Greek Military Intelligence and the Crescent. Dr. Panagiotis Dimitrakis
and this potentially causes the formulation of an over exaggerated threat estimate. Moreover, problems occur because of an inadequate understanding of the opponent’s military doctrine and foreign and defence policy establishments. History is abundant with examples of the misperception of motives and doctrines. This is especially evident in the Turco-Greek case as the burden of history of confrontation has influenced the way in which politicians and military officers have viewed Turkish intentions toward Greece during and after the invasion of Cyprus in 1974. In the 1980s, the emergence of a nationalistic/neo-Ottoman rhetoric in Turkey influenced the way Greek politicians and Greek public opinion perceived Ankara’s strategic intentions. However as shown in Chapters II and III, a dispassionate analyst would have hypothesised that Ankara did not have the military, financial and diplomatic capabilities to pursue an aggressive nationalist foreign policy.
In assessing intelligence concepts and methods, it is necessary to refer to factors that may corrupt an estimate. ‘Mirror imaging’ is an analytical obstacle that has not been previously studied by Greek analysts or academics. Mirror imaging refers to the projection of one’s own way of thinking, culture and political history, onto the opponent. Phrases like ‘they must know…’, ‘they probably realise that..’. or ‘it is logical for them to react that way..’. represent honest attempts to create a framework for understanding the mentality of the opponent.15 The assessment of the opponent’s way of thinking is linked and compared to one’s own standards. Interestingly, the Anglo-American concept of mirror imaging is related to a famous ancient Greek saying: ‘You shall not judge by your own affairs those of others’. As demonstrated in Chapters II and III, some Greek politicians and the public opinion might have overestimated the perceived Turkish threat because of the strong influence of the Turkish military in domestic politics. Besides, Greek diplomats and generals strongly believed that a semi-autocratic regime, like that of Turkey in the 1980s and 90s, harboured aggressive intentions toward Greece. They argued that Greece, a true democracy since 1974, had no expansionist intentions toward Ankara and that the invasion of Cyprus, along with the Turkish resolve to continue the occupation of the northern part of the island, proved the existence of a militarily aggressive Turkey. Greek officials strongly believed and still believe, in Immanuel Kant’s argument that ‘democracies do not fight each other’16 and that it is ‘logical’ to expect aggression from a regime where the military has considerable influence in the political process.17 The politicians’ and the public’s collective memory of the invasion of Cyprus in 1974 has largely shaped the understanding of Turkey’s intentions towards Greece in the post 1974 era.18
One area of military intelligence, which has had particular relevance to the Greek-Turkish confrontation, is the well-heard argument that the opponent’s forces are always deployed offensively and not defensively and have been far too numerous to have been undertaking defensive missions. During the Cold War, Western analysts estimated that the Soviet forces could launch surprise offensive land operations at short notice and with no time for a political signal to be received by Western governments. This analysis created the almost unchallenged assumption that Soviet military capabilities and their deployment indicated the Kremlin’s intentions. However the explanation that the Kremlin did not have expansionist intentions was not accepted by these pessimistic analysts. Soviet strategists had in fact made rational contingency plans in response to a Western offensive and in the case of such an event they would initiate an intensive counter-attack. It is understood that there has to be a constant attempt for accurate and critical analysis of the way the opponent views his own capabilities and those of his opponent’s.19 The fact that the opponent state can use its capabilities does not mean that it will employ them during a crisis.20 In the interviews retired Greek generals argued that the composition and the deployment of Turkish forces in East Thrace and Anatolia were offensive in nature, using offensive weaponry, assets such as landing craft and paratrooper regiments and offensive war plans, indicated by exercises featuring air drops and beach landings. They also believed that Ankara had reformulated her military doctrine on US air-land battles in the early 1980s. Nonetheless, these military officers did not elaborate further on the assessments of Turkish operational doctrine and did not mention the possibility of another explanation. For example, the Turkish General Staff planners did not have strategic depth in East Thrace (Turkey) in response to a Greek land offensive and this may explain why Ankara chose to assume an offensive posture. Moreover, historically, the Turkish Army in East Thrace enjoyed high symbolism as it traditionally guarded the borders of Ottoman Istanbul/Constantinople. With regards to the Turkish air-land battle doctrine, one could argue that in the 1980s, this US-NATO concept was the most available and familiar for the pro-Western, Turkish military, equipped with US-made weaponry and sharing training with US and NATO member states military since the early 1950s.
Generally, long-term Greek intelligence assessments, following certain US intelligence analysis patterns, tended to over-exaggerate Turkish intentions, military capabilities and the operational performance of her weaponry.21 Usually, Western and Greek planners reacted against the ambivalence and ambiguity of data by assuming the ‘worst-case scenario’.22 Unshakable assumptions of the hostile intentions of the opponent state may just be poor analysis leading to poor foreign policy. The analytical approach adopted by some top Greek politicians and officers of always assuming the worst and the side effects of misinterpreted intelligence in crisis decision-making have yet to be addressed by Greek scholars. However it is worth noting that this research and the interviews conducted reveal that no Turcophobic mentality existed in the key service echelons of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the NIS or the MoD in the 1980s and 90s.
Leadership and Intelligence
Politicians are described as ‘human beings and political animals’ and this duality affects their response toward intelligence estimates. Declared policies should enhance political and ideological credibility and secure re-election, even though contrary evidence may be clearly evident.23 Former Deputy Director of South African National Intelligence Service, Shan McCarthy, has studied the influence of self-confidence on a politician’s way of thinking. The politician believes that his personal success (i.e. to be elected President, Prime Minister or to be appointed member of the cabinet) is mainly the result of good personal judgement and superior decision-making skills.24 Politicians constantly acquire their own information from personal contacts with fellow foreign leaders in private discussions. Gradually, they become ‘analysts on their own’ and tend to only trust a small, intimate circle of political advisors who may not have specialised training and experience in intelligence matters. The intelligence bureaucracy is not always well informed about the estimates of their political superiors. This means that senior intelligence officials who do not take into consideration the views and priorities of the politicians they serve, may find their estimates deemed irrelevant by top-level decision-makers. Former head of Israeli military intelligence, Shlomo Gazit, comments on the requirement of ‘chemistry’ between the political leader and his intelligence chief, the importance of a reciprocal relationship, mutual trust and the need for constant communication, directions and feedback.25 However all these useful suggestions derive from his own military experience in the 1970s and 1980s, decades in which Israel was engaged in conflict with the Arabs, Egypt and Syria. Within the historical context of the 1980s and 1990s, the relationship between leaders and intelligence chiefs constituted different behavioural and structural arrangements in different cases. The experience of a Greek officer, who may have studied the Turkish armed forces for years but was not called up to fight in Cyprus or in the Aegean, is vastly different to an Israeli officer who found himself either on the desert battlefield in protection of his homeland or in constant dramatic communications with his political leadership during a conflict.
Others argue that leadership intelligence challenges the intelligence cycle and may cause confusion in the echelons of the intelligence and foreign policy establishment.26 The Anglo-American concept of the ‘politicisation of intelligence’ encompasses the attempts of the political and military leadership to influence the mid-level analyst’s estimates and conclusions in favour of their subjective policy positions.27 There are types and degrees of politicisation. As demonstrated in this study, the Greek ‘politicisation of intelligence’ took place in a domestic political context. It did not include the biased analysis of foreign threats or pressure from higher echelons on mid-level intelligence analysts. In these cases, Greek politicians simply ignored the foreign affairs and defence bureaucracy. Throughout