Military Agility. Meir Finkel
mortars, an SS-11 missile platoon, and a motorized infantry platoon on half-tracks from the 55th Brigade. Much work went into ensuring the improvised force’s supply of fuel, ammunition, communications equipment, and machine gun mounts, as well as sealing (waterproofing) the AFVs and other vehicles. The tank crews underwent training at the Armor School’s firing range. The landing force carried out maneuvers in the Ashdod Port, completed its preparations and exercises by June 4, and assembled in the port on the night of June 4–5.100 The next day the El-Arish landing was canceled, and the Eshkolot Landing Force came under the command of the 11th Brigade and participated in the capture of the Gaza Strip.
Training
Training exercises in the waiting period were limited in order to conceal force preparation. The limitations applied mainly to heavy weapons. Absolute radio silence was maintained, and movement to concentration and training areas was reduced and done without radio communication. Training focused on proficiency enhancement and operations in special areas and under NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) conditions.101 The infantry (especially in Southern Command) underwent intensive training related to attacking fortified objectives. The IDF planned for an NBC threat because of its deep concern about Egypt’s use of chemical weapons in Yemen. A commander of a tank company, Lieutenant Avigdor Kahalani, recalled that, during the waiting period, “they surprised the hell out of us with anti-gas systems…. We carried out hasty training sessions in holding our breath while hooking up to the system.”102 Captain Yossi Peled, the commander of a mechanized infantry company, remembered that “they suddenly gave us these weird masks. What’s this? Protection from gas…. So how does it work? What’s it like under fire? What about training? How am I supposed to remember the drill? What if the radio suddenly conks out and I have to improvise, was I thoroughly trained for this?”103
The 94th Battalion, 200th Brigade, which was still not completely formed, continued its program of instruction and refresher training into early June.104
Intelligence Measures
Southern Command’s intelligence aids are of special interest. After ten years of quiet following the Sinai War, Southern Command was suddenly ordered to commence hasty planning for an IDF attack in May 1967. Zalman Gandler writes that since the start of the waiting period, IDF military intelligence had been working around the clock to prepare up-to-date material, and the quantity collected after two weeks equaled that normally compiled in an ordinary year. The area was photographed only at the end of the waiting period, and only some of the forces received the updated photostats. Even then, it was too late.105
To sum up the Six-Day War case, the high level of readiness the IDF attained in three weeks enabled it to win the war. Good relations with European countries (France, Britain, Germany, and Holland) allowed Israel to narrow some of the gaps in aircraft equipment, tank ammunition, and NBC equipment.
The Yom Kippur War: The “Blue-White” Alert
At the April 16, 1973, general staff meeting, the chief of intelligence reported that the latest findings predicted war for May 15. His assessment, however, was that the likelihood of war was low. The chief of staff, Lieutenant General David (Dado) Elazar, decided to undertake a wide range of preparations, executed discreetly. These included increasing the available order of battle in Sinai and the Golan Heights; updating operational plans; advancing training schedules planned for later in the year; forming new reserve units and canceling orders for the dismantling of regular units; accelerating weapons replenishment; and speeding up the completion of operational infrastructure such as roads, fortifications, and antitank obstacles.106 This section discusses some of the tensions involved in these preparations, and it highlights what can be accomplished in a relatively short time.
Organization
The formation of the 210th Division was originally planned for March 1974. On May 14, 1973, the date was brought forward to June 15.107 The buildup of the division included the establishment of division headquarters, the 312th Communications Battalion, two tank battalions (the 106th and 183rd) in the 164th Shot (105mm L7 Centurion) Brigade, the headquarters of an artillery regiment (the artillery battalions had already been formed), the 923rd Engineering Battalion, and an improvised supply regiment headquarters.
The formation of the 418th Ivri Missile Unit, originally planned for 1974, was moved up to 1973, and the formation of the 440th Division headquarters, which was part of the Ofek A Multiyear Plan, was brought forward to August 1973. Similarly, the formation of three armored reconnaissance battalions for the 143rd, 146th, and 162nd Divisions, which had been planned for August–November 1973, was advanced to June–July.
In the corps of engineers, two assault roller bridging units were established in June 1973 (not originally planned for 1973). In addition, the formation of two reserve engineering battalions for the 252nd and 210th Divisions was advanced from October–December 1973 to June–August 1973.
The 1973 work plan called for the demobilization of the regular 75th Battalion, 7th Tank Brigade, but during the 1973 alert it remained a regular battalion.108
Operational Infrastructure
The following infrastructure was present:109
• Twelve kilometers of antitank trenches in Northern Command.110
• One hundred twenty-one kilometers of roads on the Golan Heights for artillery and tanks.
• Communications lines stretching between Nafakh-Safed (Northern Command) and Yalek-Refidim and Yalek-Dveila (Sinai).
• Reserve stores units at Abu-Rudeis (Sinai) for an infantry battalion, tank company, and battery of 122mm cannons, and at Bir Tmada (Sinai) for sixty-four tanks.
The 679th Brigade’s reserve stores unit advanced to Corazim (northern Galilee),111 and the 179th Brigade’s reserve stores unit moved to the Filon Base (northern Galilee). After the war, the Agranat Commission report stated that advancing the reserve stores units of Northern Command’s armored brigades contributed decisively to their speedy arrival in the Golan and blocking of Syrian forces.112
Weapons and Equipment
The following weapons and equipment were available or added:113
• Hundreds of vehicular and portable radio communications sets were added.
• Water-crossing equipment—twenty-one carriages for transporting Unifloat pontoons—was brought forward, and a fifth Yiftach roller bridge was ordered.
• The Ivri Missile Unit received an additional four launchers and twenty rockets.
It should be noted that until the war broke out, the attempt to develop towing hitches that would enable the roller bridges to traverse the steep, sandy slopes in the Suez Canal area took place at a frenetic pace, regardless of cost, yet ultimately proved unsuccessful.114
Another area of tension during the force buildup was the development and replenishment of night-vision devices for tanks (Arab armies had been equipped with them since the Six-Day War). There were no plans to acquire infrared sights that could be procured in the West (such as those in Russian-made tanks) because, according to intelligence estimates, war was not expected. Instead, Israel planned to wait until its own technology for starlight enhancers was developed. However domestic production of electro-optic systems was beset by delays and cancellations,115 which put IDF tank crews at a grave disadvantage in the Yom Kippur War.
Training
The amount of prior training naturally had a major impact on the units’ competency. Among the various exercises were task-oriented maneuvers for the canalcrossing units. Avshalom Levi describes the 257th Armored Battalion, 421st Brigade, a reserve unit formed in April 1973 and commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Shimon Ben Shoshan. The battalion’s initial training lasted ten days. Officers at the platoon commander level and higher participated in a divisional skeleton exercise in August that gave an invaluable boost to the battalion’s proficiency.