Upper Canada Preserved — War of 1812 6-Book Bundle. Richard Feltoe
the fort. Most dangerously, however, was the impact of a hot-shot on the roof of the fort’s powder magazine. Piercing the roof’s metal covering, the red-hot ball lodged within the wooden beams of the roof and began to burn its way through toward the large quantities of black powder below, threatening a devastating explosion. In response, many of the small number of troops left behind to guard the garrison made a quick exit through the fort’s gate and headed for the cover of the nearby woods. Ignoring the danger, however, Captain Henry M. Vigoureux (Royal Engineers) and a handful of men clambered up onto the smouldering building and proceeded to tear away at the roofing to expose the shot. Creating a bucket chain, Vigoureux and his valiant crew doused the rising fires and extracted the still-warm cannonball, thus saving the fort from destruction. While at Fort Erie, once news reached the fort of the American attack at Queenston, the riverside batteries were ordered to begin a bombardment of the enemy positions in an effort to prevent them detaching troops to support the invasion. As part of this cannonade, an American barrack, containing a quantity of ammunition, exploded, killing and injuring several soldiers inside the building; a warehouse full of goods removed from the Caledonia was set on fire, severely damaging the salvaged goods; while the Caledonia, already damaged, was hit several more times and sank at her mooring.
(Above) A View of Fort George Upper Canada, E. Walsh, artist, circa 1813. Fort George as seen from a riverside American fortification upriver of Fort Niagara. The Navy Hall complex of buildings can be seen at centre left. (Below) Modern waterfront developments encroach on the same view of Fort George in 2012.
Library and Archives Canada, C-000026.
Above and below: Two views of the reconstructed National Historic site of Fort George as seen in 2012 from the American side of the Niagara River.
Three days after the battle, on October 16, 1812, a solemn military funeral procession wound its way from Government House to Fort George, where Major General Isaac Brock, and his aide Lieutenant Colonel John Macdonell, were interred with full military honours within the bank of one of the fort’s bastions. The British artillery fired a salute to their fallen leader, which was shortly echoed by a similar volley from the American batteries across the river, along with their flag being flown at half-mast, a solemn sign of the esteem in which Brock was held by soldiers on both sides of the conflict and a fitting thank-you from those American officers whose current freedom was owed to the general’s courtesy at the outset of the war in the now burned-out officers’ mess at Fort George.
The powder and ammunition magazine building at Fort George. Hit by hot-shot on October 13, 1812, but saved from exploding by the heroism of Captain Henry Vigoureux (R.E) and his team of volunteers.
CHAPTER 7
The Frenchman’s Creek Fiasco, November 29, 1812
A victory had been won at Queenston, but it had been bought at the price of losing the one individual with the skills and personality to conduct the British war effort with any sort of vigour. General Sheaffe was a competent officer, but was generally considered by his own subordinates as a martinet, focusing on the minutia of military service to the detriment of larger strategic considerations. To the civilian administration of the colony he proved officious, offensive, and totally without the dynamic leadership qualities of his predecessor, General Brock. Nor did he have the fortitude to circumvent Prevost’s directives for a quiet defensive posture in dealing with the Americans. As a result, instead of launching an immediate counteroffensive against the shattered American forces, Sheaffe agreed to a three-day armistice, which actually stretched on until mid-November, frittering away his temporary military advantage and allowing the badly demoralized Americans to recover and plan yet another invasion.
On the American side, the debacle of Queenston inevitably led to the resignation of Stephen Van Rensselaer, much to the pleasure of his political opponent Daniel Tompkins, who was now certain of being re-elected as governor. Not to mention the smug satisfaction of Brigadier General Alexander Smyth, who was subsequently appointed as commander of the “Army of the Centre” by Dearborn. No court martial or enquiry was ever held over the mutinous behaviour of Smyth, the shambles of the invasion, or the wholesale failure of a militia regimental system that legally permitted troops to refuse their officer’s orders.
Having successfully eliminated Van Rensselaer as his commanding officer and succeeded to his position, Smyth went on to undermine General Dearborn by applying directly to Secretary of War Eustis for an independent command and demanding substantial reinforcements of men, equipment, and supplies. In return, he bombastically promised to pursue an aggressive campaign on the far side of the Niagara that would sweep the defenders away at a stroke. In reality, Smyth’s command was in serious trouble. Many of his officers considered Smyth’s refusal to work with Van Rensselaer as a betrayal and spoke quietly of the need for a change of command. In addition, an official inspection of the regular and militia regiments stationed at Buffalo revealed a shocking state of deficiencies in the army’s organization, as exampled by that of the Fourteenth Regiment, commanded by Colonel W.H. Winder:
The Colonel and Lieut-Colonel appear to have taken great pains to acquire a knowledge of the duties of their stations. The company officers are almost as ignorant of their duty as when they entered service. The non-commissioned officers and privates are generally only tolerably good recruits…. The arms of this regiment are in infamously bad order. They appear to be old muskets that have probably been bought up at reduced prices by the contractors … and are now placed in the hands of men who are almost within gunshot of the enemy … some of the cartridges are said to have been made up in 1794…. All the men are without coats and many without shoes or stocking’s and have been obliged to mount guard … barefooted and in their linen jackets and overalls…. The regiment is composed entirely of recruits. They seem to be almost as ignorant of their duty as if they had never seen a camp and scarcely know on what shoulder to carry the musket … and if taken into action in their present state will prove more dangerous to themselves than their enemy.[1]
— Captain William King, Assistant Inspector, October 5, 1812
Additional problems came with the fact that the defeat at Queenston had led to wholesale desertions from the ranks of the New York militia, to the point where some companies had more officers than men. Nor were the regular troops immune from discontent, as the Fifth and Twenty-third Infantry regiments mutinied when their pay was not forthcoming. Seemingly blind to these disaffections and critical problems, Smyth continued his policy of issuing grandiose proclamations that decreed that victory over Sheaffe and his forces was all but complete:
General Order to the Soldiers of the Army of the Centre …
Companions in Arms!
The time is at hand when you will cross the stream of Niagara to conquer Canada and to secure the peace of the American frontier. You will enter a country that is to be one of the United States. You will arrive among a people who are to become your fellow-citizens. It is not against them that we come to make war. It is against that government which holds them as vassals … Soldiers! You are amply provided for war. You are superior in number to the enemy. Your personal strength and activity are greater. Your weapons are longer. The regular soldiers of the enemy are generally old men, whose best years have been spent in the sickly climate of the West Indies. They will not be able to stand before you, when you charge with the bayonet…. It is in your power to retrieve the honor of your country; and to cover yourselves with glory.[2]
— Brigadier General