Visas and Walls. Nazli Avdan
that these states’ own citizens were maimed or killed. From Turkey’s perspective, however, despite not leading to any Turkish fatalities, this incident would still be classified as direct experience with terrorism because it occurred on Turkish territory (Mickolus et al. 2007).10 To provide a contrasting example, on October 10, 2015, Turkey suffered an attack on its own soil, in the capital city of Ankara, of an unprecedented nature. The victims were Turkish nationals. From Turkey’s perspective, the Ankara incident fits under both forms of direct experience: on its own territory and involving its own citizens. In practice, these two types of incidents overlap to a great extent: thus the majority of assaults that occur within the state’s borders also involve its own nationals.11 While these incidents may overlap in practice, it is possible to differentiate between two types of avenues of impact: targeted incidents that I dub the territorial effect and compatriots’ effect.12
I propose two complementary mechanisms to support this expectation. First, targeted terrorism plays into the hands of policymakers that champion policy stringency. In effect, targeted terrorism sets in motion the process of securitization, whereby a particular issue area is redefined and repackaged as an existential threat (Buzan, Ole, and Wilde 1998). Through this process, policymakers emphasize the external roots of terrorism and the dangers of permeable borders. Securitization repackages international terrorism as a grave and pressing danger, on an equal footing with military threats (Huysmans 2006). Direct threats expand the scope of policy options that are politically palatable. As a consequence, controversial policies that might have been a hard sell are easier to justify. To illustrate, in response to 9/11, liberal democracies adopted tough legislation dealing with immigrants and foreigners and expanded the rights of the executive to survey and assemble information (Epifanio 2011). Some of these measures might have been politically unpopular, without the threat of transnational terrorism, because they cut into the procedural and privacy rights of not just foreigners but also citizens. However, the sense of urgency generated by attacks on these countries’ own territories—9/11, 4/11 (Madrid), and 7/7 (London)—downplayed the influence of liberal reservations.
Second, targeted events have a more pronounced impact on public fears and anxieties. To the extent that border control aims to quell these fears, we should expect incidents that trigger alarm to connect more closely to harder borders. Psychologists connect fear to a demand for caution and defense (Huddy et al. 2005). Tighter controls align with a defensive perspective and borders are viewed as a protective shield against external threats (Staniland 2006). Researchers also document a significant shift in public attitudes as a consequence of terrorism, such that people are more willing to tolerate painful measures, including restrictions on civil liberties (Davis and Silver 2004). Accordingly, the public will be more likely to welcome and even embrace draconian policies that run counter to liberal norms. Harder borders depart from liberal principles of freedom of movement. Absent direct attacks, the public may not support them. An ancillary line of research finds that transnational terrorism realigns the political environment by making the public more likely to elect right-wing, hawkish political leaders (Huddy et al. 2005; Lahav 2004). It is plausible that hard-line leaders are more likely to trumpet tougher border controls.
Territorial Effect
Transnational terrorist incidents that transpire on the state’s own territory are likely to heighten negative attitudes toward terrorist violence more than terrorist events that transpire abroad. Physically proximate events are more salient. An extensive line of research shows that those proximate to areas suffering from prolific levels of terrorism exhibit higher levels of anxiety and fear and that these emotions endure (Allouche and Lind 2010). Analogously, proximate violence is more vivid in memory (Lowenstein et al. 2001). Empirical studies of public attitudes show that Americans exhibited symptoms akin to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in response to 9/11 and, further, that these symptoms were more acute among those who lived in New York’s metropolitan areas (Schuster et al. 2001). Violence that takes place on one’s own soil will also be more jarring and therefore enduring in collective memory. Numerous studies, conducted in countries that bore witness to major terrorist events—Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States—corroborate this insight (Allouche and Lind 2010; Braithwaite 2013; Romanov, Zussman, and Zussman 2010).
Compatriots’ Effect
Incidents that victimize the state’s citizens are a form of direct experience with terrorism. I contend that even when assaults occur in other countries, the involvement of the state’s own nationals will generate a stronger policy response. Such events are simply publicly more visible; the death of a country’s citizens invites longer and more expansive media coverage. People are more likely to be cognizant of these events. Such attacks may be physically distant but are personally proximate. Personal proximity centers on shared communal traits, in this instance defined by citizenship. People come to believe they may be next in line. Such events also pose a danger to citizens’ broader community and way of life (Huddy et al. 2002). Assaults that victimize the state’s own citizens are likely to elicit a stronger outcry because the public can readily empathize with fellow citizens. Parallel to attacks on the country’s soil, these events create room for tougher policies and play into the hands of hard-line policymakers who espouse a tougher approach to border control.
Trading Security for Economic Gain
Smart borders demand that states pursue selective policies instead of a blanket clampdown. Border closure targets specific source states and takes into account the past history of attacks. In contrast to global threats that are diffuse, incidents that are traceable to source countries permit selective border closure. A selective strategy is more appealing to economically open states that cannot afford wholesale border closure. Naim (2005) argues that selective border policies are necessary for coping with the exigencies of globalization. He maintains that such policies are necessary for “a government that is mandated to control an increasing number of cross-border activities, on all borders” (Naim 2006). Precisely because states are limited in their ability to identify and track down clandestine transnational actors, we expect them to craft policies that minimize territorial breach by potential threats. However, smart borders do not simply screen undesirables. They also sustain borders open to benign flows. Therefore, permeable borders necessitate that, to some degree, states must trade security for economic gain.
Economic interdependence scholarship helps illustrate how states balance economic goals with security objectives. A rich body of knowledge in international relations maintains that trade and capital ties shape states’ conflict behavior (Doyle 1997; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2000; Mansfield and Pollins 2003; Polachek 1980; Viner 1951). Extrapolating from this, I argue that commercial ties influence states’ security-seeking behavior vis-à-vis transnational threats. Economic and security interests intersect when it comes to control ling borders. The argument builds on the work of liberal scholars who argue that trading states are more reluctant to use militarized force (Domke 1988; Rosecrance 1996; Rosecrance 1986). Mirroring this contention is the idea that commerce and territorial conquest accomplish the same objectives, so that material incentives eclipse security interests in state grand strategy. A more nuanced argument is rooted in the logic of opportunity costs whereby bilateral economic ties are central to the pacifying effect of trade (Oneal and Russett 1997; Oneal and Russett 1999; Russett and Oneal 2001). Specifically, states shy away from engaging in militarized disputes against commercial partners. Opportunity costs are an important reason why states are reluctant to take up arms against economic partners. States anticipate backlash from partners; the prospect of economic loss from disruption or diminution of trade in turn restrains the use of force.
Neoclassical economics would tell us that economic openness predicts open borders. Empirical patterns, however, fail to sustain this expectation. To stress an earlier point, migration scholars argue that trading states continue to pursue relatively closed migration and border policies (Cornelius et al. 2004; Hollifield 2000). The neoclassical argument may miss the mark insofar as it ties economic openness to liberal migration policies without heeding how bilateral ties affect states’ policies. In order to overcome this theoretical shortcoming, I contend that general openness to economic flows may not necessarily entail open borders; instead, economic interdependence with a commercial partner will predict more liberal policies toward the partner. Specifically, asymmetric dependence on commercial partners will