The Emergence of American Amphibious Warfare, 1898–1945. David S. Nasca
short time allowed for the removal of the stores, and notwithstanding the fact that the men worked hard and worked fast, considerable quantities of our property and part of the ten days’ rations I requested were left on board. The battalion moved from the ship shortly after 4:15 a.m., and moved out to the beach, short 2 miles from the wharf, and after we had been there some time the Panther came out of harbor and apparently lay to in the offing about two and one-half hours…. The battalion is now strung out in camp along the beach for over a half a mile…. I think that, notwithstanding the annoyance, trouble, and expense this transfer has caused, the experience will be some value to the battalion.96
While the landing at Key West was less than stellar for the Marines, the capture of Guantanamo Bay went smoothly, and the entire battalion landed under the protection of the naval squadron’s fire support. As stated in the squadron bulletin from the U.S. Flagship New York near Guantanamo Bay, “the pickets launched against Guantanamo were fired by the Spaniards near the fort, but suffered no casualties. In addition, no effort was made to dispossess the Spaniards of the upper part of the bay, as the squadron had no use for it, and the Spanish defenders must, eventually, surrender in any case for want of food.”97 Soon after the Americans took Guantanamo Bay, the Spanish colonial forces counterattacked the Marines, forcing them to improvise. Working in conjunction with Commander McCalla’s squadron, Lieutenant Colonel Huntington coordinated not only the movement of reinforcements and additional machine gun and artillery support ashore, but also utilized naval gunfire from the American cruiser, the Marblehead, to supplement the Marine battalion’s firepower. After defeating the Spanish counterattack, Marines later attacked and seized Cuzco Well through a combined arms attack with Cuban insurgents using ground artillery, machine guns, and more naval gunfire support from the gunboat the USS Dolphin. Ship-to-shore support during the fighting was accomplished through the gunboat’s weapon systems being used with deadly effect on the Spanish defenses around Cuzco Well through use of makeshift naval signal flags from shore. This tactic prevented the American forces from being hit by the USS Dolphin’s guns and allowed them to seize control of Cuzco Well.98
The capture of Guantanamo Bay and Cuzco Well resulted in a secure naval base of operations for Admiral Sampson’s naval forces and placed American forces in an advantageous position to support Major General Shafter’s attack on Santiago. Soon afterward, the American expeditionary force, with the help of Cuban insurgents, slowly hammered away at the defenses of Santiago. After less than two weeks of siege, the Spanish defenders surrendered the city soon after the destruction of Spain’s naval forces against Admiral Sampson’s fleet in the Battle of Santiago.99 The total defeat of Spain’s ground and naval forces in Cuba was possible thanks, in part, to the United States’ use of amphibious operations to effectively terminate the Spanish-American War. This war essentially ended Spain’s role in the international system as a major power, while confirming the United States’ entry as a world power at the end of the nineteenth century. However, the end of the war and its successful use of amphibious warfare overseas had unanticipated political, social, and military ramifications that contributed to the manner in which the United States would use military force in its geopolitical strategy during the first half of the twentieth century.
The Spanish-American War and Its Impact on Amphibious Warfare
The Spanish-American War was the United States’ first use of amphibious warfare for long-term geostrategic purposes overseas. While it could be argued that amphibious warfare had been used outside the United States by American forces in the past, such as against the British in the Bahamas during the American Revolutionary War or in punishing the Barbary States during President Thomas Jefferson’s administration, these conflicts were small-scale military operations that had no long-term political or military value. The use of amphibious warfare in the Spanish-American War was different because a large American ground force was deployed overseas from the United States to seize and hold ground for geopolitical purposes. The result was not only the end of Spanish power and influence in the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific, but also enhanced U.S. diplomatic and military credibility throughout the world because it could employ its military far from home.
Amphibious warfare was essential to the American political and military leadership because despite quickly destroying Spain’s naval forces in both the Pacific and the Caribbean, the United States had extreme difficulty landing and supporting its ground forces from ship to shore. While the Philippines and Cuba were considered hostile territories, the Filipino and the Cuban insurgencies were vital factors in facilitating American forces as they attempted to organize themselves and attack the Spanish colonial garrisons. The United States was fortunate against Spain, because the Spanish defenders had every opportunity to stop the American landings on the beaches but did not exploit those opportunities. In addition, limited avenues of approach existed for American forces to land; with a little preparation and effort, the Spanish could have easily wreaked havoc on the American invaders, since they certainly possessed the weaponry, terrain, and naval coastal guns to repel an attack from the water.
Upon conclusion of the war with Spain, the American political and military leadership understood that they only possessed half of the power projection capabilities required to be a major world power for the twentieth century. Based on the performance of the U.S. Navy, America understood that its efforts at modernization, training, and expanding its naval forces had paid dividends. Spanish naval power was completely crushed in less than three months because the United States invested the time and energy for the best guns and armor, powerful steam engines, and highly trained naval personnel. However, the ground aspect of the American military was missing, based on the ad hoc performance in the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. While the deployment of Soldiers and Marines ashore was successful because of their grit and determination against Spanish ground forces, the American military clearly lacked the ability to efficiently execute amphibious warfare.
American forces were critically delayed because of their haphazard landing in the vicinity of Santiago, therefore giving the Spanish defenders time to rally and set up strong defensive positions to prevent the quick capture of Cuba’s capital. However, the U.S. Army would have faced a much worse situation if the Spanish defenders had attacked the American ground forces while they were assembling and preparing for the big push into Cuba’s capital. The lack of specialized troop transports built for quickly loading and unloading ground forces and logistical support was obvious; but in addition, little coordinated naval gunfire was available for troops on the beach, and no communication or unity of command existed between the landing force and the naval squadron tasked to supervise the debarkation. A. B. Feuer points out:
Mahan [sic] commented on the petty bickering between the Army and Navy war departments: The transports did not come under naval authority until they had sailed—and then only for escort duty. Everything connected with seagoing transportation is a particular feature of maritime activity. Internal disciple of a ship—and proper control of its movements in a convoy—can only be insured [sic] by naval organization and naval command. The committing of transport service to the Army is vicious in theory, and directly contrary to the practice of the most experienced maritime nation—Great Britain.100
Simply put, leadership, as well as naval and logistical technology, was simply not in place to conduct a fast, effective amphibious landing for the U.S. Army.
While the Marine attacks on Guantanamo Bay and Cuzco Well were successful, significant technological gaps were readily identified in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War. Communication between ship and shore was too slow and cumbersome because naval and ground forces had to rely on messengers being rowed back and forth. However, the use of makeshift signal flags during the fighting at Cuzco Well to help coordinate naval gunfire away from the American ground forces and direct it toward the Spanish defenders was a stroke of common sense that played a role in developing America’s future amphibious capabilities. In addition, the use of naval gunfire, the employment of machine guns, and the engagement of light artillery with Lieutenant Colonel Huntington’s Marine battalion on the beaches of Cuba led to the expansion of the Marine Corps’ mission of now conducting amphibious assaults in America’s future conflicts.
Evaluation of the United States’ fledgling amphibious warfare capabilities indicated that logistics were also an issue. The offloading