From Disarmament to Rearmament. Sheldon A. Goldberg
this second staff study requesting guidance from the CCS regarding the ultimate disposition of German General Staff Corps officers and general officers “now being arrested” as none of the existing guidance provided an answer to that question. The draft cable suggested that “drastic steps” be taken and actually included the recommended “physical extinction” of these officers. If that was unacceptable, the draft continued, permanent exile or life imprisonment was to be considered. A policy decision was requested as soon as possible in order to coordinate plans and put them into action. Although this solution was not accepted in the long run, the staff study, signed by Major General E. W. D. Strong, assistant chief of staff (G-2, Intelligence Division), recommended approval.101 Toward the end of December, however, General Morgan disapproved the several recommendations regarding this issue, stating that though it had not yet been approved, the JCS directive would provide sufficient guidance.102
While the final method for disposing of senior German commanders and staff officers had not been determined, guidance provided by SHAEF, which also included Eclipse Memorandum No. 7 and the Handbook Governing Policy and Procedure for the Military Occupation of Germany, specified that both active duty and retired General Staff Corps officers were to be arrested, not to punish them but to prevent them from making plans or preparations for future wars and to ensure that their ability to mount subversive activities against the Allies was reduced to a minimum. Additional guidance signed by the SHAEF chief of staff, Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, indicated that they were to be segregated completely in special internment camps. Similarly, general officers not needed to administer and control German military personnel awaiting disbandment were to be deprived of all authority, not permitted to wear decorations or other symbols of military achievement, and be sent to regular concentration areas.103 They were not to be discharged without authorization from Supreme Headquarters.104 British officers in particular were convinced that General Staff officers were no good and would do everything possible to retain their power, re-create the General Staff Corps, go underground, plan new wars, and so on. As late as March 1945, the 21st Army Group wanted them to be registered and placed under counterintelligence supervision after their discharge.105
The Disarmament School
In early 1944, while the planning for Operation Rankin C was underway and in anticipation of the need to implement those plans, Colonel Grazebrook wrote a memo outlining the need for cadres trained for the disarmament mission as well as a draft syllabus for that training.106 Grazebrook’s suggestions were seen as a good idea by most, although the question of who would ultimately be responsible for the training and where it would be given was left unanswered at that time. Regarding the several suggestions regarding syllabus topics, Colonel Grazebrook was reminded that there were still a number of officers around who had been involved in disarmament matters in the last war and that he would be well-served by having them give “a few informal talks to the cadres.”107
A month later, on 9 May, the Civil Affairs section of the British War Office indicated that they were prepared to run a disarmament course and, if so directed by either SHAEF or CCMS, could do it with three weeks’ notice.108 After much discussion with headquarters, the European Theater of Operations, US Army (ETOUSA), and the British (to find a suitable location), the disarmament school was established in London with a staff of twenty under the direction of Lieutenant Colonel Frank Kowalski Jr.109
Grazebrook’s memo, now SHAEF/21540/1/Ops, “Training of Disarmament Missions,” proceeded on the assumption that trained disarmament cadres would be authorized before the cessation of hostilities.110 It suggested a four-stage course of training that would include an introductory course in which students would obtain background information, a period of study covering both general and specific problems they would face, a discussion period in which to exchange ideas and formulate policies, and lastly a period in which the newly trained cadres would, in turn, train the remaining personnel of the disarmament missions and detachments. The memo further recommended that SHAEF (G-3) be responsible for the training and that it commence as soon as possible. An appendix to the memo contained a syllabus of introductory courses that contained eleven topics ranging from the background of the terms of surrender to the plan for the occupation and control of Germany, the German evasion of disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, the various military, police, paramilitary, and armaments organizations, plans for the control and disposal of German forces and surrendered war matériel, and the imposition of sanctions and reprisals.111
On 24 August, Grazebrook learned that General Wickersham had received a reply to a letter Grazebrook had sent him in mid-July to forward to ETOUSA regarding the provision and training of disarmament staffs required for the US zone. The reply stated that ETOUSA had assumed responsibility for training these staffs and prepared a directive ordering the theater commanders to provide the necessary personnel and proceed with training. A detailed list of the numbers, ranks, and qualifications needed by US officers for the various disarmament staffs was also attached.112 This directive to theater commanders was sent on 27 September 1944 and expanded on 29 October 1944.
Thus, in early October 1944, the commanding general of the communications zone (ComZ) was directed to earmark US personnel for cadres for disarmament and control staffs and to conduct a training course for them.113 The first course started on 30 October and lasted for three weeks. According to School Memorandum No. 3, the three-week course, comprising approximately 130 hours of instruction, was divided into five phases covering six subject areas: organization for disarmament and control in Germany, policy and plans, German political organization, organization of the German armed forces, German industrial organization, and German supply and communication.114 The planned student capacity was 160 but more could be accommodated if sent by the army groups. Upon successful completion of the course, those officers attending were to be earmarked for duty with disarmament and control staffs upon cessation of hostilities. A second function of the school was to provide reference manuals to assist disarmament and control staffs in accomplishing their mission.
The first phase, “General Background Subjects,” took approximately one-third of the total class time, half of which was presented during the first week and the remainder divided equally between the second and third weeks of the course. The second phase, approximately twenty hours in duration, provided technical training for the students in accordance with their branch or duty assignment and special instruction for the executives and logistics officers. This training also took place during the last two weeks of instruction and included staff studies that each student had to solve on an individual basis.
Phase three consisted of lectures by British and American officers that were given throughout the course. Speakers were obtained from the armed forces division of the US Group Control Commission (US Group CC), US Strategic Air Forces in Europe, US Naval Forces in Europe, and the British CCMS. During the first course given there were a total of twenty-six lectures while the second running of the course contained sixty-five lectures.115
Phase four consisted of end-of-the-day “controlled” discussions in lieu of question-and-answer periods after each lecture or presentation. These discussions were led by a member of the school staff and the instructors of the previous day, and went over material presented the previous day. They were also used to underscore points made by the guest speakers.
Phase five took approximately one-fourth of the instruction time and was devoted to the development of staff studies by groups of students according to their duty assignments. It was believed that in this manner, the students would become familiar with sources of information and establish contacts with other groups with whom they would eventually need to establish working relationships.
In mid-September, staff-level discussions indicated that a second running of the disarmament course was needed. The discussions initially concerned training operations and logistics officers but they eventually expanded to include a limited number of key officers involved in the disarmament and demobilization process, some of whom would be retained and assigned to the US Group CC.116 On 29 October, a letter was sent to the commander of ETOUSA by SHAEF’s adjutant general, Brigadier General T. J. Davis, informing him of this necessity and requesting that action be taken to conduct a second course of instruction.