The British Carrier Strike Fleet. David Hobbs
he warned FO2 by signal that his ships might be required to engage North Korean armed forces in order to implement the UN Security Council’s Resolutions.
Allied Preparations
After a rough but fast passage, Belfast arrived at Yokosuka Naval Base at noon on 27 June and Admiral Andrewes drove immediately to meet COMNAVFE in Tokyo where he found that the latter had just come from a meeting with General MacArthur. Both were deeply concerned about the deteriorating situation in South Korea but Admiral Joy advised that since all British and Commonwealth citizens had already been evacuated, there was no requirement for a humanitarian operation. However, since the Soviet reaction to the mobilisation of UN forces was uncertain, he thought it best for the British task force to concentrate south of Japan having taken on fuel and, as far as possible, provisions. On 28 June Admiral Brind received a signal from the Admiralty authorising him to ‘place the Royal Navy at present in Japanese waters at the disposal of the United States’ Naval Commander for Korean Operations (Vice Admiral C T Joy) in support of the UN Security Council Resolutions’.7 The early meeting between COMNAVFE and FO2 meant that the two admirals understood each other’s views and they now had the authority to move quickly. On 29 June COMNAVFE ordered Admiral Andrewes to deploy his ships immediately to join USN task groups. Jamaica with the frigates Black Swan and Alacrity joined Admiral Higgins USN in the cruiser Juneau off the east coast of South Korea. FO2 himself, now back in Belfast, in company with Triumph and the destroyers Consort and Cossack and the newly-joined HMAS Bataan joined Task Force 77, which included Valley Forge, off Okinawa. From this position the carriers could be used to defend Formosa or Okinawa if necessary or to strike at targets in Korea. All Commonwealth ships adopted USN signal procedures and the joint task forces were able to work well together from the outset. Admiral Andrewes wrote in his report ‘it all seemed so familiar as it was just what we had done so often before during the exercises in March with very similar forces’. It was also only five years since the US and British Pacific Fleets had worked together so successfully in the final phase of the war against Japan.
The First Carrier Strikes
Valley Forge and Triumph formed Task Group 77.3 which was commanded by Rear Admiral Hoskins USN, Commander Carrier Division 3 (COMCARDIV3). Planning for strikes against targets in North Korea began as the force moved north-west into the Yellow Sea and the first strikes by aircraft from the two carriers were flown off between 05.45 and 06.15 on 3 July 1950. Valley Forge launched eight Corsairs, twelve Skyraiders and twelve Panther jet fighters to strike at the North Korean capital Pyongyang which was beyond the radius of action of the USAF B-29 bombers based in Guam. B-29 units were ordered to deploy to airfields in Okinawa but it took considerable time to move their support, weapons, maintenance and spares infrastructure into place, without which the aircraft were useless. Of course, these were all things the aircraft carriers carried with them as they moved, enabling them to choose their ideal launch positions for strike operations. Triumph launched nine Fireflies and twelve Seafires to attack the airfield at Haeju and adjacent railway bridges. Seafire FR 47s were notoriously difficult to maintain and 800 NAS did well to get all the squadron’s aircraft serviceable for the strike. The Seafires were armed with 3in rockets and the Fireflies with 500lb bombs. The two carriers had been allocated separate target areas to take into account the shorter radius of action of the British aircraft but also to spread the impact of their strikes for which the enemy was totally unprepared. The geographical separation of strike targets for aircraft of differing performance or command structure was to become a major feature of strike warfare over Korea in the years ahead. The North Korean Air Force was felt to pose a negligible threat but TF 77 was only 100 miles from Communist Chinese airfields in the Shantung peninsula and 220 miles from Soviet airfields at Port Arthur. The Panthers’ task was to defend the area against both North Korean fighters and any others that might intervene. They shot down two airborne North Korean Yak fighters and destroyed a further nine by strafing them on the ground. Both strikes proved to be successful and all their aircraft returned safely although several had been hit by small-arms fire. Later in the day both carriers ‘aircraft struck at railways in their respective target areas.8 Because the full extent of Communist aggression was not yet clear, these strikes had been planned as a one-day operation but in view of the deteriorating situation in South Korea, TG 77.3 was ordered to remain in action to continue the strikes as long as practical, again showing the flexibility of carrier-based aviation. The greatest priority for strike operations was given to attacks on railway facilities that were being used in support of the NKPA’s drive to the south.
The first British aircraft was lost on 28 July 1950 when Commissioned Pilot White RN of 800 NAS, on combat air patrol (CAP) over the task group in his Seafire, was ordered to intercept a radar contact that was not showing the correct IFF9 response. The contact tuned out to be a USAF B-29 bomber and as White flew up alongside it, one of the gunners opened fire and shot him down ‘for no very apparent reason’.10 He managed to parachute into the sea, suffering from burns, and was rescued from his dinghy by the USN destroyer Eversole which returned him to Triumph later in the day. When informed of the incident COMNAVFE said that ‘the calculated risk of damage to friendly forces must be accepted’; Mr White’s comments were not recorded. It is significant to note that although the RN and USN were familiar with each other’s equipment, the USAF had clearly not been adequately briefed about its Allies’ equipment. After the initial strike operations, FO2 detached from TF 77 with Belfast and his two destroyers and returned to Sasebo Dockyard which Commonwealth warships were to share with their USN counterparts as a forward base throughout the conflict.
Blockade
On his arrival FO2 was able to have further discussions with COMNAVFE who confessed that both he and General MacArthur had been surprised by the UN decision to defend South Korea but were convinced of the correctness of the decision. Rear Admiral Higgins USN joined their discussions and COMNAVFE instructed the two rear admirals to set up a blockade of northern Korea as TF 96. TG 96.5 under Higgins, comprising largely USN ships, was to cover the east coast and TG 96.8, comprising largely British and Commonwealth ships under Andrewes, was to cover the west coast although ships of both task groups could move to the other coast when necessary. This command structure worked well and lasted until the end of the conflict in 1953. COMNAVFE gave clear instructions for the conduct of the blockade which included notes on international law and directions for the treatment of ships that attempted to evade interception. In October 1951 the west coast task group was re-designated as TG 95 with separate elements including the British carrier and its destroyer escort, blockading units, minesweepers and other activities.
There were immediate concerns about the possibility of Soviet submarines from Vladivostok being used to support the NKPA offensive and, after a signalled discussion between Admiral Brind and Admiral Forrest Sherman, the US Chief of Naval Operations, authorisation was given to attack unidentified, submerged submarines inside the designated war zone. The first open-water naval engagement occurred on 2 July 1950 when Jamaica was operating off the east coast with Admiral Higgins’ task group. Four fast patrol boats attacked the group and were engaged by gunfire. Three were sunk and the fourth made off to seaward, zigzagging at high speed. The first action off the west coast occurred on 12 July when the Cossack was engaged by NKPA field guns while she passed inside the Techong islands. She returned their fire at an initial range of 5000 yards, subsequently opening to 8000 yards and destroyed two enemy guns for the expenditure of 140 rounds of 4.5in ammunition, suffering no damage herself. FO2 issued his own instructions for the implementation of the west coast blockade on 8 July. His object was to dominate the coastline occupied by the NKPA; prevent any infiltration by sea into coastal areas held by the South Koreans and to provide naval gunfire support against any enemy target at sea or on land. His initial dispositions centred on three task units, each comprising a cruiser and several destroyers or frigates, the latter having the advantage that they could operate close inshore to engage targets inland. During the conflict a number of warships were used for shore bombardment including, once, the maintenance carrier Unicorn.
The objects of the British and US patrol areas were obviously similar but their methods differed because of the dissimilar geography of the east