The British Carrier Strike Fleet. David Hobbs
conspicuous aspect element of the British contribution to Korea and they flew at rates which had never been achieved before. In an analysis of Theseus’ early operations, FO2 calculated35 that she flew 670 sorties in a given period and he compared this with an average of 585 sorties per carrier for the 1st Aircraft Carrier Squadron of the BPF over a similar period in 1945. These statistics were found to be even more impressive when the analysis revealed that the average air group of a single carrier in the BPF was ‘about 54’ but that Theseus’ air group was only twenty-eight. A later analysis using figures for Glory or Ocean in 1953 would provide even more impressive statistics. The British and Australian carrier operations during the Korean conflict were admitted on all sides to be outstanding but, realistically, this level of achievement was only possible because of the lack of serious naval and air opposition. Had these existed on an appreciable scale, more carriers would have been required to form a task force capable of both offensive and defensive operations on a larger scale. This would have stretched the early post-war RN but would, nevertheless, have been possible. It should not be forgotten that though the enemy had a large but simply equipped Army, it would have found it extremely difficult to locate and fight the carrier task forces the USN and RN could have brought into action had the need arisen.
During the Korean War the RN committed five aircraft carriers and the RAN one to the UN cause out of total of seventy-six warships committed by the Commonwealth governments to the conflict. Their achievements were the result of hard work, much improvisation and operations which had driven many ships, including the light fleet carriers, to the limit of their machinery’s capability; in some cases, such as Theseus’ catapult, it was arguably driven beyond it. The armistice signed on 27 July 1953 ended hostilities that had lasted 1128 days and involved warships from Australia, Canada, Colombia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, the UK and the USA.
The seal of royal approval was set on the achievements of the Royal and Commonwealth Navies by the following message from Her Majesty the Queen to the Board of Admiralty which was subsequently signalled to the Fleet. ‘Please express to all serving in the Commonwealth Fleet my deep appreciation of the splendid service they have given throughout the fighting in Korea’, signed ELIZABETH R.
3 Assistance for Commonwealth Navies
The Royal Navy had come to rely heavily on the Commonwealth for the manpower needed for the rapidly expanding number of new ships and naval air squadrons after 1941. By 1945 about 50 per cent of the Fleet Air Arm’s aircrew came from Australia, Canada and New Zealand, the bulk of them serving, technically, in the reserve elements of the RAN, RCN and RNZN but spending all their mobilised time serving with the RN. It seemed logical, therefore, that the RCN and RAN should eventually operate their own carrier task forces, although it was accepted that the post-war RNZN would be too small to do so. Carriers could be lent by the RN at first to give experience but both the Australian and Canadian Governments saw that their navies would need to include carriers after the war if they were to be capable either of independent action or making a realistic contribution to a UN, Allied or Commonwealth task force. There was certainly some truth in the view that the Admiralty saw carriers operated by the RAN and RCN as a way of solving its manpower problems in 1944 but, to be fair, it also saw RAN and RCN carrier task forces as ‘safe pairs of hands’ that could contribute to an overall Commonwealth capability, effectively reducing the number of carriers and their air groups that the RN would need to maintain in commission itself.
Initially, the operation of escort carriers seemed to offer an attractive method of gaining experience but the terms of the Lend-Lease Agreement between the US and British Governments specifically stated that these US-built ships must remain a part of the RN and could not be handed on to a third party, even one that was part of the British Empire and also flew the White Ensign. In the longer term the new light fleet carriers provided an ideal option since they would be reasonably cheap to operate and contained many of the systems already in service in RAN and RCN cruisers and destroyers. By 1945 the RN realised that it had more of these ships under construction than it could man and operate after demobilisation without a drastic reduction in the number of other types of ship but it did plan to retain a number in service and would continue to be the design authority for the class, reducing still further the cost of ownership to the Commonwealth navies. Put simply, the large number of light fleet carriers being completed in 1945 represented too good an opportunity to miss.
The Royal Canadian Navy
After the Allied leaders’ Quebec Conference in 1943 a joint RCN/RCAF committee was established to study the future potential for naval aviation in Canada. In October it recommended that ‘aircraft carriers be acquired and operated by the Navy’,1 as a vital component of the RCN’s ability to command the oceans adjacent to Canada, Newfoundland and Labrador. In co-operation with the RCAF it was also expected to contribute to the defence of Imperial sea communications, and to the joint defence of the oceans adjacent to North America as well as supporting national policies and interests generally. The Navy Board accepted the recommendation and factored it into its short-term plan to form a Canadian Pacific Fleet that would form a distinct national organisation but deployed operationally as a component of the BPF until the end of hostilities. In principle the Board hoped to acquire two light fleet carriers on loan during 1944 but when informed by the Admiralty that ships would not be available until 1945 an alternative scheme was considered and then adopted. The Admiralty agreed that two ‘Ruler’ class escort carriers would be made available to provide the RCN with carrier experience. To circumvent the Lend-Lease restriction both ships remained under RN control but their executive and seaman departments were provided by the RCN. The air department and embarked squadrons were provided by the RN, albeit with a number of New Zealand aircrew. Harmony was not helped by the differing scales of pay and daily victualling allowances paid by the RN, RCN and RNZN although this had not initially been recognised as a potential problem. The first of these ships, HMS Nabob, was taken over by the RN in September 1943 but spent some months in Burrard’s Yard in Vancouver undergoing modifications. Her RCN sailors joined her at Esquimalt in January 1944. She underwent further modifications in Liverpool after arriving in the UK but eventually worked up with 852 (Avengers) NAS embarked in June before joining the Home Fleet. With the squadron embarked, her ship’s company comprised 504 RCN, 327 RN and nine RNZN personnel.
She sailed in late August 1944 from Scapa Flow for Operation ‘Goodwood’, a strike by the Home Fleet’s carriers on Tirpitz in Kaa Fjord. Bad weather interfered with the attack but Nabob was hit aft by an acoustic torpedo fired by U-354 which blew a hole 50ft long by 40ft high below the waterline and bent the single propeller shaft. She was fortunate, however, in having Chief Shipwright J R Ball RCN in her complement, whose previous duty had been shoring up torpedo-damaged ships in St John’s, Newfoundland. His experience helped to shore up bulkheads around the damaged area and the ship was able to return to Scapa Flow on 27 August under her own steam. Despite being down by the stern, she had even managed to fly off Avengers on an anti-submarine patrol. Unfortunately, she was found to be so badly damaged that there was insufficient capacity in UK shipyards to repair her and so she was de-commissioned on 30 September 1944 and left, unrepaired, on a mud bank on the south bank of the Firth of Forth where she was stripped of equipment for use as spares by her sister-ships.2
Puncher was commissioned in February 1944 and on 10 May 1944 Captain R E S Bidwell RCN assumed command. She was used initially as an aircraft ferry carrier and made several passages in convoy from New York to the UK before suffering a main gearing failure in November 1944. She was refitted and repaired on the Clyde with items removed from Nabob. Once repairs were complete she joined the Home Fleet in February 1945 and embarked 881 (Wildcats) and 821 (Barracudas) NAS for strike operations off the Norwegian coast. The war in Europe ended while she was refitting in the Clyde but in May and June she operated as a deck landing training carrier for 1790 and 1791 (Fireflies) NAS before having bunks and extra bathrooms fitted into the hangar for duty as a troopship. From August she carried out a number of runs between the UK, Halifax and New York with a reduced ship’s company. On the first of these she carried 491 RCN and