The British Carrier Strike Fleet. David Hobbs
and ‘magneto’ patrols during 1952 but none of them prevented the number of tasked flying sorties from being met.
The Aircraft Holding Unit at Iwakuni
One of Unicorn’s first tasks was to establish an aircraft holding unit (AHU), at an airfield at Iwakuni which was situated on the other side of Hiroshima Bay from the dockyard at Kure. The airfield was administered by the RAAF and apart from acting as an operational base for 77 Squadron with its Meteor fighters, it hosted a squadron of USAF B-25 bombers, USN Neptune maritime patrol aircraft and a small detachment of RAF Sunderland flying boats. It also acted a staging post for Allied transport aircraft and turned round large numbers of flights organised by the US Military Air Transport Service, RAF Transport Command and QANTAS which was contracted to support the Australian armed forces. Like the wartime MONABs, the sailors that set up the AHU had to make do at first with primitive facilities and their first move was to make an office out of engine crates and a workshop in the back of a 3-ton lorry. The ‘team’ comprised a single officer, initially Lieutenant Foster RN, one chief petty officer aircraft artificer, four petty officers and twenty sailors. Its primary task was to hold twenty-four replacement aircraft of which two, one Sea Fury and one Firefly, had to be at 24 hours’ notice for issue to an operational carrier.25 Their workload varied from intense when Unicorn unloaded aircraft or the operational carrier arrived to take them on board and unload ‘duds’ for repair or scrap to dull when neither were present. During the quiet periods the sailors turned to with a will to improve their facilities and help other lodger units at the base. They were, in turn, helped by them whenever necessary. The AHU proved to be a fine example of inter-Allied co-operation throughout the conflict.
SAR Helicopter Coverage
The value of helicopters as combat SAR platforms was demonstrated both on land and at sea during the Korean War. As a ‘planeguard’ during day carrier operations it offered unrivalled efficiency but a destroyer with its sea-boat ready was still needed close to the carrier at night. At different times RN aircrew were rescued by helicopters operating from the quarterdecks of bombarding cruisers at Wonsan and Inchon, from tank landing ships acting as small flight decks close inshore and from USAF airfields as well as from their own carriers. Their morale value was important but the limitations of the Sikorsky S-51 and its licence-built British derivative the Westland Dragonfly had to be appreciated and understood. These included a relatively small radius of action, made even smaller by the strong headwinds often encountered and a reliance on dead-reckoning navigation with its potentially large errors. The ability to fly on instruments was minimal, limiting their usefulness in adverse weather and their VHF radios were limited to ‘line-of-sight’ ranges. For all these reasons, the ubiquity of their basing was a critical factor and some of the aircrew that were rescued would not have been recovered if only the carrier-borne helicopters had been available. The dedication and skill of the USN and USAF helicopter crews to their combat rescue task was worthy of the highest praise.
Destroyers and frigates also formed part of the SAR organisation and were frequently placed in ‘rescue stations’ close inshore where they could move to recue aircrew from Allied aircraft that managed to cross the coast and ditch after being damaged. On 7 April 1951, for instance, the destroyer Cockade was acting as Allied air search and rescue ship in the Yalu Gulf when she was ordered to search for the crew of a crashed US bomber. This involved moving close inshore among shoals in foggy weather and searching in co-operation with a USAF amphibious aircraft which was able to land on the water to pick up the one survivor that was located;26 the rest of the crew were never found. Fortuitously, however, Cockade was able to rescue another US airman who had been shot down in January, concealed by friendly Koreans and brought out to the destroyer in a junk when she was seen to be close inshore.
RAF and British Army Involvement
The Royal Navy provided the only British contribution to tactical air operations throughout the Korean War but the other Services made contributions to the overall UN air effort. The RAF maintained a detachment of four Sunderland flying boats at Iwakuni drawn from 205, 88 and 209 Squadrons which constituted the Far East Air Force Flying Boat Wing based at RAF Seletar in Singapore. They flew daily sorties under naval operational control in support of the Commonwealth warships that implemented the blockade to the west and south-west of Korea.27 Air observation was important for troops on the ground and two units were formed to provide it in 1951. These were 1903 Air Observation Post (AOP) Flight which formed part of the 1st Commonwealth Division. It was a joint unit equipped with Auster AOP 6 aircraft flown by pilots drawn from the Royal Artillery with maintenance personnel provided by the RAF. 1913 Light Liaison Flight was also formed in 1951 with Auster AOP 6 aircraft which were flown by officers and NCOs of the Glider Pilot Regiment28 and RAF maintenance personnel. Both units were disbanded after the armistice.
Screening the Carrier Battle Groups
There was a latent threat, throughout the war, that the Soviet Union would seek to escalate the conflict with attacks on UN warships by aircraft and submarines. It was necessary, therefore, to ensure that a proportion of aircraft sorties maintained defensive anti-submarine patrols and CAP and that a screen of destroyers remained with the operational carrier. The screen was not always made up entirely of RN warships but often included a mix of British, Australian, American, Canadian and Dutch destroyers. Anti-submarine capability had to be maintained at high proficiency but this was not always easy to achieve, given the emphasis on other tasks and the lack of training opportunities. The rotation of destroyers between the war zone and other areas of the FEF helped by allowing ships to take part in exercises and in 1951 Cossack, Consort, Charity and Cockade took part in USN ‘hunter-killer’ anti-submarine exercises off Okinawa that helped to keep standards at a high level. The opportunity was also taken to upgrade destroyers with the latest weapons; Cockade for instance was taken into Singapore Dockyard in March 1952 to have ‘X’ mounting removed and two Mark 6 ‘Squid’ anti-submarine mortars installed in its place with their associated bomb handling room and improved sonar. She returned to the war zone in December 1952 after a work-up.
The threat of air attack from the Soviet Union or China was always present but, fortunately, there was only one such attack on a British warship. The destroyer Comus had covered a landing by a USN reconnaissance unit on the west coast on 21 August 1950 and was steaming about 85 miles west of Kunsan when she was attacked by two North Korean Il-10 ‘Beast’ bombers which dived on her singly from astern.29 The first dropped four bombs that hit the ship on the port side killing one sailor, wounding another and leaving a hole 4ft high by 8ft long on the waterline which flooded the forward boiler room. The second aircraft’s aim was less accurate; it dropped its bombs ahead of the ship and all of them missed. Comus was able to make for Kure under her own power, escorted by her sister-ship Consort and a CAP of USMC fighters. Fears that this might mark the beginning of a Communist attempt to break the blockade led FO2 to order his ships off the west coast to concentrate in order to increase their anti-aircraft firepower and Triumph to maintain a Seafire CAP over them in daylight for the immediate future. The attack proved to be an isolated incident, however, and there were no further attacks on the carrier battle group or any other Commonwealth warship.
Command and Control
It was clear from the outset that the United States would bear the heaviest share of the fighting in Korea and, since there was an existing US command structure in nearby Japan, it was natural that the British and Commonwealth warships in the war zone should fit into it. Operational command was the most significant since the British FEF retained administrative control through its own logistical and type-support infrastructure. This was also able to support the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand ships since they and their equipment were, at the time, all of British design and origin. Personal relations between American and British officers were founded on mutual respect and remained effective and cordial throughout the war.30 Misunderstandings and differences of outlook were inevitable but were always overcome. Many arose simply because of the difficulty found in arranging verbal contact with the American operational commanders, most of whom exercised their commands afloat. In contrast, the three British