Military Agility. Meir Finkel
buildup with the new equipment was completed. All of Israel’s weapons had to be put to maximum use; the piston-powered aircraft had to be restored to combat capability and the air crews had to be quickly refreshed. Ironically, the air force went to war in the midst of a lull in its operational fitness and tactical preparedness.”86
Israel was lucky that it could rely on the air capabilities of its coalition allies France and Great Britain; thus, its operational shortcomings were not conspicuously apparent. Weapons upgrade is a fact of life for every military organization. The fact of the matter is that every war catches an army in the middle of change. The IAF’s story is a classic example of war erupting when the military is undergoing a dramatic overhaul that temporarily diminishes its capabilities. The lesson to be learned is that before implementing an upgrade, the implications of the transition from tried and tested capabilities to new ones must be taken into consideration. Translating this principle into reality is complex and expensive because it often demands twice the amount of training. In other words, it entails employing old and new weapons simultaneously, maintaining two weapons inventories, and so forth. Naturally, the newer the weapons (or C2 systems), the more resources needed to assimilate them and the more convoluted the process becomes. Changing an infantryman’s personal weapon is much different from replacing an aircraft. The more complex a weapon’s technology, the more difficult its assimilation is, the longer the time required, and the greater the risks involved.
Besides the basic changes in the armored corps, the IAF, the antitank systems, and so forth, a number of senior commanders assumed new roles before the war broke out. Bringing in new players at the start of a war is a risky undertaking. In Israel’s case, the head of the J3 branch and deputy chief of staff, General Haim Laskov, was transferred to the armored corps to oversee the rapid force buildup (he later commanded the 77th Division based at the armored corps headquarters). Laskov’s former position as head of GHQ was assigned to Major General Meir Amit, the commander of Southern Command. Amit’s role was taken over by Colonel Asaf Simchoni in early August 1956.87
The Six-Day War: The “Waiting Period”
In February–March 1967, on the basis of the Maccabee Multiyear Plan, the GHQ reviewed the assessment that an all-out Arab-initiated war was unlikely until 1970, although limited operations were possible.88 This evaluation radically changed on May 19 when Egyptian advances in Sinai heightened the possibility of hostilities.89
Ammunition Shortages and Tank Upgrades
The Bnei Or (Sons of Light) Multiyear Plan was designed to expand the Centurion and Patton order of battle to more than 600 tanks. Optimal operation of the 105mm Shreer (Muscle) tank cannons required 250,000 shells of various types. This amount was difficult to obtain because of the high cost of ammunition in Britain. At the conclusion of the arms deal with the United Kingdom in April 1965, and with domestic production by IMI, the total would be around 50,000. Therefore, the IDF signed another deal with Britain for 86,000 shells. This would bring the 105mm Shreer ammunition up to the standard (full tank belly and battalion-level truck reinforcement) for three days of fighting. The problem was that the supply of the ammunition was spread out through 1970 and 1971. Another complication was Britain’s development of a new kinetic energy armor-penetrating L-52 shell that was superior to and more expensive than the L-28. After weighing its options, Israel decided to acquire the new L-52.90
In early 1965 the armored corps commander, General Tal, dramatized the situation estimate to Prime Minister–Defense Minister Levi Eshkol: “The armored corps is good for inspections and parades but it’s not ready for war if it lacks ammunition.”91 Upon hearing this, Eshkol agreed to add another 22,500 shells to the budget. Tal flew to Britain to facilitate the acquisition. Use of the shells in training exercises was banned because of the shortage of ammunition (20-pounders were used instead). In reality, and for myriad reasons, on May 15, 1967, the start of the alert preceding the Six-Day War, the full inventory of Shreers stood at 24,200 kinetic energy armor-penetrating shells, 16,500 high-explosive antitank (HEAT) shells, and 5,230 high-explosive squash head (HESH) shells. This was the approximate standard (excluding armor-penetrating shells) for three days of combat.
During the waiting period from May 15 to June 5, 1967, while the country held its breath to see whether President Nasser of Egypt would recall his troops from Sinai or the Israeli government would declare war, an impressive number of tanks were upgraded with Shreer cannons (sixty-five Centurions and fifteen Pattons). This effort “emphasized the urgent need for ammunition, especially HESH shells, in order to close the widening gaps. Britain, the source of these rounds, conditioned their delivery on the rate of production. Now the supply would have to come from the British army’s current stock.”92 Britain largely fulfilled Israel’s requests. By June 4, 3,670 HESH shells had arrived in Israel by air, and 4,700 arrived by sea the following day. The delivery of these munitions during the waiting period and after the war began had a substantial effect on the armored units. For example, a company of Centurion tanks that was hastily cobbled together by the chief armor officer’s headquarters and attached to the 10th Brigade on the eve of the war was armed with only armor-penetrating shells. On the morning of June 8, when the company reached Jericho, the first HESH shells finally arrived.93
A similar problem was the shortage of HEAT shells for the 105mm cannons of the Sherman M-51s. On May 15 the ammunition inventory stood at 6,120 HEAT and 9,650 HESH shells. Thus, each of the 175 tanks was armed with only 34 HEAT shells and had enough HESH shells about three days of fighting.94 As a result, “each Sherman in the 45th Brigade received only half a belly of HEAT shells (19–20 to a tank) and at the battalion and company level the stock was non-existent. Another delivery of the shells arrived on June 4.”95
Brezner states that, as these data show, no meticulous planning had been performed to match ammunition stocks to existing tanks or the expected number of Centurions. At times, this led to an acute ammunition shortage and a critical threat to the effective operation of first-line tanks if war erupted in the near future. Although vast resources had been invested in improving the Centurions, given the lack of ammunition, their optimal combat capability could not be realized. In an extreme case, all efforts to upgrade the tanks would be in vain. Not only the new tanks but also the Sherman M-51s suffered from an ammunition deficit due to the long wait between placing the order and receiving the product. Some of the ammunition (HEAT shells) was still being developed, and the IDF had to stand by until research and development were completed. The Ministry of Defense hoped IMI would begin producing some of the ammunition and thus broaden the range of its products, which would save foreign currency and avoid lengthy delivery delays. Finally, budget cutbacks played a role in the dire shortfall in ammunition.96
In ten hectic days (May 16–25) the ordnance workshops managed to upgrade 115 tanks, including 16 Centurions. When Central Command received them, they were still armed with 20-pound cannons, just as they had been when shipped from Britain. The tanks’ 20-pounders were not replaced with 105mm cannons after it was realized that Central Command had enough 20-pounder shells.97
The three-week waiting period leading up to the war were of major significance because they enabled critical shortages to be filled. “The armored corps’ ammunition deficit taught Rabin that force buildup demands a planned parity between weapons’ replenishment and the acquisition of ammunition and spare parts…. ‘Better thirty tanks less and having what we possess with the necessary amount of ammunition and spare parts.’”98
Force Organization
During the waiting period, the chief armor officer’s headquarters established two battalions and three companies made up of Armor School staff instructors and the armored corps’ testing unit. The headquarters made optimal use of the 900 officers and men who had trained in Israel or had returned from abroad by reinforcing the armored divisions with 197 additional crews.99
The formation of the Eshkolot Landing Force (named after its commander, Ze’ev Eshkolot) on May 23 was also an important step. This force was designated to make a seaborne landing during the 55th Paratrooper Brigade’s airdrop in the El-Arish area in the event the 84th Division was delayed on the roads. The force consisted