Russian Cyber Operations. Scott Jasper
of asymmetry and how cyber operations fit into the Russian asymmetric arsenal. It then applies the technical and legal framework to analyze the 2007 cyber assault by Russian “patriotic hackers” (ordinary citizens expressing nationalistic/political views through cyberspace) on Estonia. It compares similar usage in the 2008 conflict with Georgia but introduces the role of cyber operations as a component of warfare. Chapter 3 discusses the Western theory of hybrid warfare in comparison to Russian doctrine. Next, the chapter applies the analytical framework to Russian cyber operations during the 2014 annexation of Crimea. After a review of the Russian model for new-generation warfare, it analyzes Russian cyber operations in the ongoing Eastern Ukraine separatist conflict. Chapter 4 explains the Russian concept of IW, arguing that the current Russian practice is a reinvigorated aspect of the subversion campaigns seen in the Cold War but adapted to the Internet age. Next, the chapter uses the technical and legal framework to analyze Russian cyber-enabled interference in the 2016 US presidential election.
Part II, “Security Dynamics,” frames the difficulties and deficiencies in the use of cost-imposition options to counter Russian cyber operations. Chapter 5 begins with a review of the theory of rationality and why the use of cyber operations by Russia is considered to be rational. It then uses the analytical framework to demonstrate how Russia circumvented norms of responsible state behavior in the 2017 NotPetya mock ransomware attack. Chapter 6 commences with a review of deterrence theories and methods to impose cost. The chapter explains why US responses to wrongful acts in the cyber domain have failed to alter the undesired behavior of Russia, as seen in subsequent hacks of the 2017 French presidential election.
Part III, “Defensive Solutions,” offers and reviews a range of defensive choices to counter Russian cyber operations. Chapter 7 examines cybersecurity risk management and by what degree current strategies improve the security of networks and systems. It then analyzes how Russian cyber operations defeated defenses to penetrate critical infrastructure in the US energy sector. It concludes by examining security measures suggested by the United States Computer Emergency Response Team (US-CERT) to prevent similar attacks and deny the Russians any benefit from irresponsible behavior in cyberspace. Chapter 8 starts with a theoretical review of resilience and how automation in cyber defense reduces the time needed to detect, analyze, and remediate cyber threats. Next, the chapter analyzes the 2017 Bad Rabbit ransomware attack, demonstrating the utility of automated cyber defenses that operate at network scale and attack tempo against sophisticated techniques. Chapter 9 explores the employment of technical offsets to counter Russian cyber operations. It illuminates how continued manipulation of international norms, for instance in the Kerch Strait confrontation, hampers forceful responses. It argues that similar to Russian pursuit of technical offsets in military innovations, the West must respond in cyberspace with data-correlation advances.
The conclusion reiterates how the Kremlin uses legal ambiguity and technical complexity to maintain anonymity and uncertainty in its cyber operations. It examines the application of a more aggressive approach to defend forward through the strategy of persistent engagement. It concludes that risk in deterrence through this aggressive cost-imposition method mandates the use of resilience solutions to withstand attacks and continue operations.
Notes
1.Raphael Satter, “What Makes a Cyberattack? Experts Lobby to Restrict the Term,” Associated Press, March 28, 2017.
2.Ellen Nakashima, “Russia’s Apparent Meddling in U.S. Election Is Not an Act of War, Cyber Expert Says,” Washington Post, February 7, 2018.
3.Michael J. Adams and Megan Reiss, “How Should International Law Treat Cyberattacks like WannaCry?,” Lawfare Institute, December 22, 2017.
4.Nakashima, “Russia’s Apparent Meddling.”
5.Strategic competition is for influence and advantage in political, economic, and military arenas.
6.Lorne Cook and Robert Burns, “NATO Chief Says Allies Keen to Avoid Arms Race with Russia,” Stars and Stripes, February 13, 2019.
7.Jim Mattis, “Summary of the National Defense Strategy of the United States of America,” Department of Defense (hereafter DOD), January 2018, 3.
8.Julian Cooper, “Russia’s Invincible Weapons: Today, Tomorrow, Sometime, Never,” Changing Character of War Centre, University of Oxford, May 2018, 2.
9.Michael Ruhle, Deterring Hybrid Threats: The Need for a More Rational Debate, NDC Policy Brief no. 15 (Rome: NATO Defense College, July 2019), 1.
10.NATO, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, AAP-6 (Brussels: NATO Standardization Office, 2018), 62.
11.President of Russia, “Speech and Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy,” Kremlin Event Transcripts, Moscow, February 10, 2007.
12.Volodymyr Horbulin, The World Hybrid War: Ukrainian Forefront (Kiev: Ukrainian Institute for the Future, 2017), 25.
13.Keir Giles et al., The Russia Challenge (London: Chatham House, June 2015), 51.
14.Keir Giles, Moscow Rules: What Drives Russia to Confront the West (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2019), 13.
15.Donald Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: White House, December 2017), 25.
16.Trump, 25.
17.Mattis, “Summary of the National Defense Strategy,” 2.
18.Thomas Wright, “The Return to Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable,” The Atlantic, September 12, 2018.
19.Gen. Curtis M. Scaparrotti, USA, “Statement before the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services,” March 8, 2018, 19–20.
20.Mattis, “Summary of the National Defense Strategy,” 2.
21.Giles, Moscow Rules, xix.
22.Giles, xix.