Greek Military Intelligence and the Crescent. Dr. Panagiotis Dimitrakis
archives and so in many respects has to use the techniques of the pioneers – trawling all available sources and, in this case, making use of extensive interviewing with key participants that has allowed him to fill in many of the gaps left by the limited documentary evidence.
This has enabled him to address the vital issue of the relationship between intelligence and policy. In the classical AngloSaxon view, the proper relationship between the two should be one of separation. Intelligence should be tasked to answer questions of interest of policy but not in such a way as to unduly influence policy one way or another and certainly not in such a way as to support a pre-determined policy even at the risk of distorting the evidence. As has become painfully apparent over the past decade even in the AngloSaxon world, matters are not so simple. It is hard to keep an arms-length relationship between the two. If the intelligence professionals do not get close enough they are apt to answer the wrong questions and address issues of no evident policy relevance. If they do get close they can make sure that the policymakers do not make errors on the basis of prejudice and untested assumptions, but if they get too close then there is a danger of gaining influence by reinforcing rather challenging prior convictions and sacrificing integrity for the chance to become part of the inner circle. Once intelligence has become politicised, then it can become more a source of domestic political cover than policy enlightenment. While the tendencies were there in the Greek case, it is interesting that no example has been found of pressure to change an estimate for political convenience.
The problem, however, is more complex. Even when proper distance is maintained between intelligence and policy they will both reflect the broader assumptions about foreign policy in general and specific issues prevalent in their societies and governing class. Intelligence is never a matter of providing accurate and objective analysis based on full information. It is always a matter of ‘joining the dots’, of making sense of sparse and often contradictory information. Because of this, the foundations of an intelligent assessment may involve only slightly more evidence than an analysis put together by someone who can only follow open sources in academic contexts and the media. In some respects overreliance on secret sources, which are often inaccurate, can produce its own distortions. In practice, as demonstrated clearly in this case, the framework for thinking about and debating foreign policy may be widely shared, embracing the worlds of both intelligence and policy. Lastly an intelligence estimate is not the same as a threat assessment. To find something threatening depends not only on concern about external hostility but also on awareness of internal vulnerability.
At times of crisis the fault lines between intelligence and policy become even greater. At one level the policymakers become even more dependent upon intelligence, for their standard perceptions of adversary behaviour may be under strain as they fear being caught out by a surprise move, possibly one involving armed force. Unfortunately at such times the intelligence professionals may also be struggling, fearful of letting their government down but having to make the most of limited information. It is one thing when long-term strategic assessments are based on limited secret intelligence, for they can be bolstered by past experience and open sources, but when it comes to tactical intelligence, intended to guide short-term actions, these limitations can result in serious errors. If it is the case, as appears to have happened during the crisis over two islets within Greek territorial waters that erupted in 1996, then the consequences can be deadly. Politicians with a poor grasp of how intelligence works and Dr Dimitrakis gives the example of Prime Minister Costas Simiitis in 1996, risk allowing themselves to become far too reliant on weak data. This book confirms basic but important lessons.
Even when it is politically awkward for them to do so, intelligence agencies can play a vital role by challenging the preconceptions and predispositions of their political masters. As this book demonstrates, whatever the elite suspicions of long-term Turkish intentions, a cool look at Ankara’s actual diplomatic, economic and military resources would have demonstrated the unlikelihood of any aggressive adventures. At the same time they must never ‘over-sell’ their product, especially at times of crisis, needing to make sure that policymakers and the wider public are aware that not everything can be known about the attitudes and behaviour of adversaries.
Sir Lawrence Freedman KCMG, CBE, FBA, FKC May 2010
Introduction
From the 1970s to the mid-1990s, the Greek-Turkish confrontation on NATO’s southeast flank was considered a fact of life by government officials, diplomats and officers. Greek-Turkish disputes over Cyprus and the Aegean continue to this day and dogfights in the Aegean skies are almost a daily occurrence. The two countries have not altered their policies and have continued to deploy their armed forces on both sides of the Aegean Sea, watching each other. While the issue of post 9/11 international security preoccupies most other governments, Athens and Ankara continue to view each other’s intentions with suspicion. Athens, has been especially suspicious of Turkey’s hostile strategic intentions towards Greek sovereign rights in the Aegean. The post-Cold War expansion of Turkish arms procurement programmes, the influence of the military in Turkish politics and the rise of new issues over the Aegean caused by Turkish diplomacy, indicates to the Greeks a revisionist Turkey ready to exploit any opportunity and crisis in order to advance her own interests at the expense of Greece.
The author provides background information on post-1974 Greek foreign policies and domestic politics and focuses his research on the tenures of Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and of Prime Minister Costas Simitis in the crisis days of March 1987 and January 1996 respectively. The 1980s was the last decade of the Cold War. However Greece and Turkey, two NATO allies, continued to regard each other with hostility. In the 1990s, during the era of the ‘New World Order’, with ethnic conflicts erupting in the Balkans, Greece continued suspecting the motives of Turkish foreign policy and the ever expanding military procurement programmes of Ankara.
The Greek-Turkish confrontation – from the Cyprus insurgency in 1955, to the Turkish invasion of the Cyprus Republic in 1974 and today’s Aegean dogfights1 – has proven to be resistant to international diplomatic initiatives by other NATO member states, arms limitation treaties and the geo-strategic changes in the international environment. Present multinational co-operations against the threat of Islamic terrorism seem to have had no influence on the way the two countries regard each other. In order to understand the course of Greek-Turkish relations from the 1970s to the 1990s, it is necessary to study the patterns and accuracy of Greek threat assessments and attempt to assess their influence over Greek policy making towards Turkey.
The chapters follow a thematic narrative, as it is vital to address a number of interrelated historical, political and bureaucratic factors which were pertinent to Greek intelligence performance from the 1970s to the 1990s. Chapter I examines Greek foreign policy and domestic politics in the 1970s and 1980s with reference to Prime Ministers Constantinos Karamanlis and Andreas Papandreou. There is also an assessment regarding the objectives of legislation for the Greek intelligence service and of the Ministry of Defence decision-making process in the 1970s, 80s and 90s. Following this is an outline of the history of the Greek-Turkish disputes since the 1970s and the legal and policy positions of each party. The way in which the legal position of Greece is presented in the Aegean disputes is of great importance because arguments of legality and perceptions of sovereign rights had a direct impact on military threat assessments. The Greeks assumed that the seemingly weak legal position of Turkey in the Aegean led Ankara to seek a resolution of the dispute by means of political manipulation or coercion. Chapter II explores the strategic assessments of the Greek military intelligence on Turkish intentions, arms programmes, deployments, propaganda and covert operations against Greece in the 1980s and 90s.
Finally, Chapter III describes the nature and the intensity of the confrontation in the Aegean by placing emphasis on the Greek-Turkish dogfights that have defined the level of tactical engagements until today. Focusing on the Greek-Turkish crises and the role of intelligence, the two following chapters deal with the major Greek-Turkish confrontations that include substantial military deployments in the Aegean; the crises of March 1987 and January 1996. Following a chronological narrative, this study provides a documented, balanced and rigorous description of the crisis days and the crisis management styles of Greek leadership. The crises chapters narrate the ways in which Greek intelligence interpreted Turkish intentions and how Greek politicians interacted with top officers. Both crises