We, the People. Adolph Psy.D. Caso
to the errors of a timid zeal, or to the calumnies of malicious envy.
Moral and political principles which regulate mankind come from three sources: revelation, natural law, and man-made conventions. In its main purpose, the first principle cannot be compared to the other two; but they resemble each other in this respect–they are conducive to our happiness. To consider the relationship of the last does not exclude those of the first two. On the other hand, though the first two are divine and immutable, they were changed by man's false religions and by man's arbitrary notions of vice and virtue that have existed in our corrupt minds. So it seems necessary to examine separately and without any other consideration that which is generated by pure human conventions, either expressed or supposed by common necessity and utility–the idea being that every faction and every moral system must necessarily come to some sort of agreement; for it will always be a praiseworthy enterprise to force the most obstinate and incredulous of men to conform to those principles that induce men to live in a society. There are, therefore, three distinct classes of virtue and of vice: religious, natural, and political. These three classes must never be in contradiction among themselves; but not all the consequences and the obligation derived from one may be derived from the others. Not everything demanded by revelation can be demanded by the natural law; nor anything demanded by the latter is demanded by the pure social law. But is very important to separate that which results from the convention; that is, from the express or tacit agreements of men, because such is the limit of that force that can be legitimately exercised among men, without a special mandate of the Supreme Being. Therefore, the concept of political virtue can unblemishedly be called variable; the one of natural virtue would always be clear and manifest if it were not for the imbecility and passions of men that obscure it; and the one of religious virtue is always both one and constant because it is revealed immediately by God Himself and preserved by Him.
It would therefore be an error to attribute to those who speak of social conventions with their consequences principles contrary either to the natural law or to revelation, because the latter two do not enter into the discussion. It would further be an error for the one who, on speaking about a state of war before discussing the state of society, would give it the Hobbesian's sense that the natural state precedes the political state, instead of taking it as a fact born out of the corruption of human nature and from the lack of an expressed sanction. It would be another error to blame a writer (as though he were committing a crime) who considers the emanations of the social contract, not admitting those very emanations prior to the contract itself.
Both divine and natural justice are their essence immutable and constant because the relation between two similar objects is always the same. But human or political justice, being but a relation between the action and the various states of the society, that relation can vary according as that action becomes necessary or useful to that society; nor can that relation be well discerned unless it is analyzed by the proper individuals in all its complicated and ever-changing relationships of civil combinations. As soon as these principles–essentially distinct from one another are confused, there is no longer any hope to conduct logical arguments on public matters. It is up to the theologians to establish the boundaries of the just and the unjust, for that which deals with the intrinsic evil or goodness of the act: the establishment of the rapport of the just and the unjust–that is, the utility and the harm done to the society, belongs to the individual who deals in public matters; for, an object can never be prejudicial to another, because everyone can easily see how much pure political virtue must give way to the immutable virtue emanated by God.
Whosever–I repeat–should wish to honor me with his criticism, should not begin by supposing that I stand for destructive principles of either virtue in general or of religion. I have already demonstrated that such are not my goals. And, instead of making me out an atheist or of being one having seditious tendencies, the critics should rather attempt to find me out a bad logician or a freshman politician. Do not tremble over each of the sentences that upholds human interests. The critic should convince me, on the other hand, either of the uselessness or of the political harm that could grow out of my principles, and demonstrate to me the advantages of traditional practices. I have given public testimony of my religious beliefs and of my submission to my sovereign with my answers to the "Notes and observations". To answer to ulterior writings similar to those "Notes" would be superfluous. But whoever will write to me with that decency normally expected of honest men and of those enlightened ones who will dispense with my having to prove the first two principles, of whatever character they may be, the critic will find in me a man who will make every effort to answer all the questions. And above all, the critic will find in me a peaceful lover of truth.
Preface of the Translator
To the First Edition
Penal laws, so considerable a part of every system of legislation, and of so great importance to the happiness, peace, and security of every member of society, are still so imperfect, and are attended with so many unnecessary circumstances of cruelty in all nations, that an attempt to reduce them to the standard of reason must be interesting to all mankind. It is not surprising, then, that this little book hath engaged the attention of all ranks of people in every part of Europe. It is now about eighteen months since the first publication; in which time it hath passed no less than six editions in the original language; the third of which was printed within six months after its first appearance. It hath been translated into French; that translation hath also been several times reprinted, and perhaps no book, on any subject, was ever received with more avidity, more generally read, or more universally applauded.
The author is the Marquis Beccaria, of Milan. Upon considering the nature of the religion and government under which he lives, the reasons for concealing his name are obvious; the whole was read, at different times, in a society of learned men in that city, and was published at their desire. As to the translation, I have preserved the order of the original, except in a paragraph or two, which I have taken the liberty to restore to the chapters to which they evidently belong, and from which they must have been accidentally detached. The French translator hath gone much farther; he hath not only transposed every chapter, but every paragraph in the whole book. But in this, I conceive, he hath assumed a right which belongs not to any translator, and which cannot be justified. His disposition may appear more systematical, but certainly the author hath as undoubted a right to the arrangement of his own ideas, as to the ideas themselves; and therefore, to destroy that arrangement, is to pervert his meaning, if he had any meaning in his plan, the contrary to which can hardly be supposed.
With regard to the commentary, attributed to Mons. de Voltaire, my only authority for supposing it his, is the voice of the public, which indeed is the only authority we have for most of his works. Let those who are acquainted with the peculiarity of his manner judge for themselves.
The facts above-mentioned would preclude all apology for this translation, if any apology were necessary, for translating into our language, a work which, from the nature of the subject, must be interesting to every nation; but must be particularly acceptable to the English, from the eloquent and forcible manner in which the author pleads the cause of liberty, benevolence and humanity. It may however be objected, that a treatise of this kind is useless in England, where, from the excellence of our laws and government, no examples of cruelty or oppression are to be found. But it must also be allowed, that much is still wanting to perfect our system of legislation: the confinement of debtors, the filth and horror of our prisons, the cruelty of jailers, and the extortion of the petty officers of justice, to all which may be added the melancholy reflection, that the number of criminals put to death in England is much greater than in any other part of Europe, are considerations which will sufficiently answer every objection. These are my only reasons for endeavoring to diffuse the knowledge of the useful truths contained in this little essay; and I say, with my author, that if I can be instrumental in rescuing a single victim from the hands of tyranny or ignorance, his transports will sufficiently console me for the contempt of all mankind.
Introduction of the Author
In every human society, there is an effort continually tending to confer on one part the height of power and happiness, and to reduce the other to the extreme of weakness and misery.