Visas and Walls. Nazli Avdan
against their citizens. Two distinct lines of argumentation support this proposition. Hardened borders and restrictive policies are hostile signals. States view visa restrictions, for example, as punitive sanctions, and the imposition of visa requirements may trigger retaliation from dyadic counterparts. A more extreme example is border barricades: these impediments aggravate neighbors even in the absence of territorial disputes (Donaldson 2005). To the extent that neighbor states perceive barriers to be adversarial signals, tighter policies bear opportunity costs. If these costs restrain states’ conflict involvement, we can expect similar restraints to act upon states’ border-control policies.
A somewhat less well-known strain of economic interdependence scholarship is grounded in sociological liberalism (Viner 1951). Scholars writing in this tradition argue that economic exchange hinges on communication and contact between states, which in turn enhance trust (Fordham and Kleinberg 2010). Through commerce, states gain knowledge about each other’s customs and practices. Harder borders are antithetical to liberal precepts and collide with the norms of a free market society (Flynn 2003). As such, economically integrated states should be guided by shared liberal tenets. At the same time, greater trust entails that states downplay security fears from economic partners.
The state-level arguments can only take us so far. After all, there are highly interdependent states, such as U.S.-China and U.S.-Mexico, that do not have liberal migration and border policies with regard to each other. In other words, state-level arguments are limited because migration control is not high politics and is thus on a different footing compared to the decision to use militarized force. There is, in addition, a societal layer to how interdependence connects with more open borders. Economic ties create vested interests in maintaining open borders. Tighter policies hinder personal contact and interaction, which are crucial to international economic exchange. Stakeholders are thus likely to oppose policy tightening due to the costs on face-to-face contact with business partners. Fervent proponents of trade and capital liberalization have historically trumpeted open migration policies (Hollifield 1992; Hollifield and Zuk 1998). Insofar as trade and migration are complementary, we expect pro-trade lobbies to champion looser migration policies (Rudolph 2008).
Looking Ahead
To recapitulate, border control fulfills two functions. The first one is demonstrative and premised on showing the state’s territorial authority. The second one centers on effectiveness and necessitates screening out and denying access to threats. Border instruments are differentiated according to how well they can perform these functions. The theory of border control makes three overarching claims with empirical implications. First, fears over security lead to policy restrictiveness. The book concentrates on terrorism as a crucial manifestation of security concerns in the contemporary policy climate. The second claim adds nuance to the first by arguing that threat perception varies according to whether violence is directed toward state interests. The third claim is grounded in economic interdependence theory and suggests that trade and capital ties make for more open borders. They do so, directly, through the opportunity costs generated by harder borders. They also do so by modulating the impact of concerns over terrorism. While the theory developed in this chapter applies broadly to border control, the empirical chapters develop hypotheses on specific instruments of control and test the implications of the theory separately on these instruments. Looking ahead, Chapter 2 formulates hypotheses on visa restrictions. Chapter 3 focuses on visa requirements and visa rejection rates. Chapter 4 shifts the focus to border barriers in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
CHAPTER 2
Terrorism, Trade, and Visa Restrictions
Visas and Border Control
In the previous chapter, I argued that border closure will be more likely in the face of transnational terrorism, especially when attacks are directed against a state’s territory and citizens. Economic ties will offset the impact of security concerns and make for open borders. This chapter will explore the observable implications of the theoretical framework for visa restrictions.
Visa restrictions comprise an important, albeit understudied, component of migration and border control. A visa is defined as a “document issued in the country of origin (or residence) of the individual by the authorities of the state to which he or she wishes to go” (Guild 2009, 118). If a state has imposed a visa requirement against an origin state, the citizens of the origin state need to apply for a visa to legally gain entry. Visas thus constitute an upstream form of control, in the sense that they regulate and monitor migrants before they have gained entrance to the destination state. Travelers apply for permission to legally enter destination states’ territories at consulates and embassies abroad. The upstream aspect of visa controls permits states to push border controls outward, beyond physical borders, both into cyberspace and into foreign space (Bigo 2011). At the same time, governments enlist third parties, for example, obliging private agents such as transport companies, in monitoring travel. Legal entry often requires varying degrees of documentation, depending on the host, origin state, and visa category (Hobolth 2013). Importantly, the visa does not guarantee admittance but merely allows travelers to legally ask for permission to enter destination states’ territories. This grants border officials some discretion when monitoring border crossings.
However, sometimes states also utilize visa controls at border ports as an on-site mechanism of control over border crossings. Sometimes referred to as the “sticker visa,” this policy instrument does not require that travelers obtain legal permission to enter destination state territories beforehand. Hence, the visa at the border does not embody the screening goal that the more common upstream visa requirement serves (Neumayer 2006). Instead, the visa-at-the-border generates revenue by requiring a nominal fee from border crossings, similar to the toll on an interstate highway in the United States. As such, the analyses herein focus on the upstream visa instrument.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates a right of exit and entry to one’s own country (Article 13) but not a right to enter foreign space. States have the prerogative to arbitrate who gains access to their territories. Visas and border controls are important tools for states to exercise control. They are also historically intertwined with the emergence of the modern territorial state. With the development of standing armies, the state took over the legitimate means of coercion. Concomitantly and similarly, the modern state has monopolized the legitimate means of mobility, restricting entry and exit across international frontiers (Torpey 2000a). Identity cards and codes, and eventually the passport, were essential for documenting membership and developing mechanisms to distinguish among them for administrative purposes. Visa restrictions are, relatively speaking, a modern invention. Together with the passport, visas and biometric identity documents uphold the mobility regime (Huysmans 2006).
Visas monitor short-term mobility. In the empirical analysis that follows, we will address visa controls as they pertain to short-term territorial access. The next chapter also examines visa applications for different categories of short-term migration, including work, study, business, and tourism. Importantly, however, visa policies impact other dimensions of migration control. For example, states tighten visa policies in order to ward off prospective asylum seekers (Finotelli and Sciortino 2013). For precisely this reason, migration scholars consider the visa regime an important component of the state’s overall asylum and refugee-control regime (Czaika and Hobolth 2016). Visa restrictions thus dissuade prospective asylum seekers and divert them to states with softer border-control policies.
Visas also are essential for reducing illegal migration. Contrary to popular belief about migrants slipping across borders unnoticed, visa violations are one of the primary ways in which people gain illegal access to advanced democracies (Jordan and Düvell 2002; Torpey 1998). According to the Department of Homeland Security, for example, in 2015, of the 10.9 million illegal migrants in the United States, 40 percent gained access via visa transgression (Attanasio 2016). Neumayer (2006) contends that visa