Upper Canada Preserved — War of 1812 6-Book Bundle. Richard Feltoe
great influence which the vast number of settlers from the United States possess over the decisions of the Lower House, is truly alarming, and ought by every practical means to be diminished….[9]
Similarly, the Upper Canada militias, which although officially listing some 11,000 men of eligible age for military duty in the event of war, were of such a poor quality and in some cases of dubious loyalty that Prevost stated, “… it might not be prudent to arm more than 4000.”[10] Instead, it was recognized that the future security of Upper Canada might depend upon the tenuous alliance of the Native tribes to the British cause. Unfortunately, here too there was a lack of unity amongst the Native nations on the desirability to aggressively pursue a war. In the upper lakes region the western tribes of the Sioux, Winnebagos, and Menominis were fervent in their desire to revenge themselves for the recent incursions of Americans into their territories. On the other hand, on the Niagara frontier the bands of the Six Nations around the Grand River were far more reluctant to go to war, and even withheld any official promise of future assistance to the British cause if the Americans attacked. Their only offer of support came by approving the use of individual warriors volunteering to act with their British allies.
CHAPTER 3
The Opening Round, June to August 1812
Following the official public declaration of war in Washington on June 19, 1812, events began to occur at an increasing pace as notices were dispatched to the frontiers by a series of messengers. Unfortunately for the Americans, although editorials on the imminence of war had filled the pages of the nation’s newspapers for months, once it began the more efficient British communications network notified their distant garrisons before their American counterparts had heard the news. This led to the opportunity for enterprising British and Canadian troops to engage in some pre-emptive strikes. For example, on June 29, at the eastern end of Upper Canada, a detachment of militia stationed at Prescott saw eight U.S. vessels passing upriver on the St. Lawrence, headed for Lake Ontario. Using a number of bateaux and longboats, the detachment chased the American vessels, intercepting them near Elizabethtown (later renamed Brockville). The schooners Sophia and Island Packet were boarded, captured, and subsequently burnt, while the remaining six American boats fled back to their base at Ogdensburg, becoming prisoners in their own port. In a similar fashion, on June 27, two longboats filled with around forty militiamen and regulars from Fort Erie were able to intercept the schooner Connecticut as it set sail on Lake Erie from Buffalo for Detroit. While at the other end of that lake, men from the Provincial Marine, accompanied by six soldiers from Fort Amherstburg (also known as Fort Malden), used a longboat to pursue, catch, and board the American schooner Cuyahoga Packet. Taking the vessel into the harbour at Amherstburg, they found that not only had they captured a detachment of thirty American troops, but also a cargo of food, medical supplies, entrenching tools, and baggage. This material had only been put on board the vessel the previous day and was part of a consignment accompanying Brigadier General William Hull’s army in its march from Dayton, Ohio, to garrison Detroit. While the supplies were a welcome addition to the depleted reserves of the British force, the captors also discovered that they had gained a huge intelligence coup in the form of a chest containing Hull’s entire personal and official correspondence. This included instructions for General Hull from the American secretary of war, the muster rolls of manpower for his command, and a complete set of lists detailing the quantities of ammunition, arms, and other supplies accompanying the army in its march to Detroit.
Brigadier General William Hull (artist unknown). The American commander at the fall of Detroit — the first of many military failures for the American war effort in 1812.
From the Conger Goodyear Manuscript Collection, Vol. 9. Courtesy of the Buffalo and Erie County Historical Society Research Library, Buffalo, NY.
Further north, the isolated garrison at St. Joseph Island, located at the head of Lake Huron, learned of the declaration of war on July 8. The garrison’s commander, Captain Charles Roberts (10th Veteran Battalion) acted immediately by organizing a lightning pre-emptive strike against the far more strategically advantageous and militarily superior American base of Fort Michilimackinac (also referred to at the time and known today as Fort Mackinac) some forty-five miles away. On the morning of July 16th, Roberts set sail in a small flotilla of longboats and canoes with a combined force of regulars, militia, and Natives, amounting to about 630 men. The following morning, before daylight, the attack force landed undetected at the northern end of Mackinac Island. Forming a column from his few regular and militia troops, Roberts flanked this force with his two large contingents of Native warriors. While at the rear, a number of men manhandled the single antique 6-pounder artillery piece that had been brought along to assault the American fortifications.
The American fortifications at the island of Michilimackinac [Mackinac]
From Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812 (artist unknown)..
Advancing along the narrow track that led to the fort, the infantry and Natives deployed into their separate battle formations, while the artillerists dragged the small cannon to a nearby piece of high ground that overlooked the fort. With his forces in place, Captain Roberts sent a note to the American garrison commander, Lieutenant Porter Hanks (U.S. Artillery), demanding the immediate and unconditional surrender of the American position. Unaware of the formal onset of war, unprepared and facing a strong enemy force, Hanks’ command officially consisted of only around sixty men. Of this small number, several men were sick, while many of the remainder were relatively elderly or otherwise considered unfit for active service. As a result, with no real alternative before him, Hanks surrendered the strategic position without a shot being fired. Tactically this victory was of only minor value, but strategically it swung the balance of power in the upper Great Lakes by securing the alliance of the western Native nations to the British war effort. It also had a decisive effect on the subsequent events that were to unfold on the Detroit frontier.
Back on the Niagara frontier, the American forces were also caught off guard. According to local folklore, when the notice of the declaration of war was delivered to Fort George the officers of the British garrison were entertaining their opposite numbers from Fort Niagara at a dinner in the officers’ mess. In a show of courtesy, the American officers were not immediately interred. Instead, the dinner was concluded with loyal toasts and expressions that a similar dinner would be held following the termination of hostilities. Following the meal the American officers were permitted to return to Fort Niagara, there to prepare for war to commence the following day.
Fort George, E. Walsh, artist, circa 1805. The parade ground and officer’s mess at Fort George in the pre-war period. (Below): A 2012 view of the reconstructed officer’s mess in the National Historic site of Fort George at Niagara-on-the-Lake.
Courtesy of the Clement Library, University of Michigan.
Despite gaining these minor victories, the fact remained that the British military position in Upper Canada was precarious at best. Britain was fully committed to the war in Europe and consequently had little in the way of resources that could be spared for the North Americas. Nor could the colonial economies provide the necessary agricultural or manufactured supplies needed to sustain the war effort on their own. Even where supplies were forthcoming, they had to be transported along a long and tenuous transportation network that was constantly open to being attacked or cut by enemy action. In view of these difficulties, securing and defending the vital lifeline of the St. Lawrence River, Niagara frontier, and Detroit River corridor became a top priority in the military planning of successive British commanders in Upper Canada. Unfortunately, each in his turn had to deal with Sir George Prevost, who was seemingly willing to entirely abandon Upper Canada so that he could keep the bulk of his supplies and manpower in Lower Canada, “just in case” of an attack against