The British Carrier Strike Fleet. David Hobbs
the Admiralty had tended to build a large number of relatively small task-specific airfields. With the completion of RNAS Culdrose, Cornwall, in 1947,42 however, this changed and a move began towards a smaller number of ‘super-stations’ to reduce the requirement for manpower by basing more tasks on a single airfield. From then onwards surviving airfields were expanded to absorb tasks from smaller air stations which were closed. The overseas airfields provided direct support for the ships on their deployed stations including facilities for squadrons disembarked from carriers, second-line squadrons for fleet requirements duties and small holdings of reserve aircraft to replace those lost or damaged.
By December 1949 the number of air stations in the UK had reduced to sixteen with five air establishments with sixteen air stations held in reserve. Overseas, only the two air stations in Malta remained in commission with Ceylon reduced to reserve at eighteen months’ notice to re-commission and Sembawang in Singapore lent to the RAF. However, with the Communist advances in China and a deteriorating situation in the Far East it was intended to re-commission Sembawang as HMS Simbang in January 1950.43 The timing of this measure could hardly have been better conceived.
Operations
In March 1947 the First Lord of the Admiralty, George Hall,44 stated that the fundamental role of the Royal Navy was to maintain operational fleets that were strong enough to ensure that the UK’s vital lines of supply could be kept open and to provide such support for the United Nations as might be required.45 At the same time, the Navy was to make the minimum demand on the nation’s manpower and material resources. Several commitments that followed the end of the Second World War remained incomplete and continued to absorb effort. These included the support of occupation forces in former enemy territory and the maintenance of law and order in other disturbed regions. Whilst the winding-up of wartime organisations and infrastructure was not yet complete, considerable emphasis had to be placed on the study and application of the wartime lessons learned by the Allies and those which were coming to light from a study of German and Japanese records. As if all this was not enough, the Admiralty was committed to improving conditions of service for peacetime personnel.
The number of aircraft carriers in full commission had reduced quickly after 1946 as the manpower and financial crises took effect. By early 1948, only Ocean and Triumph were in full commission with air groups embarked although Victorious was running as a training ship with a reduced ship’s company.46 After her night-fighter trial, Ocean formed part of the Mediterranean Fleet and demonstrated the various operational roles that aircraft carriers were capable of fulfilling. In October 1946 she gave medical assistance to support the wounded from the destroyers Saumarez and Volage when they were damaged by Albanian mines in the Corfu Channel. In May 1948 with 805 (Seafire F 17) and 816 (Firefly FR 1) NAS embarked she formed part of the RN task force that covered the withdrawal of British forces from Palestine. Her squadrons provided the only air cover available once the RAF airfields ashore were evacuated. In June 1948 she returned to the UK and the squadrons disembarked to re-form as part of the RAN’s first air group.
East of Suez, the last aircraft carrier to serve with the BPF was Theseus with 804 (Seafire FR 47) and 812 (Firefly FR 4/5) NAS embarked between February and December 1947. After she returned to the UK, the BPF was re-designated as the Far East Fleet (FEF) and its air element was run down, with the RN air station in Singapore lent to the RAF and all stocks of aircraft and spare parts on the Far East Station returned to the UK or otherwise disposed of. The civil war between the Communists and Nationalists in China, however, posed a threat to the considerable British interests in the region, including the colony of Hong Kong and the trading city of Shanghai where more than 4000 UK nationals were based. In February 1949 the Nationalist cruiser Chungking, the former RN Arethusa class Aurora, went over to the Communists and was renamed Tchoung King. She was bombed and sunk by Nationalist forces in Taku harbour in March 194947 but was raised and returned to service, albeit in poor condition, in 1951. The maritime threat to the region’s trade was becoming serious but worse was to follow in April 1949 when the frigate Amethyst was on passage up the Yangtze River to relieve the destroyer Consort in providing support for the British Embassy in Nanking, the Nationalist capital. She was fired on and driven ashore on mud banks near Rose Island48 and attempts by Consort to tow her off proved unsuccessful, with both ships suffering damage and a number of dead and injured. The heavy cruiser London attempted to reach her with the frigate Black Swan but after an exchange of fire with Chinese Communist shore batteries she suffered a number of men killed and wounded and had to withdraw. Amethyst managed to break out under cover of darkness in July.
Against this deteriorating background, the decision to reinforce the FEF with an aircraft carrier was a logical step and measures were taken to provide support for the deployed carrier air group. The first of these was the re-commissioning of the naval air station at Sembawang in Singapore. The maintenance carrier Unicorn was re-commissioned from reserve in Devonport and loaded with a considerable outfit of air stores which were intended to re-stock Sembawang. She also carried a number of Seafire FR 47s and Firefly FR 1s in a state of preservation to support the operational carrier air group and replace losses. Having unloaded her stores and aircraft to form an aircraft holding unit (AHU) ashore, Unicorn was in Singapore Naval Base preparing for her passage back to the UK in June 1950. The light fleet carrier Triumph, which had emerged from a refit in Sheerness Dockyard to re-commission on 21 April 1949, was selected as the operational carrier for the FEF. She worked up with 13 Carrier Air Group (CAG), which comprised 800 (Seafire FR 47) and 827 (Firefly FR 1) NAS embarked together with a single Sea Otter amphibian for SAR duties. She sailed in July and on 23 October 1949 took part in Operation ‘LEO’, air strikes against Communist guerrillas in the Malayan jungle areas south of Gemas and Baru Anam in cooperation with ground forces and RAF aircraft.49 On 8 June 1950 she visited Ominato in Japan with other ships of the FEF and six days later began a series of exercises in Japanese waters with ships from the RN and USN. Their extent and timing soon proved to be of critical importance.
Search and rescue before the helicopter; a Sea Otter ASR 2 seen being lowered into the water by crane from Theseus’ flight deck. Note that the engine is running and the aircrewman is on the upper wing ready to release the hook. The ladder, down which he must climb to the cockpit, is just visible below the aircraft’s engine. The aircraft is being held steady by a rope run through the tail wheel strut and held taut by sailors. (Author’s collection)
A Firefly landing on Glory, seen from the ‘plane-guard’ destroyer. The batsman is just visible below the aircraft, his arms and conspicuous bats are slightly below level indicating that he considers the aircraft to be below the ideal glide-slope. Both barriers are raised and the aircraft that have already landed are parked forward in Fly 1. (Author’s collection)
At 04.00 local time on 25 June 1950 the Communist North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) launched an unprovoked attack on South Korea across the 38th Parallel with eight combat divisions, one of which was armoured. It came as a complete surprise, unpredicted by any Western agency and must rank as one of the greatest intelligence failures of the modern era1 although it was not to be the worst in that eventful year. The South Korean Army lacked tanks, artillery and air support and was forced to retreat to the south along roads choked by large numbers of civilian refugees. News of this aggression reached Mr Trygve Lie, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in New York at 03.00 local time, some fourteen hours after the attack. He called an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council immediately and, by unanimous agreement of the nine member nations who were present and who voted,2 the Council placed the blame for the conflict squarely on the North Korean Government. The Secretary-General called on the aggressor to