The Gathering Storm. Geirr Haarr
A/A armament with twelve twin-mounted 37-mm and eight single 20-mm guns were heavier than in most other contemporary ships, but the 37-mm guns were only semi-automatic. Twelve torpedo tubes, with ten reloads (twelve in Prinz Eugen) completed the offensive armament. Three Arado Ar196 floatplanes were to be carried for the catapult.
Admiral Hipper was launched by Raeder’s wife Ilse on 6 February 1937 and commissioned in April 1939. As was the case for most large Kriegsmarine ships, the forecastle was found to be very wet, even in moderate seas. During a refit in late 1939, a raked ‘Atlantic’ clipper bow was fitted, the bridge improved and a funnel cap added to prevent smoke invading the tower platforms. This made her a very handsome, efficient-looking ship – and very difficult to distinguish from the battleships at a distance: a problem the Royal Navy and Coastal Command would face several times.
Blücher was launched on 8 June 1937. She was extensively modified, though, based on the experiences from Hipper, and it would be mid-November 1939 before trials and working-up could commence. Hipper and Blücher were formidable ships on paper. In reality, the use of a high-pressure steam system resulted in frail and uneconomic machinery that would trouble them throughout their careers. Prinz Eugen would be better, but she would not be operational until August 1940. Arguably, the need for this type of ship in the Kriegsmarine was limited and thus a waste of resources. Merchant war in the Atlantic required larger units, capable of sustained individual operations, and the German strategy at the time did not include bases in France or Norway from where such cruisers might have operated efficiently in fast battle groups.
By the end of 1935, the German shipyards were working at maximum capacity. Lack of qualified personnel and tools, complicated procedures and the poor quality of some part-deliveries delayed the start-up of new projects. It also meant that frequent compromises were made and that in many cases unsuccessful combinations of old and new technologies were applied. The new ships needed crews, and a large-scale recruitment campaign was initiated. In particular, there was a severe need for experienced officers and a large number of warrant officers were given rank and commission. Good for them, but awkward for the Kriegsmarine, which not only lost the backbone of its organisation, but also had to train new non-commissioned officers (NCOs) amidst an increased competition from the other services for the best candidates. As a consequence, the general standard of the Kriegsmarine fell, in spite of the best intentions. When the war broke out and a large number of auxiliaries and support ships were requisitioned, the lack of qualified and experienced officers became almost desperate.31
The U-boat Weapon 32
In June 1935 the cruiser Emden returned to Wilhelmshaven after an extensive cruise around Africa and the Indian Ocean. With her was Karlsruhe, which she had met off Spain, returning from a similar cruise to the Americas. Admiral Raeder was in Wilhelmshaven to welcome the ships and after inspecting them and addressing the men, he invited Kapitän zur See Günther Lütjens of Karlsruhe to join him in a meeting with Fregattenkapitän Karl Dönitz onboard Emden. In the latter’s cabin, he told the two surprised captains that they were to leave their ships immediately and move to key administrative positions contributing to the rebuilding of the German Navy.
Lütjens would, after a brief spell at the North Sea Naval Station in Wilhelmshaven, head the Officer Personnel Branch of the Navy HQ, shaping the cadre of new officers that would lead the ships and man the staffs of the Kriegsmarine. Dönitz would be tasked with reviving the still officially non-existent U-boat arm, the Unterseebootwaffe or U-bootwaffe.
Eight years earlier, in 1927, the first training courses for the new generation of U-boat men had started. Selected ensigns at the Torpedo and Radio School in Flensburg-Mürwik had been given theoretical lectures in U-boat operations, and in June 1933 the Anti-Submarine Warfare School (Unterseebootabwehrschule – UAW) in Kiel had been opened. In spite of its name, this was in reality a training unit for officers, NCOs and sailors to serve on board U-boats. In parallel, the training of engineering and technical personnel had also commenced. The forty-four-year-old Dönitz was now promoted to Kapitän zur See and challenged to shape these men into an efficient naval force.33
The first six 250-ton Type II boats, U1 to U6, were commissioned in September 1935 and assigned to the U-boat school flotilla in Kiel.34 The next batch of the improved Type IIB, U7 to U12, each with a handpicked lieutenant as captain, were during the autumn of 1935 assembled in the Weddigen Flotilla under Dönitz’s command and based at Wik, north of Kiel.35 The flotilla, named after one of the first successful U-boat commanders of WWI, became the test-bed for Dönitz’s tactical ideas, including the development of the Wolfrudel – wolfpack – concept: tactical groups of submarines attacking convoys or formations of warships in a coordinated manner. During early 1937, twelve further boats were added to the Weddigen Flotilla, half of them as spare boats so that the flotilla had a good number of boats operational in spite of repairs or maintenance. The new depot ship Saar was assigned to the group, as were four old torpedo boats to act as targets and to retrieve practice torpedoes.36
Overall command of submarine policy, development, construction and training rested firmly with Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine (OKM) in Berlin, where Konteradmiral Leopold Siemens was in charge of the U-boat division, while Dönitz focused on operations and tactics. Under his supervision the captains and crews of the Weddigen Flotilla went through an intensive period of drill and operational training under warlike conditions, practising emergency dives, underwater navigation and torpedo attacks – submerged in daylight and at the surface at night. Professional skill alone was not sufficient for a submarine captain to succeed, in Dönitz’s opinion. Each boat as well as the entire arm needed to possess an exceptional pride in the job and a confidence that they were better equipped and better trained than their adversaries. ‘I wanted to imbue my crews with enthusiasm and a complete faith in their arm and to instil in them a spirit of selfless readiness to serve in it,’ Dönitz wrote, adding, ‘I had to rid my crews of the ever recurring complex that the U-boat, thanks to recent developments in British anti-submarine defences, was a weapon that had been mastered.’ The British anti-submarine device Asdic was not proven technology, he held, and should be disregarded. Moving as close as possible to the target would reduce errors and prevent evasive action. In Dönitz’s view, 500–600 metres (550–650 yards) was a suitable distance, contrary to the 3,000 metres (3,300 yards) taught at the Submarine School.37
Hitler visiting the U-boatwaffe in Kiel August 1935. It looks as if he has been down below inspecting U7, which had been commissioned just two months earlier by Oberleutnant zur See Kurt Freiwald. He must have been pleased, as Freiwald was promoted to Kapitänleutnant shortly afterwards. (Author’s collection, original photo taken by Heinrich Hoffmann)
Results improved steadily and morale in the flotilla soared while Dönitz built a reputation as a forceful but fair master who knew his trade and cared for his boats and his men. He encouraged comradeship between officers and men and made an effort to go to sea with his boats as often as he could, or followed them closely from on board the Saar. In 1936, command of the Weddigen Flotilla was transferred to Kapitän Otto Loycke while Dönitz was appointed Führer der Unterseeboote (FdU) – Officer Commanding Submarines.38
To attack the British supply lines effectively, Dönitz argued, he needed 300 U-boats. One-third would always be at base for repair with crews resting, one-third would be in transit to or from the theatre of operations and one-third would be in action – one hundred U-boats being the minimum needed to have any chance of severing the British lines in the Atlantic. Raeder accepted this, but pending an acceptable conclusion to the discussions of what kind of boats to build, followed by a solid strategic analysis of how they should be used; he was not willing to exceed tonnage permitted under the Anglo-German Naval Treaty. Instead, he focused the resources allocated to the navy on surface ships, where there was a long way to go before the limitations were reached. By the end of 1936, a total of thirty-five U-boats were in commission. When the war broke out in September of 1939, the Kriegsmarine was still a long way