communications and hope of supplies to Hull’s army. A fiction, but one that was readily believed and only added to General Hull’s already growing list of bad news. These items included:
Reports that several of the Native tribes’ were shifting in their attitudes from maintaining a cowed neutrality to becoming a potential or actual aggressive enemy force.
Word that the relief column was now refusing to advance until a strong escort and guarantee of safe passage could be provided.
News of the fall of Michilimackinac from the lips of its own garrison commander.
An intercepted communication from the Northwest Company post at Fort William claiming (falsely or mistakenly) that there were a potential five thousand Native warriors ready to come to the aid of the British from that quarter.
Despite these concerns, Hull continued making preparations for a major advance and assault on Amherstburg. On August 7 the final straw arrived in the form of news that General Brock was making active efforts to forward troops from Niagara and that one formation was already sailing up from Fort Erie.
In response, Hull entirely abandoned his plans for any further offensive actions. Thus, apart from a detachment of around 150 troops left behind to garrison a single fortification on the east bank, he ordered the entire evacuation of the remainder of his army from Upper Canada. During that night and following morning, a near-mutinous American army withdrew to Detroit, while Hull came under a storm of protest and criticism from his more aggressively minded regimental commanders. Seeking to re-establish his line of communications as his first priority, Hull ordered a new expedition be made by Lieutenant Colonel James Miller with over six hundred troops and two pieces of artillery. This force marched from Detroit on August 8th, passing the unburied corpses of the Brownstown rout the following day. Waiting a few miles further south, Captain Muir’s far smaller force of some 150 regulars, fifty men from the Essex Embodied Militia Regiment, and two hundred Native warriors looked to repeat their earlier victory.
Late in the afternoon fighting began between the advanced pickets of both forces. This quickly escalated as the Americans pressed their advantage of numbers and used their disciplined firepower to maintain pressure on the British line, while successfully driving back the Native incursions on their flank. This was reflected on the British side by a series of tactical errors, when one flank of the British regular force mistakenly retreated instead of advancing, leaving the remainder of the line in serious danger of being outflanked and surrounded. In addition, a detachment of regular troops that had only been added to Muir’s force that day mistook the Native allies for Americans and fired upon them. This precipitated a lengthy round of friendly fire between the two groups and inflicted a number of casualties upon both units. With the Americans pressing aggressively through the centre, thus splitting the British and Native force in two, the British position soon became untenable. In response, a seriously wounded Captain Muir was forced to order a retreat to the boats at the riverbank and a return to Amherstburg.
Despite having achieved a military victory at what the Americans later called the Battle of Monguagon (in British accounts, Maguaga) and successfully opened the lines of communication once more, Miller made no serious effort to press on to link up with the vital supply column. Instead, claiming the loss of most of his men’s backpacks and rations to Native pilfering during the course of the fighting, he kept his force encamped at the battlefield under a succession of days of torrential rain that reduced the roadway to a quagmire of mud. Nor did things improve when Hull sent a small relief-convoy of boats — that brought only a single day’s rations for Miller’s men. Furthermore this flotilla of nine boats was subsequently intercepted and captured by the British during its return trip upriver, leaving Miller believing that his force could be attacked from both the front and rear. Finally, mud-caked, hungry, and exhausted, Miller’s column marched back into Detroit with nothing but the moral claim of a victory to their credit, as once again the British were monitoring the southern road and the supply convoy had been told by Hull to abandon any further attempt to advance until it was provided with a suitable escort.
Thoroughly alarmed at his deteriorating situation, General Hull ordered the small detachment still remaining in Upper Canada to abandon their position on the 11th. For those Upper Canada citizens and deserting militiamen who had previously welcomed or actively assisted the invaders, their future looked dire as they were certain to be singled out for retribution by their Loyalist neighbours or even charged with treason. In consequence, while some collected their families, abandoned their homes, and fled to the U.S. east bank, others decamped into the interior of Upper Canada, to continue their opposition to the Crown as renegades and officially denounced traitors. Opposition to Hull’s continued command of the U.S. “Northwest Army” now erupted in full force within his already divided command, with letters and petitions for his removal