The Emergence of American Amphibious Warfare, 1898–1945. David S. Nasca
Unfortunately, this meant that the landing locations selected in Cuba did not have the port facilities to accommodate the efficient debarkation of the troops, nor did it have the ability to offload and organize weapons, equipment, and supplies for the expeditionary force. In addition, the loading plan for the troop transports was a haphazard effort in which men, equipment, supplies, and horses were thrown together in the rush to get American ground forces to Cuba. Unfortunately, not much thought was put into how the landing force would debark onto Cuba, therefore setting conditions for a confused, disorganized amphibious landing.
The friction and slowness of Fifth Corps’ debarkation put the entire American expeditionary force in a vulnerable position. The inability for American forces to land quickly along Cuba’s southern coast was the result of several factors—the choppy conditions on the ocean, the difficulty of men dropping into boats, and the distraction of the huge guns from American warships providing uncoordinated naval gunfire support. To make matters worse, the unloading of follow-on men, supplies, and artillery simply could not happen because the docks and harbor facilities of Daiquiri were ruined by the storm. Therefore, the American expeditionary force once again adapted to the situation by men and horses jumping into the water and swimming ashore while lifeboats and steam tugs were used to ferry supplies and artillery. Unfortunately, most of the supplies and artillery still remained in the American fleet because there was no way for most of the ships to empty their holds without cranes and winches.85
The troop transports in these operations were contracted from commercial companies, and to make matters worse, the vessels were not designed for billeting troops and conducting amphibious landings. In General Order Number 13 in 1885 released by Rear Admiral James E. Jouett of the U.S. Naval Force on the North Atlantic Station in 1885, he laid out in exact detail how amphibious assaults were to be organized and executed when the landing force began operations from sea to shore:
Land on a beach for ordinary drill or parade, [while] boats will pull in to the beach in line abreast, with intervals of one boats’ length between the boats, and all the men and howitzers will be landed at once. If all must land at one point, “column” will be formed, and the crews will be landed in succession. After landing, the formation will take place at once. The battalion will be quickly established in the desired direction, and the other battalions will be formed on the same line. The intervals between battalions will be six yards. The marine battalion forms on the right, the infantry battalion of seamen on the left of the marines, and the artillery battalion on the extreme left. The order of arrangement of the companies and field pieces from the different battalions will be the same as given for boats; and each company and howitzer crew will upon landing be nearly opposite its place in line.86
While the ships did have life vessels to facilitate the movement of men and supplies ashore, there were simply not enough of them. Men and officers were so impatient with the debarkation process that many jumped into the water to swim ashore, and later they found even the lifeboats could not handle moving horses ashore, which led to the crew having the horses jump into the water so they could swim ashore. Unfortunately, some of the horses became confused when they were pushed into the water and instead swam out into the open ocean where they soon drowned. Due to these complications, not enough horses were left to maintain an effective cavalry unit, and many cavalrymen became infantry for the fighting ahead. In addition, without horses, the careful use of the expeditionary force’s manpower became a concern for the unloading and stockpiling of supplies and equipment for the campaign ahead. According to Richard Harding Davis, disembarkment was a marvelous thing in which thousands of men finally made it ashore, but were prevented from engaging the enemy because three weeks had to be spent unloading their packs, arms, ammunition, and supplies. Instead of the landing force securing the beach and making its way quickly into the interior as originally planned, the Americans became bogged down because of supply and logistical issues while the Spanish had time to prepare for the upcoming American assault.87
Not surprisingly, the plan to seize Santiago in a coup de main was lost when the Spanish colonial forces realized the presence of American ground forces. The Spanish forces under the command of General Antero Rubin took up defensive positions at Las Guasimas and ambushed the American forces as they pushed west toward Santiago.88 Edmund Morris observes that the campaign to capture Santiago was not accomplished without considerable further bloodshed since the city proper was stiffly fortified, with five thousand troops and a seemingly inexhaustible stock of ammunition. In addition, wounds, malarial fever, and dysentery incapacitated or killed more and more men. It took less than forty-eight hours before the expeditionary force was desperate for personnel and supplies.89 During this time, the American ground forces were also hampered by Spanish colonial forces that were very familiar with the jungles of Cuba. Fighting a rearguard action, General Antero Rubin’s forces slowed down the American advance with snipers as well as hit-and-run attacks using the local vegetation and terrain to their advantage. The Spanish colonial forces’ use of smokeless gunpowder made it difficult for the Americans to locate and close with the enemy. This gave the Spanish an edge in the bitter jungle fighting between the landing beaches and the city of Santiago, therefore buying time for its defenders to strengthen its defenses and prepare itself for the American assault.90
Despite the unexceptional performance of the American expeditionary force’s initial contact against Spanish colonial forces, General William R. Shafter and the officer leadership quickly adjusted tactics by employing skirmishers to flush out snipers and small-scale Spanish units in the jungle.91 In addition, they also stayed off the main roads and trails toward Santiago, using the jungle for cover and concealment and, when engaged by the enemy, employing fire and maneuver in rushes. General Shafter’s forces continued to advance toward Santiago in this manner until Spain’s colonial forces anchored themselves along the San Juan River, thus forcing the Americans to employ frontal attacks against well-entrenched defensive positions. Frank Freidel points out, “The twin battles of El Caney and San Juan Hill on July 1, 1898, decided whether the American expeditionary force in Cuba would succeed or fail. It was a close decision.”92 However, with the employment of artillery and small arms fire to suppress Spanish defensive positions, American forces broke through at El Caney and San Juan Hill and continued their push toward Santiago.93
While the U.S. Army struggled with its landings in the vicinity of Daiquiri and Siboney, the U.S. Navy continued its blockade of Cuba with the preponderance of its naval forces focused on containing the Spanish fleet in Santiago. According to Lieutenant Jose Muller Y Tejeiro, “The enemy had complete control of the sea, and from Daiquiri, where the landing was made, to Punta Cabrera, the American fleet, consisting of over seventy vessels, including both war and merchant vessels (many of the latter armed with guns), did not permit us to even think of receiving reinforcements or help of any kind, unless it were from the interior of the island.”94 However, American naval forces were prevented from engaging the Spanish navy because of the powerful naval defenses protecting Santiago Bay. Worse, American naval forces were at a disadvantage in terms of weather because they were fighting in hurricane season. In order to secure shelter for such an event, Commander Bowman H. McCalla was detached from Admiral Sampson’s blockading fleet at Santiago to secure Guantanamo Bay with a squadron composed of a battleship, three cruisers, and a gunboat. Shortly after arriving at Guantanamo Bay, Commander McCalla neutralized Spanish coastal defenses and landed a battalion of U.S. Marines under Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Huntington in order to seize the harbor facilities and their fortifications.95 Interestingly, prior to the amphibious assault against Guantanamo Bay, Lieutenant Colonel Huntington reported many lessons learned to the Commandant of the Marine Corps during his battalion’s first and only “practice” amphibious landing and the problems he encountered at Camp Sampson, Key West, Florida, prior to participating in the amphibious assault on Guantanamo Bay:
I received orders from Commander Reiter that the battalion would leave the ship at 4:15 a.m. It was necessary to knock off work at 3:45 a.m. in order that the men might get ready to go ashore. I was ordered by Commander Reiter, against my earnest pleas, to leave on board the Panther one-half of our 6-millimeter ammunition (225,000 rounds) and one-half of the 3-inch ammunition (18 boxes), the Panther having two 3-inch guns and we having four. This 6-millimeter ammunition was retained, Commander Reiter informed me, to serve as ballast,