Upper Canada Preserved — War of 1812 6-Book Bundle. Richard Feltoe
of age. Nor were matters much better at the level of district and regimental commanders, as most had little or no actual military experience other than their ceremonial and depot duties in the pre-war period.
General Henry Dearborn, (artist unknown) the senior American general at the commencement of the war. He was a veteran political appointee and relic of the Revolutionary conflict of nearly forty years previous.
Courtesy of the Buffalo and Erie County Historical Society Research Library, Buffalo, NY.
Sir … I take the command of the troops at Black Rock and its vicinity in obedience to Your Excellency’s order with the greatest diffidence, having no experience of actual service. My knowledge of the military art is limited; indeed, I forsee numberless difficulties and occurrences which will present to which I feel totally inadequate. I have been ambitious that the regiment and brigade which I have commanded should be distinguished at their reviews, but I confess myself ignorant of even the minor duties of the duty you have assigned me, and I am apprehensive that I may not only expose myself but my Government. Any aid which Your Excellency may think proper to order will be received with thanks. A military secretary intimately acquainted with the details of camp duty would be of great service to me …[6]
— Brigadier General William Wadsworth to New York State Governor Tompkins, June 28, 1812
On the other hand, if the United States was in no position to begin a war, the Crown colonies of British North America were in no better shape to defend against one. Canada, except as a name, did not exist, while British North America was not a unified country. Instead, it was a collection of individual colonies, each with its own governmental body and different attitudes toward the prospect of conducting a war with the United States. Furthermore, its population was not only dispersed over a huge geographical area, but was also far smaller than that of the U.S. Estimates place the population of the combined colonies of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Lower and Upper Canada at less than 500,000, while that of the United States was in excess of 7.5 million. Of this 500,000, Upper Canada had less than 77,000 settlers, of which only around 9–10,000 were on the Niagara frontier. Secondly, in the event of war, while the British army had an official complement of some 10,000 regular and provincial or “Fencible” troops stationed within British North America,*[7] the dominance of defensive military thinking meant that securing Halifax, Quebec, and Montreal used up almost 80 percent of the available troops, artillery, ammunition, and supplies. By contrast, Upper Canada was defended by little more than 1,200 officers and men, scattered along a defensive frontier of over 1,000 miles. Repeated pleas for additional manpower and supplies for the defence of Upper Canada, sent by Upper Canada’s senior military commander, Major General Isaac Brock, were refused or excused away by his superior, Sir George Prevost, as being impossible to accomplish or threatening the security of the Lower colonies.
Instead, following the directives emanating from England to maintain a defensive posture and minimize the need for troops and supplies in the Canadian colonies, Prevost withheld these vital resources from Upper Canada and considered the region as expendable to the greater war effort. He also handicapped his military commanders with the following instructions:
My sentiments respecting the mode of conducting the war on our part … [must be] suited to the existing circumstances, and as they change so must we vary our line of conduct, adapting it to our means of preserving entire the King’s Provinces … Our numbers would not justify offensive operations being taken, unless they were solely calculated to strengthen a defensive attitude … I consider it prudent and politic to avoid any measure which can in its effect have a tendency to unite the people in the American States…. Whilst division prevails among them, their attempts on these Provinces will be feeble, it is therefore our duty carefully to avoid committing any act which may, even by construction, tend to unite the Eastern and Southern States, unless by its perpetration we are to derive a considerable and important advantage….
— Sir George Prevost, Montreal,
July 10, 1812.[8]
Major General Sir Isaac Brock K.B., G.T. Berthon, artist, circa 1883. In 1812, Isaac Brock held the cumulative titles of senior military commander for Upper Canada, lieutenant-governor of Upper Canada and president of the Upper Canada Executive Council. News of his knighthood only arrived in Canada following his death.
Archives Ontario, Acc. 694158.
Sir George Prevost, S.W. Reynolds, artist, date unknown. Appointed governor-in-chief and commander-in-chief of the British forces in British North America in 1811, Sir George proved to be an able civil and political administrator. Unfortunately, his on-field military command capabilities were not as strong. Following flawed decisions made during the Plattsburg campaign of 1814, he was recalled to England at the end of the war to face a court martial inquiry. He died a month before the inquiry began.
Library and Archives Canada, C-19123.
A constraint that Brock fortunately chose to interpret with a large degree of flexibility when it came to his course of action over the next few months.
Nor did Brock receive any significant assistance from the local provincial legislature, which was salted with several actively pro-American sympathizers. This situation had arisen during the period following the colonial rebellion of the American eastern seaboard states in 1776. At that time the population of the thirteen colonies had become divided into what were termed “Rebels” (who sided with those fighting for independence in what became known as the American Revolution), and “Loyalists” (who had fought for the king). With the victory of the rebels and the creation of the United States of America, the postwar punitive measures (including property seizures and revocation of civil liberties, rights of property, employment, and legal standing, not to mention mob violence and lynchings) that were heaped upon the Loyalists forced huge numbers of individuals and families to become homeless refugees. For the British government, the plight of the Loyalists required some form of recompense. In response, large tracts of land were granted to Loyalists in the undeveloped regions of its Canadian colonies, including Upper Canada, in particular along the Niagara frontier. As a result, during the last decade of the eighteenth century, while many waterside areas saw varying degrees of clearing and settlement by these transplanted refugees, the interior of the region still remained relatively untouched. However, during the following years, increasing numbers of Americans also arrived and took up residence, bringing with them their republican sentiments. This new pro-American influx naturally generated resentment within the established communities of the old Loyalist families and their descendants, and effectively split the population into rival political camps. It also created security problems for the limited number of British regular military forces detailed to defend the border against any future American aggression. Numerous letters and reports by successive lieutenant governors of Upper Canada recorded their unease at the increasing influence and dissenting opinions of that sector of the population who maintained that their allegiance was to the United States, not the king, and who considered the annexation of Upper Canada by the United States as merely a matter of time, or opportunity.
Now, with war in the offing, these near-traitors, in the opinion of Brock and his military subordinates, were taking every opportunity to block any legislation or expenditure designed to improve the defences of the colony. In a letter to Sir George Prevost, penned on February 25, 1812, Brock commented:
I had every reason to expect the almost unanimous support of the two branches of the Legislature to every measure the Government thought necessary to recommend; but after a short trial I found myself egregiously mistaken