From Disarmament to Rearmament. Sheldon A. Goldberg
following the armistice that ended World War I.
Other paragraphs of the draft directive dealt with the return of German units outside Germany’s 31 December 1937 borders and non-German personnel in the German armed forces. Lastly, commanders in chief were cautioned to refer to as yet unwritten guidance for instructions on the treatment of war criminals before disposing of German personnel or POWs.
This draft, circulated as US Directive No. 15 and EAC(45)1, underwent several amendments and changes but was never approved, so SHAEF was never provided with official guidance on this issue. On 6 December 1945, more than a year later, and months after the war had ended and long after most disarmed German forces and POWs had been demobilized, the ACC issued Control Council Directive 18, “For Disbandment and Dissolution of the German Armed Forces,” which contained the same basic guidance as the US draft.89
In mid-1944, a key assumption of another draft study outlining the planning process for the disbandment of the German armed forces was that the bulk of these forces in the West would be outside Germany’s 1937 borders. Other assumptions were that some surrendered German forces would be used for labor in the liberated areas and that some arrangement would have to be made with the USSR to transfer surrendered personnel to and from the Soviet zone. What was decided at that time, however, was that disbandment during the middle period would be solely based upon the need for labor with priority given to medical personnel, agricultural workers, and workers in certain essential industries. The draft also included details as to what articles of clothing would be issued to disbanded German armed forces members based on their rank (whether their clothing had been issued or paid for by the individual) and the availability of their own clothing. Pay, initially set at 60 Reichmarks for officers and 30 Reichmarks for other ranks, was later modified to 80 and 40 Reichmarks respectively. Food allowances were also specified in this study.90
On 28 November 1944, the SHAEF posthostilities planning staff produced yet another study, which essentially recommended that with the exception of certain categories of personnel, all surrendered German armed forces personnel should be discharged and sent home as soon as possible. It portrayed the elaborate and bureaucratic procedures that were being developed and the need for labor as the primary criterion delaying discharge for as long as eight months. It stated further that the large numbers of POWs, estimated at two and a half million, would exceed the Allies’ ability to control.91
Along with discussions of the disbandment of the German armed forces and demilitarization of Germany in general that will be discussed below, the issue of what to do with German general officers, especially the German General Staff Corps, collectively known as the “military caste,” was a major issue. On 24 September 1944, Colonel Grazebrook disseminated a staff study for comment on “The Disposal of the German Military Caste.” The staff study indicated that one of the primary objects of defeating Germany was to effect Germany’s “complete demilitarization and eradicate her traditional militarism.” It continued that although plans had been made to disarm and disband the military and destroy its warmaking potential, these plans were superficial: Germany’s militaristic spirit and military caste of highly trained, professional officers remained, and they held not only the ability to rebuild the Wehrmacht but “the burning desire” to do so.92
The study continued, explaining that although the Versailles Treaty had forbidden the reestablishment of the great German General Staff, it had nonetheless been resurrected in other forms. Grazebrook expressed his fear that while the surreptitious methods used in the 1920s would most likely not succeed in the 1940s, he was convinced that other methods would be found unless steps were taken to prevent that from happening. As long as qualified officers remained in Germany, they would remain a source of danger. This danger could be prevented by the complete destruction or removal from Germany of the best brains of the military caste.93
Grazebrook’s study mentioned that there were no organizations parallel to the General Staff Corps in either the German Navy or Air Force, nor were there equivalents to General Staff Corps officers among the German officer corps in general. The study specified that German generals should not be allowed to retain any of their power or be allowed to continue in office in any capacity. The study recommended that these officers be detained after their surrender and permanently exiled from Germany in order to render them “impotent.”94
Because of the nature of the problem, which went well beyond the supreme commander’s level and was a tripartite matter, SHAEF stated that all it could do was recommend to CCS that a long-term policy statement be prepared.95 A second draft of the study, apparently written on 12 November and designed to reach conclusions that would be incorporated in an attached cable to be sent to CCS, included policies suggested by both US and British authorities but also highlighted discrepancies between the two. The US Draft Directive to the Supreme Commander Regarding Military Government of Germany Following the Cessation of Organized Resistance that the JCS had given the CCS for consideration stated the following: “All General Staff Corps officers who are not taken into custody as prisoners of war should therefore be arrested and held pending receipt of further instructions as to their disposition. You will receive further instructions as to how to deal with other members of the German Officer Corps.” A similar British directive submitted to the EAC made no specific mention of the German officer corps or General Staff: “You will be guided in the general disposal of forces under German Command by the following considerations: (1) All sections of the OKW, OKH, OKM, OKL and staffs which are not required for essential administrative control purposes will be detained under guard or disbanded as you may direct as early as practicable.”96
The five-page staff study, which incorporated many of Grazebrook’s earlier statements, underscored the importance of the problem by referring to the abundant historical examples of how the “German Armed Forces reduced by peace treaties to apparent impotence, reemerged in an astonishingly brief period as an effective and potentially dangerous organization.”97 Thus, the objective (the total defeat of Germany), the study continued, was to “prevent a recurrence of this disastrous cycle by effecting the complete and permanent demilitarization of Germany.”98
The study then divided the military caste into three categories: generals, the General Staff Corps, and the professional officer corps. After a brief section on the generals that maintained that generals who surrendered should not be allowed to retain any vestige of authority or continue in office in any capacity, the General Staff Corps received the greatest censure. Defined as the “high priesthood of the German cult of war,” the General Staff Corps was cited as “the repository of expert knowledge resulting from exhaustive study and experience, and who sought to perpetuate the teaching of von Clausewitz.”99 The study warned that unless drastic steps were taken, the General Staff Corps would plan and develop a future Wehrmacht, going even so far as to state that “the only fully successful method [of preventing the rebuilding of the General Staff Corps] would be the extermination of the military caste,” and that if this was not acceptable, some form of permanent control over all members of the General Staff Corps was essential.100
The remainder of the study dealt with the need to detain these officers and when that detention should occur. It also advised that a number of German commanders and staff officers would be required to assist in the administration and disbandment of the German armed forces and that close supervision was needed. The study also cautioned that the detention of all potentially dangerous officers was needed to demonstrate Allied determination to stamp out German militarism.
A few days after the study was distributed, Chief Operations A Subsection Colonel C. R. Kutz forwarded his comments on this second staff study. He concluded that segregating or eliminating the German General Staff Corps would be, at best, a temporary expedient as long as German military writings remained. He also felt that their physical extermination would only make martyrs out of them and give General Staff Corps officers even greater prestige. Kutz recommended that a way be found to discredit them in the eyes of the German people and that after their discharge, they be kept under strict surveillance and required to report periodically to Allied authorities. He also recommended that SHAEF’s Psychological Warfare Division study the measures that could be used to discredit General Staff Corps officers.
A