Foreign Intervention in Africa after the Cold War. Elizabeth Schmidt
between those who targeted local regimes due to longstanding grievances and a much smaller segment who attacked Western countries that, in their view, supported impious rulers, oppressed Muslims, and defiled Muslim holy lands. As a result, the US war on terror, like the war on communism, had unintended consequences that sometimes intensified local support for violent opposition groups.
Central Propositions
The impact of foreign political and military intervention in Africa after the Cold War is illuminated by a series of subregional case studies, described at the end of this chapter. They provide evidence to support the book’s four central propositions.
First, free market austerity policies, imposed by international financial institutions acting through weak postcolonial states during decolonization and the Cold War, contributed to deadly struggles over power and resources in the post–Cold War period. As dictators were driven from power, indigenous strongmen, and in some cases neighboring states, intervened to further their own interests. Other international actors interceded in an attempt to restore regional stability or protect civilian lives. However, they tended to engage selectively, choosing conflict zones that impinged on their own political, economic, and strategic interests, while ignoring other conflicts and casualties. Although some interventions benefited civilian populations, others harmed them. The failure to intervene when strategic interests were not at stake also had dire consequences.
Second, the war on terror, like its Cold War antecedent, increased foreign military presence on the African continent and generated new external support for repressive governments. Expanded US involvement was particularly noteworthy. Concerned about US energy and physical security, Washington focused on countries rich in energy resources and those considered vulnerable to terrorist infiltration. US military aid, combined with commercial military sales and arms left over from the Cold War, contributed to an escalation of violence in many parts of Africa. Rather than promoting security, US military and covert operations often intensified strife and undermined prospects for peace.
Third, although US counterterrorism initiatives cast a long shadow, they were not the only foreign interventions in Africa during this period. After the Cold War, the UN, the AU, and African subregional organizations played a growing role in diplomacy and peacekeeping initiatives, sometimes leading to multilateral military action. France, a former colonial power, maintained a strong military presence on the continent and intervened in numerous conflicts. Emerging powers such as China, India, Brazil, Turkey, and the Gulf states, which were heavily invested in African oil, minerals, and agricultural land, exerted new political influence.10 While these countries often reinforced the powers of repressive regimes, in some instances they used their authority to promote peace and security efforts. The success of externally brokered agreements was largely determined by the degree to which all parties to the conflict and representative civil society organizations were engaged in the process. Accords imposed from above or outside, with little buy-in from relevant groups on the ground, were least likely to succeed. Public pressure for humanitarian intervention in response to African crises also contributed to new waves of foreign involvement. Activist groups in Western countries put the spotlight on mass atrocities and mobilized support for action to protect African civilians. However, they often oversimplified complex issues and sometimes proposed the kinds of military solutions that historically have harmed civilian populations.
The fourth proposition suggests that during the period under consideration, foreign political and military intervention in Africa often did more harm than good. External involvement motivated by the war on terror tended to intensify conflicts, and foreign response to instability often rendered local conflagrations more lethal. In addition, the emphasis on quick military action diverted attention from the political, economic, and social grievances that lay at the root of the conflicts. Even humanitarian missions, which were premised on the responsibility to protect, sometimes hurt the people they were intended to help. They were often weakened by inadequate mandates and funding and undermined by conflicting interests.
In the second decade of the twenty-first century, the merits and demerits of foreign intervention remained hotly contested, while the impact of failures to intervene was also the subject of much debate. The voices of African civil societies were not yet central to the discussions, nor were the concerns of affected populations foremost on the agenda. The prioritization of these constituencies is critical to the long-term success of any peace initiative.
Scope and Limitations
For the purposes of this study, foreign political and military intervention refers to the involvement of external powers or organizations in the internal affairs of an African country. These entities may be based on other continents, or they may be neighboring African states or subregional or regional organizations. The term “intervention” implies an unequal power relationship. It occurs when a dominant country or organization uses force or pressure to exert power over a weaker sovereign entity or when a weaker entity requests external assistance to restore order, monitor a peace accord, or end a humanitarian crisis. Intervention can be viewed in a positive light, such as when powerful nations intervene to halt a genocide or enforce peace agreements. However, when outsiders have intervened to enslave, conquer, colonize, overthrow or install governments, or plunder resources, intervention has had extremely negative ramifications.
Although this book focuses on political and military intervention, the enormous problems that afflict Africa today cannot properly be understood without taking into account the impact of foreign intrusion into African economies, externally induced climate change, and environmental destruction and plunder of resources by outside forces. These factors, which have contributed to many African conflicts, are beyond the purview of this book, as is the growing presence of China. However, their significance should not be underestimated, as noted briefly below.
Foreign Intrusion into African Economies
Although outside powers had attempted to control the lucrative African trades in gold, ivory, and slaves for centuries before the Industrial Revolution, it was rapid industrialization in nineteenth-century Europe that sparked the continentwide scramble for African resources, labor, and markets. The Berlin Conference of 1884–85 devised rules to legitimate European claims, and imperial powers rushed to establish “effective occupation” that would entitle them to a share of what Belgian King Leopold II termed “this magnificent African cake.”11 The ensuing “scramble for Africa” unleashed a wave of foreign intervention that brought most of the continent under European authority within a few decades. France, the UK, Belgium, Portugal, Germany, Italy, and Spain established regimes to extract African wealth—especially rubber, minerals, cotton, and plant oils—and to force African people to provide the labor and taxes necessary to keep the system afloat.
Political independence, beginning in the 1950s, did little to alter the unequal economic relationships established during the colonial era. Former imperial powers sustained governments that perpetuated the status quo. Resource extraction, primarily for the benefit of outsiders and small groups of indigenous elites, continued, along with political repression to guarantee access. The Cold War exacerbated tensions in new African states as rival powers, seeking to protect their own economic and strategic interests, supported repressive regimes.
The colonial legacy of unequal exchange between African commodity producers and industrialized countries has contributed to the deep impoverishment of African populations. When African colonies achieved political independence in the mid- to late twentieth century, the inequality inherent in these economic relationships persisted in a system dubbed neocolonialism. In the words of pan-African leader Kwame Nkrumah, neocolonial states had “all the outward trappings of international sovereignty,” but their economies and political programs were “directed from outside.”12 Deeply rooted economic inequalities were exacerbated by the steep rise in oil prices in the early 1970s and the worldwide collapse in commodity prices at the end of that decade. African political economies, which had been structured to export primary products and import manufactured goods, suffered severe balance of trade deficits. The economic crisis stemming from structural inequalities was aggravated by inflated military budgets, corruption, and economic mismanagement. With their economies crumbling, many African countries turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and Western commercial