The Emergence of American Amphibious Warfare, 1898–1945. David S. Nasca
was simply too disorganized, while the deployment of ground forces was simply not used to great effect based on a combination of economy of force and the local concentration of American military power. Major Robert Meade of the United States Marine Corps voiced his frustration to Captain French Ensor Chadwick, chief of staff of the North Atlantic Squadron, about the gainful deployment of himself and the other Marines while on the U.S. Flagship New York off Santiago, Cuba, on June 12, 1898. Meade requested that the chief of staff define his position and duties on the flagship and clearly define his status. In addition, Meade felt that the Marines of the fleet would not be landed as an organization and, therefore, would be of no use to the campaign ahead.101 The troop transports were not made specifically to carry and land men and supplies. Instead of the orderly landing and buildup of supplies, also known as “building the iron mountain,” naval and ground forces failed to communicate and, in some cases, refused to cooperate with the landing force. During the amphibious assault on Guantanamo Bay, Commander McCalla had to give a direct order to one of the ships in his squadron after it refused to help the Marines unload their equipment and provide the necessary support to finish their transition ashore. Despite the Marines’ success in capturing Guantanamo Bay, Commander McCalla understood what was at stake in possibly losing the naval installation to a Spanish counterattack.102
Besides command and control issues, naval vessels used for carrying the ground forces were found to be inadequate in the trip from the United States to Cuba. According to Edmund Morris, “Considering the logistical problem of moving 16,286 troops … [General Shafter] had no choice but to leave the remainder of his corps behind in Tampa, owing to wild miscalculations of available berth space; as it was the ships were so crammed with men that bodies covered every foot of deck…. It was out of the question to disembark, since orders to proceed might be received at any minute; so for the next six days sixteen thousand men baked like sardines in their steel ovens.”103 Despite also having captured small towns in the vicinity of Santiago, several problems were not anticipated, such as these settlements not having the capabilities to support the offload of American men and equipment. In addition, American ships involved in the landings did not have enough naval intelligence to either develop a familiarity with the hydrography of Cuba’s coast or to have an understanding of possible naval defenses and units that might be defending the beaches. Therefore, naval forces involved in the amphibious assaults hesitated to get close enough to shore and risk possibly grounding one of their ships. The difficult situation on the Cuban coast meant that wooden lifeboats had to be used to move weapons and supplies ashore. While men improvised by jumping off their ships along with their horses and swimming ashore, they lost several of their animals to drowning or, in the case of donkeys, had no luck pushing them off the ship at all.104 This problem meant more than just not having a cavalry to function as reconnaissance or to serve as a mobile force to use against the Spanish; it also effectively grounded the logistical train. According to Donald Smythe, “So exasperating was the mess that grumbling was inevitable. One trooper damned [General] Shafter up and down as a fat old slob who was sitting on his rump in his tent when he should have been on the spot straightening out the supply mess.”105 For that reason, soldiers had to carry heavier loads of supplies and weapons with them into battle through extremely harsh heat when they advanced against enemy positions near Santiago. From General John J. Pershing’s recollection of the landing in Cuba during the Spanish-American War as a junior officer, “Each soldier carried three days’ field rations of raw bacon, hardtack, and coffee. On his back was strapped his rifle, 100 rounds of ammunition, a blanket roll, a shelter tent, and a poncho. So weighted down, it meant certain death.”106
While these problems could not have been remedied due to the urgency of time and the political situation both at home and abroad, the American political and military leadership understood that improvements needed to be made to its amphibious capabilities for future wars. The lack of U.S. amphibious capabilities became apparent in the Philippines when Commodore Dewey’s naval and ground forces found themselves in a very sensitive diplomatic situation. The destruction of Spanish naval power in the Pacific attracted the British, the Japanese, and the Germans. While Great Britain and Japan looked on as the Americans destroyed Spain’s Pacific Fleet, German naval forces intentionally got in the way of American ships in Luzon by either denying them access to certain parts of Manila Bay or intentionally getting in the line of fire to prevent an American bombardment of Spanish defenses in Manila. After Germany’s ships withdrew thanks to Commodore Dewey’s refusal to have his ships back down from a potential fight, Dewey began negotiations for the surrender of the Spanish garrison and occupation of the city. However, Commodore Dewey and the small American occupational force found itself handling a potential Filipino insurgency, especially when the Philippines’ national leaders found out that they would not be granted immediate independence.107
When American forces began to secure Manila and Luzon, the United States soon realized that hundreds of islands made up the Philippines and that it would require an extraordinary number of troops, supplies, ships, and even specialized naval support to occupy the archipelago before it collapsed into chaos.108 If these requirements were not met, it would mean either leaving the Philippines vulnerable to having other foreign powers carve out their own spheres of control there or conducting a long-term American counterinsurgency campaign against rebellious elements of the Filipino population. In addition, there were also American interests to consider in the Asia-Pacific Region in which the United States’ political and economic leadership felt that giving up the Philippines would mean eventually being locked out of China’s markets by the other major powers. In addition, from a military standpoint, an American presence in the Philippines would be a good thing in terms of protecting the indigenous population, having access to valuable ports and harbors, and being able to station a forward-deployed American force to protect U.S. interests.109
Amphibious warfare brought Spain to its knees and essentially forced the country to give up its colonial holdings in the Pacific and the Caribbean. The United States used its navy to destroy Spanish naval power and isolate key colonies in order to allow ground forces to land and seize control. Although the amphibious assaults were ad hoc operations and left much to be desired by the military leadership, the United States accomplished its war aims quickly and with few casualties. From his study of American foreign policy during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Michael H. Hunt believes the United States saw establishing and managing an empire as a simple matter. According to Hunt, “Advances in military technology had lowered the cost of fixing control over peripheral peoples…. Surely Americans, tested in a running battle with Native Americans across the continent, knew how to coerce obedience as well as Europeans.”110 More importantly, the United States was also recognized as a major power in the world with the military strength to back up its global interests. The Treaty of Paris of 1898 officially ended the Spanish-American War and granted the United States control over most of Spain’s colonial territories in the Pacific and the Caribbean.111 However, the American victory had unforeseen political and social implications that did not become immediately apparent during the war or during the peace that followed afterward.
American Geopolitical Implications of Amphibious Warfare
According to Max Boot, “Few Americans paid much attention as their [military] made one overseas landing after another during the course of the nineteenth century. In part this was because most of the landings were not very large; in part because Americans were not very interested in imperialism abroad.”112 However, the Spanish-American War brought geopolitical changes both within the United States and to the international system. The American victory confirmed that Spain was no longer a world power; and as a result, Spain lost its territorial possessions and influence to the United States. The new world power now had new acquisitions that extended its power and influence to two geographic regions of the world: Asia-Pacific and South America. While American commercial and diplomatic interests had already been in place in these parts of the world, the United States now had territories where it could station and forward deploy American military forces, ready to influence geopolitical forces in these parts of the world. In addition, the American political and military leadership found itself coping with the future governmental and security concerns that changed the dynamics of the American political system and presented new challenges and responsibilities.
Commodore