The Emergence of American Amphibious Warfare, 1898–1945. David S. Nasca
the wake of the Napoleonic Wars.46 Meanwhile, Great Britain, France, the Ottoman Empire, and Piedmont-Sardinia formed a coalition to stop Russian expansion into the Balkans and the Middle East.47 Another source of rivalry and friction developed after Japan’s smashing victory over China during the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895, leading to the triple intervention of France, Russia, and Germany in the Asia-Pacific Region. These three major powers stopped Japan from imposing additional monetary and territorial demands at the expense of China and possibly causing its collapse in the region.48 Finally, British and French competition continued on and off following the Napoleonic Wars during the nineteenth century and almost led to war in 1898 when the Scramble for Africa resulted in a showdown between British and French forces during the Fashoda Incident over imperial territorial disputes regarding control of the source of the Nile River.49 According to David Levering Lewis, the possibility of a global war was postponed and therefore allowed the various major powers to continue their military repression and administrative consolidation of their holdings both at home and abroad. However, the delayed world war allowed for continued tensions to build, and with them, an arms race began, and two powerful alliance systems arose that promised an even greater, more destructive world war.50
With the various major powers competing with each other for international supremacy and prestige, these nations also utilized their industrial and scientific bases to build and modernize their militaries as well as experiment and develop new military technologies. Industrialization not only allowed these powerful states to quickly support both the defense and economic opportunities of their people, but it also allowed the unprecedented national coordination and mobilization of their people and resources for total war. Hew Strachan points out, industrialization transformed war with the standardization of weapons and equipment with interchangeable parts. The introduction of precision machine tools and assembly processes combined with the refinement of better materials led to the unprecedented production of weapons of high quality and destruction. Therefore, many of the theoretical ideas and creations from the mind became a reality thanks in part to the rise of science and technology.51
In other words, the wars that were fought against an equally powerful nation were now more dangerous and destructive than ever, thus allowing the major powers, thanks to technology, to draw on every ounce of strength from the land and its people to win in a potential all-out war. Martin van Creveld observes in his study of industrialization and its impact on the growth of the military that as national economies expanded, so did armies; their growth more than kept pace with the rise in population. While machinery increased production, it also made its manpower pool available for other purposes, such as the military. Soon, armies were numbering in the millions in terms of both active and reserve troops ready for the possibility of combat.52 This reality became apparent in the Crimean War, the American Civil War, the Taiping Rebellion, and the German and Italian Wars of Unification. In each of these conflicts, the size and support of these armies dramatically increased because of science and technology, and so did the casualties and the level of destruction. This new reality resulted in nations requiring longer periods of time invested in reconstruction and recovery before being able to reengage in diplomatic affairs and pursue their national interests in the world.
The constantly shifting agreements and coalitions that maintained the balance of power within the international system were fading away. The world was changing because of the decline of certain states at the expense of new states that were rising to the fore. Henry Kissinger observes that several factors within the international system were transforming the balance of power, such as the decline of Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, as well as the rise of Germany, Italy, and Japan. However, the balance of power within the Vienna system, Kissinger goes on to explain, was being radically altered with the rise of a unified Germany, and Great Britain continually distancing itself from maintaining the international system established at the Congress of Vienna in 1815.53 The instability of the world due to intense state-on-state competition inevitably led to two slowly coalescing alliance systems by the early twentieth century: the Triple Entente composed of Great Britain, France, and Russia and the Triple Alliance made up of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy.54 While European rivalries threatened the peace and security of the international system, both the United States and Japan found themselves at cross-purposes in both Asia and the Pacific. Japan’s growing ambitions in the Pacific were intensified by the vulnerability of China and Europe’s colonial possessions in the region. While the United States and Japan were wary of each other and made long-term plans for an eventual war, Russian and British strength in the region also served to curb Japanese aggression during the nineteenth century.
Ironically, despite the friction and tension within the international system, a worldwide belief existed that the days of the Napoleonic Wars, where all the major powers were drawn into the conflict, were over and that national differences could be worked out and resolved peacefully. However, the fluctuation of power across the international system that was shaped by the unpredictability of interactions between the European powers still created moments of political crisis in which the threat of war was always a possibility because of the heightened pressure and threat of losing national prestige and power.55
Past experiences from wars during the nineteenth century also mistakenly led to the understanding that conflict between nations would be very short, as proven in the German and Italian Wars of Unification, the First Sino-Chinese War, and the various small colonial bush wars that took place in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. Meanwhile, the Crimean War, the American Civil War, and the Boer War were argued to be the exception rather than the rule of future conflicts, despite the massive loss in human life and material destruction. Orlando Figes argued that these conflicts were the earliest examples of truly modern wars that were fought with new industrial technologies, modern rifles, steamships, and railways, and where novel forms of logistics and communications were utilized to support and coordinate the movement and deployment of massive military forces resulting in unprecedented casualties prior to being eclipsed by World Wars I and II.56
While the United States avoided most of the international crises and small wars, American political, economic, and military power continued to grow from its geographical base in North America. While technology from the Second Industrial Revolution dramatically improved economic standards at home, it also introduced new social and political problems that demanded new, unique solutions from the American government. Doris Kearns Goodwin observes, “With this transfiguring mechanization and the development of mass production, however, the gulf between the employed and the employer is growing wider; social contrasts are becoming sharper.”57 In addition, the United States also had to spend increasing amounts of time and energy on American foreign policy, since its diplomatic and commercial ties brought it into contact with almost every part of the world. Although America’s contact with the international system brought economic and cultural benefits that continuously transformed American society, it also left the nation susceptible to the world’s problems and crises.
America’s Expanding Geopolitical Interests in the Nineteenth Century
The United States’ successful fulfillment of the American goal of Manifest Destiny meant that the American nation straddled the North American continent from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean and that the country had direct access to markets in Europe, Asia, Africa, and South America. The American republic’s position was ideal in the international system because it had access to two of the world’s largest oceans, giving it maritime access to both East and West. In addition, its geographic landmass across the North American continent also gave it access to a variety of environments and natural resources ready for development and exploitation. Finally, the United States bordered only Canada and Mexico, two relatively weak states that no longer posed a significant threat to the United States’ core interests. John J. Mearsheimer’s examination of the United States as a great power is interesting because while he acknowledges that the United States did possess the economic strength to compete with the other major powers in the international system, he points out that the United States was no ordinary great power. Its small military combined with its hesitation to use it to pursue its interests made the American power an unusual state actor throughout the nineteenth century. During this period, the United States instead relied almost exclusively on the use of soft power for its foreign affairs, using a combination