Upper Canada Preserved — War of 1812 6-Book Bundle. Richard Feltoe
otherwise known as “The Prophet.” In response, Governor William H. Harrison of the Indiana Territory instigated a military campaign that resulted in the defeat and destruction of the Native alliance at the Battle of Tippecanoe (November 7, 1811). From this point on, many of the surviving Native tribes became the deadly enemy of the United States and saw any potential enemy of the new republic as an ally to be secured.
The Shawnee War Chief, Tecumseh (Leaping Panther). Artist unknown. The lynchpin of the Native alliance opposing the westward expansion of the Americans in the pre-war period, he was also a crucial element in Upper Canada’s defense during the War of 1812. He was killed in action against the Americans at Moraviantown, Upper Canada, in October 1813.
From Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812.
The potential for conflict between Great Britain and the United States deepened in 1810, when American congressional elections resulted in the election of several vehemently anti-British representatives. Later styled “War Hawks,” these politicians quickly gained control of several prominent administrative committees. They also pushed through a series of measures that could be interpreted as being deliberately aimed at creating an atmosphere of crisis that would bring about a declaration of war against Great Britain. Using the claim of “Free Trade and Sailors Rights” as their basis for complaint, they manipulated public opinion by making inflammatory speeches and publishing vitriolic editorials in the nation’s press. At the same time, if anyone questioned or opposed their position, they were immediately stigmatized with accusations of being subversive or even traitorous in their actions. As a result, the War Hawks successfully marginalized the conflict issues with France and characterized Britain, led by Spencer Perceval (holding the dual roles of prime minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer), as a villainous bully that needed to be taught a lesson.
Such was the depth of anti-British rhetoric within the American legislative assembly that
Peter B. Porter, a leading War Hawk from Buffalo, New York, and chairman of the Committee of Foreign Relations, was able to openly state on December 6, 1811:
The Committee … were satisfied … that all hopes of accommodating our differences with Great Britain by negotiation must be abandoned … the Orders in Council … ought to be resisted by war…. That we can contend with Great Britain openly and even handed on the element where she injures us, it would be folly to pretend. Were it even within our power to build a navy which should be able to cope with her, no man who has any regard for the happiness of the people of this country would venture to advise such a measure … but, Mr. P. said, there was another point where we could attack her, and where she would feel our power more sensibly. We could deprive her of her extensive provinces lying along our borders to the north. These provinces were not only immensely valuable in themselves, but almost indispensable to the existence of Great Britain, cut off as she now is in a great measure from the north of Europe…. In short, it was the determination of the committee to recommend open and decided war — a war as vigorous and effective as the resources of the country and the relative situation of ourselves and our enemy would enable us to prosecute.[2]
However, despite every effort to create a unified national cry for war against Great Britain, the War Hawks found that when matters finally came to a formal vote for the declaration of war in 1812, the United States was still anything but united in its position. Divided by party politics, there were also strong regional opinions for and against a war. For example, the northeastern seaboard states (Massachusetts [including Maine], Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, and Delaware), rejected war in the Congressional vote of June 4, 1812, and submitted formal petitions of objection to the president. On the other hand, the inland states of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio voted in favour, backed by New Hampshire, Vermont, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. Similarly, the Senate was divided in its vote of June 17, 1812. Faced with this national division, President James Madison initially hesitated to sign the bill. However, when news arrived that a lone gunman had assassinated Prime Minister Spencer Perceval in the House of Commons on May 11, and that the British government was consequently in a state of turmoil, President Madison moved quickly and signed the declaration of war on June 18, 1812.
U.S. President James Madison (artist unknown) signed the declaration of war against Great Britain on June 18, 1812.
Courtesy of the Buffalo and Erie County Historical Society Research Library, Buffalo, NY.
If the American nation was not politically united in its desire for war, neither was it militarily ready to press its point by force of arms. Despite the fact that Congress had taken the president’s earlier request for the raising of 10,000 regulars and 50,000 militia (November 1811) and expanded it to read 25,000 regulars, 50,000 militia, and additional funding of $10 million, it could not simply make these troops appear on the battlefield. Grandiose claims of an instant victory once war was begun were made by people like Congressman Henry Clay, “… it is absurd to suppose we shall not succeed in our enterprize against the enemy’s provinces … I am not for stopping at Quebec, or anywhere else, but I would take the whole continent from them and ask them no favors…. I wish never to see a peace till we do,”[3] and Secretary of War William Eustis, “We can take the Canada’s without soldiers; we have only to send officers into the provinces, and the people, disaffected towards their own government, will rally round our standard,”[4] were flights of fancy, geared to grab the newspaper headlines. In reality, despite the prospect of war having been prophesied and called for since 1807, the U.S. military supply and distribution system was a total shambles and completely incapable of making or moving the vast amounts of materiel required on the frontiers to prosecute a successful offensive campaign:
The keeper of the stores will not part with cannon, muskets, ammunition, or other articles, without the order of his superior officer. General Dearborn has requested me to order out the Militia … and informs me that the Quartermaster General will supply camp equipage for them. Upon application to the Quartermaster General, who is now in Albany, I find there is no camp equipage except a few tents and about sixty camp kettles which have been in our arsenal at this place for several years. For the delivery of even these I cannot obtain a written order. The Deputy Quartermaster General will not give an order for their delivery without written directions from the Quartermaster General and the Quartermaster General does not seem willing to give such written directions … although he is perfectly willing I should have the articles. Under such circumstances, I shall presume to take possession of them at my own hazard and shall accordingly forward them to-morrow morning, hoping that my proceedings on the emergency will be approved and confirmed.[5]
— New York State Governor, Daniel D. Tompkins to Secretary of War William Eustis, June 27, 1812
The official account of having some twenty-five regiments of regular infantry, four of artillery, two of cavalry, and one of rifles, for an impressive total of over 35,000 regular troops, translated into a reality of nearer 13,000 men, scattered across the entire country and made up primarily of untrained and barely outfitted raw recruits. Similarly, the springtime call for the mustering of the state militias had been a resounding failure, with many units fielding more officers than men. Furthermore, even where units had assembled, few were in a position to conduct a war in any coherent fashion as long as they were led by officers who saw their military service principally as a platform for their own political advancement (and, conversely, as an opportunity to undermine any officer who was also a political rival). Finally, since senior appointments to the command and staff of the army were the individual prerogative of the president, he chose to rely heavily upon aging and sometimes infirm veterans of the revolution to lead the army. For example, the “first major general” of the United States Army, Henry Dearborn, was no less than sixty-one years old, while his fellow