Making Arguments: Reason in Context. Edmond H. Weiss
can be made.
Theorist. The theorist will look for a principle to vote for. If the advocates can enunciate a principle, it may help them win favor with the judge. If we are debating the Patriot Act, for example, an advocate might argue that safety and security supersede freedom as goals in our society. The judge’s adherence to the principle could help one side to prevail over the other.
Jurist. One must know the rules and guidelines for advocacy and adhere to those requirements that apply to the current context. Procedural rules must be followed. Evidentiary standards must be upheld. Only permissible argumentative behaviors are tolerated. Fairness must be maintained. Neither side in the controversy can have an advantage stemming from violating the rules; nor can the judge can render a decision based on such an unfair advantage. Indeed, the jurist judge may be skeptical toward an entire argument if even a small part of it violates “due process.”
Politician. The judge wants a remedy and will vote for the plan that can be implemented as quickly as possible. The judge is driven by a sense of the urgency of the issue, and debaters should stress the directness with which the urgency can be resolved. Politician judges are particularly skeptical toward proposals that seem to delay or stall action.
Scientist. The judge may ask for evidence, and may expect the advocates to know what the evidence means and how it was gathered. The scientist judge will expect an advocate to answer any indictments of the evidence, and defend it against other studies and counter-evidence. Debaters would be unwise to overstate the certainty in the data and should never appear to be suppressing contrary or inconvenient facts. Scientists are especially wary of false claims of cause-and-effect, especially the reasoning error known as the “false positive.”
Modalities of Judgment
The classification and description of these philosophies does not tell the whole story when it comes to judging arguments. First, there are many other ways to describe judging paradigms, as well as an indefinitely large number of additional judging philosophies. Second, and more important, the judging philosophies are greatly influenced and nuanced by differences among individuals acting in their capacities as judges. We cannot pretend that the variability among people does not also factor into how individuals judge arguments. In fact, we acknowledge that those differences among individuals can account for as much (or possibly more) of what goes into judging an argument than do the judging philosophies.
Most important, in any given context the judge may move beyond a single model for judging arguments and offer himself or herself as an amalgamation, a cluster of paradigms for assessing argumentative outcome. Further, multiple judges can share roles and responsibilities, shifting and adjusting paradigms as the situation merits.
Since the latter half of the twentieth century--in response to the work of Stephen Toulmin, Chaim Perelman, and Charles Willard--argumentation scholars have been much more receptive to the idea that well-made arguments are constructed with the judge in mind. And this new tolerance has carried over to the teaching of argumentative practice as well. For example, at many high school and college debate tournaments, coaches (who will serve as judges for other teams than their own) submit elaborate descriptions of their own judging philosophies.
Debaters, who have access to these descriptions, rely upon reading them as a way to reshape and reframe their argumentative strategy for this or that debate round. The debaters do not throw away their original arguments, but they do adapt, restructure, and change the emphasis in ways they believe will please and influence the respective judging philosophies. This is much more than mere audience adaption. It is a subtle, even nuanced response to the shifting modalities of judgment. Making arguments in this sense means applying reason not just to the arguments themselves, but, more important, to the context of judgment.
To illustrate, consider this actual judging philosophy written by a teacher of academic debate:
The process by which I arrive at a decision is unbiased, based upon reasonableness, and my perception of what is fair. I as a judge am obligated to explain my decision clearly, and in a way that will benefit all the advocates involved. For me, argument is communicative activity offering all the participants the opportunity to learn.
As a judge, I will try to hold all participants to the criteria that have been developed for how argument should take place in competitions. My decision in this debate will be my own, and will neither be influenced by my relationship with any of the advocates nor by my consultations with others (including other possible judges of the debate).
In striving to be fair and unbiased, I will evaluate a round of debate based upon the rules specific to the event. I will make sure that argumentative rules are followed, and will enforce violation of rules with penalties that can include sanctions as severe as forfeiting the debate; employ critical judgment, making sure not to disadvantage any team or participant based upon what I know of other teams and participants.
In evaluating the debate, I will present a written ballot, justifying the reasons for my decision. In this written ballot, I will take the opportunity both to explain the reasoning behind my decision and to offer informative, thoughtful critiques that provide students with a foundation for improvement.
Consequently, I will be diligent and thorough in completing my ballot. It is not enough for me merely to choose a winner. Following a debate, I will take time to elaborate (even orally, if there is time) upon what I viewed as the central issues: I will point out how and why I felt one team prevailed, and identify the shortcomings of both teams, especially the one that lost.
In judging a debate, I will explain to all participants why they were ranked as they were, highlighting points of missed emphasis, or ways in which a given debater failed to produce a necessary argument in a given situation. While my criticism may seem harsh (especially to the side that did not prevail), it will be constructive and be composed with a mind toward the continual improvement of the debaters.
In the end, I appreciate and consider the enormous intellectual commitment of all the debaters I judge, each of whom must express him- or herself in front of an audience while engaged in a sophisticated and difficult process.
My written ballot should be a valuable resource for those I judge, as well as their coaches and team-mates; when students do not know why they have won or lost, they have little opportunity to learn from the experience. The insights gleaned from my ballot can thus give debaters a chance to address the debate skills that need to be mastered. I pledge to write a ballot that is clear and specific, so that debaters will have a precise understanding of my decision-making.
Time permitting, and if I am allowed, I will offer an oral critique of the debate, without revealing my written decision.
This judging philosophy is easily recognizable as an “educator.” Debaters who “pull” this judge at a tournament are advised to approach their argumentative responsibilities as would students in a course where the professor lays down very specific criteria for success in an assignment. Debaters who are conversant with the rules and procedures of academic debate, and who apply the theories and principles of argumentation as they have been taught them, are prepared for this judge.
To a lesser extent, this judge is also exhibiting the assumptions of a “jurist.” He or she is committed to the published guidelines. In the same way that a parliamentarian enforces rules of procedure, this judge is committed to the essential fairness in the process of arguing. The act of arguing must not per se disadvantage one of the participants. All have the right to have their arguments aired.
What is striking about this judging philosophy is how little it reveals about how the judge would actually make the decision. In contrast, consider this much more revealing statement of philosophy:
People have called me a negative judge. By this, I think they mean that I feel, in any given round of debate, that the affirmative has a lot to accomplish. I believe that human beings get a pretty fair shake from the status quo, and I am willing to stay with the