Israel in Africa. Yotam Gidron
to Rabin and became minister of defence. Yigal Allon, who served as an IDF general during the 1948 war and was Rabin’s commander in pre-state Palmach militia, was Israel’s new foreign minister.35
If military figures dominated Israel’s government, the military industries began to dominate its international strategy and economy. After the 1973 war, Israel’s deterrence had to be restored. This meant rebuilding its army and, equally important, ensuring that it was as self-sufficient as possible.36 As the Israeli defence industry massively expanded in the following years, experimenting with new and increasingly sophisticated technologies, the scale of Israeli arms exports soared. In 1967 Israel’s total arms exports were estimated at around $30 million, most of which was ammunition. By 1973, this number had more or less doubled. By the early 1980s, the figure was above $1 billion annually.37 To guarantee that the expansion of the defence establishment remained viable, Israeli leaders were soon ready to sell arms to whomever agreed to buy them. And their customers were exactly those states ready to buy arms from anyone who agreed to sell them.
The most significant ramification of these processes – politically and economically – was the emergence of an alliance between Israel and the one African state it had previously tried to publicly avoid. Until the early 1970s, Jerusalem had an ambivalent relationship with South Africa. The South African Jewish community was one of the most important financial donors to Israel, and since the war of 1948, young Jewish South Africans regularly travelled to Israel to volunteer in its military – a ‘tradition of military pilgrimage’ that has continued until today.38 But Israel’s opposition to apartheid kept the two states apart. Not only did Israel regularly vote against South Africa in the UN, but some of the most vocal anti-apartheid activists in South Africa were Jewish. As Israel was losing ground in Africa, however, the similarities between the Jewish state and apartheid South Africa – two besieged, exclusive communities that viewed themselves as outposts of the West in a hostile, Soviet-dominated environment – became increasingly apparent, the identification between their leaders and publics grew, and their interests began to converge.
After the events of October 1973 and under the leadership of Shimon Peres on the Israeli side and Defence Minister P. W. Botha on the South African side, negotiations began on a comprehensive and far-reaching defence cooperation.39 In 1976, South African Prime Minister John Vorster travelled to Israel on an official visit, giving the emerging relationship a public facet. But, as Sasha Polakow-Suransky shows in his detailed study of this alliance, its true nature and scope remained confidential. Away from the public’s eyes, the defence elites of both countries developed remarkably close ties as they were regularly shuttling between Tel Aviv and Johannesburg, sharing intelligence and experiences in counterinsurgency warfare and developing new military technologies. Covert arms trade and military cooperation flourished and continued well after the UN Security Council in November 1977 passed a mandatory arms embargo against Pretoria. By 1979, some 35% of Israeli military exports were heading to South Africa – Israel’s largest arms client.40 The cooperation probably reached its most extreme level of secrecy with the collaboration in the development of nuclear bombs and delivery systems. The two countries exchanged not only knowledge in this field but also nuclear materials and are widely believed to have conducted a nuclear test together in the South Atlantic Ocean in September 1979.41
Another country that maintained a similarly discreet and highly influential relationship with Israel after 1973 was Ethiopia. In 1974, a revolution led to the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie and the emergence of the socialist Derg regime, led by Mengistu Haile Mariam. So deep was Israeli involvement in Ethiopia until 1973 that Israeli Ethiopianist Haggai Erlich has argued that the inability of the imperial establishment to deal with the popular protests it faced in 1974 was partly the result of the expulsion of Israeli military advisors from the country.42 Soon after Mengistu took power, he followed in the steps of the emperor he had deposed and turned to Israel, seeking both military support and assistance with convincing Washington to continue its support to Ethiopia despite the brutality of its new Marxist-inspired regime. The Derg saw as its ultimate objective the establishment of a united centralised nation state in Ethiopia and continued to fight secessionists in the northern part of the country. Like Israel, it had an interest in preventing an independent Eritrea.
In return for access to Ethiopian ports in the Red Sea, Israel trained the Ethiopian military and supplied it with ammunition and spare parts.43 The Derg also allowed several members of the Beta Israel community – the Jews of Ethiopia – to leave the country for Israel.44 Before Mengistu managed to secure Soviet support, Israel tried to advocate on his behalf in the US and to mobilise President Jimmy Carter’s support for a strong Israeli–Ethiopian cooperation, but Carter was unconvinced and reportedly perplexed by the importance the Israelis attached to the issue.45 The covert Israeli–Ethiopian relationship temporarily fell apart in early 1978, when Moshe Dayan, then Israel’s foreign minister, accidentally (or not) exposed it in an interview. The Derg responded in anger but admitted that the relationship existed because Israel was the only country that agreed to sell arms to Ethiopia.46 According to Mossad veteran Yossi Alpher, Siad Barre, the president of Somalia, discreetly approached Israel, presumably hoping to attract Israeli and American support after the Soviets switched sides and abandoned him for Mengistu, but he was rebuffed.47
Meanwhile, just across the border from Ethiopia and Somalia, cooperation between Israeli and Kenyan security and intelligence agencies was also maintained despite the lack of formal bilateral ties. This relationship was particularly close, allowing Israel to carry out in 1976 the famous ‘Operation Entebbe’. In July that year Israel sent its commando units to Uganda to raid Entebbe airport and release Israeli hostages that were held there after their plane was hijacked by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Kenya quietly provided support and allowed Israeli planes to refuel in Nairobi on their way back to Israel. In fact, earlier that same year, Israeli intelligence secretly cooperated with Kenya to thwart another attack by the PFLP – an attempt to shoot down an Israeli aircraft departing from Nairobi. Jomo Kenyatta was promised absolute confidentiality with regard to his country’s cooperation with Israel on the matter.48
Конец ознакомительного фрагмента.
Текст предоставлен ООО «ЛитРес».
Прочитайте эту книгу целиком, купив полную легальную версию на ЛитРес.
Безопасно оплатить книгу можно банковской картой Visa, MasterCard, Maestro, со счета мобильного телефона, с платежного терминала, в салоне МТС или Связной, через PayPal, WebMoney, Яндекс.Деньги, QIWI Кошелек, бонусными картами или другим удобным Вам способом.