Making Arguments: Reason in Context. Edmond H. Weiss
usually follows various models, philosophies, or paradigms. That is, a judge tends to have a predisposition to look at argument in a particular way. Such judging philosophies are neither monolithic nor pure. Rather, they are archetypes—models of reasoning—that individuals identify with and embrace. And these models of judging are so potent that they can even overcome important philosophical or political disagreements. For example, conservative and liberal judges have been known to reach the same conclusions at a debate—presumably because their models of judgment (jurisprudence) were similar.
The following list is useful for advocates in considering how to frame and present their arguments before particular judges, or in specific arenas:
Tabula Rasa—literally, the judge is a “blank slate.” This concept of the judge suggests examination of an argument without presuppositions. That is, the judge is a competent and intelligent person who, in effect, knows nothing about, and has no prejudice toward, the issues in play. Within the tabula rasa paradigm, the impulse to vote for or support an argument merely because it confirms the judge’s opinions is, purportedly, completely suppressed. One’s beliefs on, say, whether marijuana should be legalized are set aside while hearing the arguments.
This judge, though not an expert on the issue under discussion, is an expert on how to render a judgment. So, whatever knowledge he or she brings to the debate is set outside the evaluative process. What the judge knows, as well as what he or she understands that the advocates do not, does not enter the controversy. Although the tabula rasa judge could easily suggest how one or another advocate could prevail in the dispute, he or she steps back and lets the advocates sink or swim on their own.
Every philosophy of judging carries with it some of the tabula rasa core. The perceived fairness and objectivity of the judge weighs in all judging criteria. The extent to which the judge is detached from the content-issues, while still using expertise to evaluate the arguments, is a desideratum, a primary requirement, in the resolution of all controversies.
The Policymaker—in this view, the judge is deciding on a course of action. He or she is weighing alternatives, and may even “enter” the controversy as a schooled expert on what it is and how to evaluate it. The policy maker is concerned less with burdens of proof and more with effective action. Does the controversy yield an improvement for society? Will it have measurable effects and outcomes? And how will these outcomes compare to rival or alternative actions? Policymaker judges tend to make their own inquiries, ask questions, examine evidence, and lay out justifications themselves for acting (or not acting). In this case, the interventions of the judge may sometimes make the weaker argument into the stronger.
The Critic—this judge views the controversy as an aesthetic conflict. In this view, advocacy is primarily an artistic enterprise, and the advocates must be, by both nature and training, artful communicators. The judge is likely to render a decision based on who were the “superior advocates,” that is, the better practitioners of the forms and styles of proper argumentation. In this context, superiority is a judgment about virtuosity, or facility in argumentation. Advocates are judged like competitors in a piano competition. Technique and interpretation are highly valued dimensions of artistic expression, and, therefore, how “beautifully” one argues is important in gaining the judge’s adherence to one’s claims.
The Educator—this judge wants to teach the advocates how to argue. The judge might offer an educational critique while the advocates engage, or provide feedback on the advocates’ performance. The impulse of the Educator is to strengthen the advocates. He or she is forever trying to improve the process of advocacy, and wants to see arguers’ continuous improvement. The educator’s role can easily be merged with the critic’s role, in that teaching advocacy and judging its artfulness go hand in hand.
The Theorist—the theorist is trying to derive over-arching, perhaps philosophical, principles from the controversy. For the theorist, advocacy is not necessarily about the specific issue or case that is under consideration. Rather, the judge looks for that abstract or theoretical principle that guides his/her decision. The decision to accept a particular argument is based more on its adherence to an ideal concept. This ideal concept need not be expressed as an abstraction or a moral precept; it can be as simple as “rationality” or “consistency.”
The Jurist—this judge is committed to protecting the process within which advocacy proceeds. He or she may render a decision on purely procedural or formal grounds. The “victory” to one advocate or another might be achieved on a technicality, or by deference to a regulative rule. (“Technicality” is what the losing side calls the procedural flaw.) Fairness and egalitarianism dominate the argumentative enterprise, and anything that can corrupt the purity of an essentially judicial process—equal cases treated equally—is to be eschewed.
The Politician—this judge evaluates positions on their efficacy in achieving a public objective. When a judge renders a decision politically, he or she is evaluating an argument on the criterion of expediency. Often issues are framed in terms of a compelling societal need, and so the judge must determine the best course of action.
The Scientist—this judge emphasizes the extensiveness of evidence in support of the position. In this context, advocacy demands production and presentation of all relevant data, research, and investigative evidence. Typically, the judge’s primary focus will be on the quality of evidence, the quantity of evidence, and/or the method by which the evidence was obtained. The judge, in such cases, acts like a research scientist, evaluating all the available evidence. This judge’s decision is guided by strict adherence to the rules of inference, inferential statistics, and scientific testing of hypotheses and theories.
How Judging Philosophies Work
The judging philosophies are archetypes or ideals. In practice, no one can evaluate an argument exclusively from one of these judging perspectives. Indeed, any particular instance will almost certainly represent a hybrid of two or more of these judging postures. At college and high school debate tournaments, judges are often asked to write and submit their “judging philosophies.” This allows the debaters to learn about how a given judge might respond. When there are multiple judges in a debate, the debaters may need to employ complicated argumentative strategies to address the diversity of judging viewpoints.
Here are some specific illustrations of how advocates might have to adapt their debating strategies to reflect the expectations of their judges:
Tabula Rasa. The judge knows something of the issue, but needs to be schooled about the severity of the problem. (What exactly is a “stem cell”?) He or she will need to appreciate the compelling nature of the problem, as well as society’s complicity in the problem’s continuation. The judge will want to know what the advocates offer as a remedy for the problem, as well as some good evidence and argument that the proposed remedy can work. At any point in the debate, the judge could decide that he or she does not have substantial proof for a given issue, and decide not to entertain any possibility of change in a direction away from the status quo.
Policymaker. This judge understands the issue, and can even offer guidance for alleviating the confusion associated with the conflict. Indeed, this judge may be more disposed toward negotiation than toward winner-take-all debate competitions. He or she will not assist one side or the other in making decision, but may synthesize an outcome that was not obvious in the presentation of disparate positions.
Critic. The judge’s decision is more idiosyncratic. The likes and dislikes of the judge may influence the decision. Preferences of taste, appropriateness, decorum, and execution greatly vary among judges adopting a critical paradigm. In this case, debaters might have to rethink their vocabulary, the order in which they present arguments, the kinds of data that are most compelling, even their clothing and personal demeanor.
Educator. The educator often imparts a sense of equifinality in a debate, a term from systems theory suggesting that the current point in the argument could have been reached by many means. While a “decision” is reached, the debaters have a lot to learn, and the decision