Israel in Africa. Yotam Gidron
and hardly any weapons. As early as 1961, southern leaders began appealing for Israeli assistance, writing letters to Jerusalem and knocking on the doors of Israeli embassies across Africa.1 Israeli officials, however, were reluctant to support them. They understood that the war in Sudan represented a golden opportunity for fuelling the tensions between Africans and Arabs, something that could only strengthen Israel in the international sphere. But the southern secessionist agenda was unpopular among African leaders, and Israel did not want to damage its diplomatic efforts on the continent by supporting the controversial cause of a non-state armed group.
It was Israel’s expansion during the war of 1967 that eventually led its leaders to change their minds. Throughout the mid-1960s, tensions between Israel and Syria escalated, prompting mutual exchanges of threats between Israel and its neighbours that resulted in the situation in the entire region spiralling out of control. On 15 May 1967 Egyptian troops entered the Sinai Peninsula and Egypt expelled the UN forces that had been based there since the 1956 Suez campaign. On 22 May Nasser announced the closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. Not before securing American approval, on 5 June Israel launched a surprise attack, starting a war that ended on 10 June in a major Israeli victory. Within these six days Israel occupied the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip, the Jordanian West Bank and the Syrian Golan Heights.2
Israel’s new occupation of Arab territories complicated its diplomatic position in Africa and altered its security concerns, which now focused on preserving its grip over territories and populations far beyond its original boundaries.3 These developments unavoidably also drew Sudan and the Horn of Africa more clearly into the Middle Eastern conflict. In the following years, a war of attrition unfolded between Israel and Egypt, whose troops were stationed on the eastern and western banks of the Suez Canal. Egypt received most of its military support from the Soviets, but Sudan also lent a hand. The Mossad calculated that increasing the capacity of the rebels in southern Sudan would keep the Sudanese military busy at home, and suggested Israel should act. Golda Meir, who became Israel’s prime minister in March 1969, approved the initiative. During the following two years, the Mossad led a covert operation that involved airdropping arms and humanitarian aid inside the headquarters of the southern Sudanese rebel group Anya-Nya and training its members in guerrilla warfare.
All Israeli assistance was provided via one southern rebel officer, Joseph Lagu. Thanks to Israel’s support, Lagu was able to consolidate his position as the leader of the southern struggle, much to the dismay of other politicians who saw themselves pushed aside. The weapons Israel sent to Sudan were mainly Syrian and Jordanian booty captured during the 1967 conflict: limited in scope and sophistication but nonetheless significant given that the rebels previously had hardly any weapons.4 Small delegations of Israeli military advisors, doctors and communication experts travelled through Uganda into Sudan to train the rebels, while additional equipment was transferred through western Ethiopia. The entire operation was carried out with the consent of Ethiopia, Kenya and, above all, Uganda, whose territories Israeli advisors used to sneak into Sudan. To maximise the impact of the operation in the international sphere, the Mossad also embarked on a secret propaganda campaign and disseminated posters and leaflets on behalf of Anya-Nya across the world, publicising the atrocities Khartoum, the Egyptians and the Soviets were committing against Africans.5
If the involvement in Sudan was a Mossad-led clandestine operation, after the 1967 war Israeli security agencies were quietly dominating Israel’s presence in neighbouring countries as well. In Ethiopia, Israel began to promote a new secret military alliance (codenamed ‘coffee’) that envisioned the establishment of a joint Israeli–Ethiopian base in Assab, on the Red Sea, though the plan did not materialise.6 In Uganda, Israeli military advisors were working in close cooperation with the Ugandan chief of staff, Idi Amin, who also used Israel’s assistance and advice to take power in a military coup in January 1971. In exchange for Israeli support – and, according to some accounts, bribes – Amin advanced Israel’s strategic and economic interests in Uganda, which included free access to southern Sudan.7
Israel’s fall from grace in Africa
For Israel, the occupation of Sinai was a strategic asset at home and a diplomatic headache in Africa. On the one hand, Israel occupied Egyptian – therefore African – territory, refused to withdraw from it and soon began establishing military bases and civilian settlements in it. This made it increasingly difficult for Israel to fend off Arab and Soviet allegations that it is a colonial power or for African states to continue to claim that the Israeli–Arab conflict is of no relevance to Africa and should be kept off the OAU’s agenda. On the other hand, with Sinai under control, Israel secured an invaluable buffer zone that protected it from potential Egyptian attacks and regained free access through the Straits of Tiran – advantages it was not willing to give up easily.
In the months following the 1967 war, the future of the occupied territories seemed unclear, and African states remained divided on the matter. The only country to sever ties with Israel following the war was Guinea. When the UN General Assembly in July 1967 voted on two resolutions – one supported by the US and considered more Israel-friendly, and the other supported by the Soviet Union and considered more Arab-friendly – 17 African states that had diplomatic ties with Israel supported the US-backed resolution, and only 9 supported the Soviet-backed one.8 At least in this case, Israel’s Africa policy seemed to have paid off, even though neither of the resolutions achieved a sufficient number of votes to be adopted.
It was eventually the UN Security Council that set the tone for the post-1967 negotiations between Israel and its neighbours with Resolution 242, adopted unanimously in November 1967. In essence, the Resolution called for peace in exchange for Israel’s withdrawal from the lands it had occupied during the war. A UN mediator, Dr Gunnar Jarring, was tasked with promoting the implementation of the Resolution, but the negotiations in the following years went nowhere. Israel insisted that it would only withdraw once a peace agreement was achieved following direct negotiations, while Egypt and Jordan insisted that first Israel had to withdraw from their territories.9 Meanwhile, Israel consolidated its control over the lands it had occupied during the war. After its remarkable military victory in 1967, its leaders believed that time was on their side.
At the OAU, however, the consensus was gradually shifting against Israel. In September 1967 the OAU issued a somewhat neutral ‘declaration’ expressing its ‘concern’ about the ‘grave situation’ in Egypt.10 A year later, a resolution was adopted calling for Israel’s withdrawal from ‘all Arab territories occupied’ during the 1967 war, and appealing to ‘all Member States of the OAU to use their influence to ensure a strict implementation of this Resolution’.11 In the following years, the Israeli–Arab conflict featured regularly in OAU meetings, as members reiterated their call for the implementation of Resolution 242.12 Behind the principled position on the territorial integrity of a fellow African state, there was another material reason for African concern with the issue. Following the 1967 war, the Suez Canal was shut down. For every year that it remained closed, East African nations were losing some $125 million: the prices of their imports increased and the revenues they earned from exports dropped, as ships had to travel all the way around the Cape of Good Hope. South Africa was therefore the one benefiting, and Israel’s refusal to withdraw from Sinai was seen as the main obstacle to solving the matter.13
One of the more interesting developments in the African position towards the Middle East at the time was the OAU’s ambitious yet ultimately failed attempt to mediate between Israel and Egypt in order to bring the politically uncomfortable and economically damaging stalemate to an end. In February 1971, in response to a proposal made by Jarring, Egypt agreed to enter peace negotiations with Israel. By then, Golda Meir had become Israel’s prime minister, having replaced Levi Eshkol, who died earlier in 1969. Replying to Jarring’s proposal, however, Meir’s government refused to commit to withdrawing to the pre-war borders, thus undermining his initiative.14 The OAU adopted a resolution deploring ‘Israel’s defiance to that initiative’, and requesting the OAU chairperson, then Ould Daddah of Mauritania, to ‘consult with the Heads of State and Government so that they use their influence to ensure the full implementation of this resolution’.15
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