The Squeeze: Oil, Money and Greed in the 21st Century. Tom Bower

The Squeeze: Oil, Money and Greed in the 21st Century - Tom  Bower


Скачать книгу
paid straight into Swiss bank accounts,’ Watts exploded. Since each Shell ‘country’ was self-financing for expansion, Watts’s ambitions were frustrated by the government’s refusal to pay Nigeria’s share of the bill. Most of the $7 billion received every year by the government in taxes and royalties simply disappeared. Hundreds of millions of dollars which the government was contractually obliged to contribute to develop new reserves had been deposited in Swiss bank accounts by corrupt officials. A succession of ministers, Watts discovered, had ‘not only stolen the eggs but refused to even feed the goose’. In the face of wholesale corruption, even Nigeria’s banks refused Shell’s requests for loans and overdrafts. Watts’s predicament was complicated in December 1993 by a military coup led by General Sani Abacha and the slump of Nigerian oil prices to $12. The new dictator repressed striking protestors and arrested the trade unions’ leaders in the oilfields, but failed to address Shell’s complaints. Exasperated, Watts threatened the minister of finance and the governor of the central bank. ‘If we can’t pay wages or finance our development,’ he warned, ‘I’ll make sure it’ll be in the press. Even my driver will be protesting in the street.’ Talking tough appealed to Watts, although the corporation’s conflict of interests – eagerness for more oil, collaboration with corrupt rulers, disregard for tribal sensitivities and discounting the social damage caused by the oil spillages – could not be disguised during an international protest.

      In 1990, Ken Saro-Wiwa, a 49-year-old writer and poet, launched a campaign outside Nigeria on behalf of the Ogoni tribe, who inhabited 1.3 per cent of the oil-rich delta and produced 1.5 per cent of Nigeria’s oil. After 30 years of oil production, the Ogonis’ farmland, water and air were polluted by oil spillages and the ‘acid rain’ produced from the gas flaring above their crops and villages. In compensation, they received little income from the oil royalties. With Shell’s knowledge, central government ministers refused to remit even the agreed 1 per cent of the revenue to the locality, and national politicians never visited the region. Until he extended his campaign against the Nigerian government to America and Europe, Saro-Wiwa’s efforts had been fruitless. But the crusade and his encouragement of an armed uprising in the delta altered Shell’s relationship with the government. The Biafran experience had taught the company that any interference with oil revenues, or any demand for secession, would be squashed.

      To protect Shell’s oilfields, Watts felt justified in appealing to the government for protection from constant vandalism. ‘We’re not a bottomless pit of money,’ he explained. Although the uprising was wrecking Shell’s operations in Ogoniland, only 3 per cent of the company’s worldwide production was threatened. During 1993, as the disturbances increased, Watts requested the support of 1,400 armed policemen, in return for which he would provide logistics and welfare. At the company’s expense, ‘mobile police’ armed with AK-47 rifles, some of whose uniforms bore Shell’s insignia, were dispatched as an ‘oilfield protection force’ to the delta. As reports of death and destruction in Ogoni villages reached Europe and America, Shell was accused of financing ‘kill and go mobs’ to brutally suppress the uprising. Amid chaotic scenes, Shell withdrew its staff and stopped pumping oil. The Ogonis would claim that on 1 December 1993 Watts thanked the inspector general of the police for his cooperation ‘in helping to preserve the security of our operation’. His gratitude was premature.

      Beyond Nigeria, Saro-Wiwa’s description of the delta’s desolation and the Nigerian government’s oppression of the Ogonis aroused fierce protests. Shell was urged to exploit its financial influence and persuade the government to cease the violence and grant the Ogonis independence. Herkströter, supported by younger directors including Mark Moody-Stuart, the British heir apparent, resisted those demands. ‘We have to work with the government,’ the directors agreed. ‘We don’t have a mandate to interfere.’ Recalling the outrage during the 1960s about American multinationals including ITT and United Fruit directly interfering in South American affairs, Shell’s directors declared, ‘We don’t get involved in politics.’ In arguments with representatives of the relief agencies, Moody-Stuart insisted, ‘Even if the government steals money, we cannot do anything about it. We are guests in the country and cannot intervene.’

      In May 1994, Saro-Wiwa was arrested for inciting the murder of four chiefs and government officials who had been attacked by a crowd of Ogoni youths in a meeting hall and hacked to death. The price of Nigeria’s oil, said protestors in the electrified atmosphere, was blood. The promise by Abacha in July 1994 that the death penalty would be imposed on ‘anyone who interferes with the government’s efforts to revitalise the oil industry’ chilled Saro-Wiwa’s supporters, especially the striking oil workers.

      Brian Anderson, who replaced Watts as the local Shell chairman in 1994, visited General Abacha. Like many Europeans, he had assumed that Saro-Wiwa would receive a short sentence. Nurtured by Shell’s straitjacketed culture, Anderson was immune to the nuances of the dictatorship, and his report to The Hague after his first conversation with the general did not raise any alarm. One year later, after a prejudiced trial, Saro-Wiwa was condemned to death. Only after the verdict and another visit to the general did Anderson realise his mistake. By then it was too late to influence Shell’s directors. Like a supertanker, they were impervious to shocks that required an immediate change of course. By then, Saro-Wiwa’s fate had become an international issue. Across America and Europe he was portrayed as the victim of Shell’s conduct, and the company was accused of polluting the Ogoni farmlands and of failing to protest against the rigged trial while financing the government’s destruction of the delta. President Clinton, Nelson Mandela and other international leaders protested to Abacha. The World Bank, Church leaders, Greenpeace, Amnesty International, PEN, the International Writers’ Association and even members of the Royal Geographical Society demanded that Shell abandon its operations in Nigeria. The opprobrium spread across all of Big Oil. Accused of exploitation, corruption, environmental damage and murder, Shell was urged to intercede and prevent Saro-Wiwa’s execution.

      In The Hague, Cor Herkströter and his board maintained their composure. Shell men never flapped. Shell’s ‘Business Principles’, a set of guidelines committing the company to an apolitical role, had been adopted in 1976 and subsequently updated five times. According to those principles, Shell’s duty was to be decent but not evangelical. Multinationals should not interfere in sovereign states. ‘We must be part of the furniture,’ everyone agreed. ‘It’s ridiculous that we should intervene against a military dictatorship,’ said one director, to approval. ‘If we left,’ said another, ‘we would cut off Nigeria’s nose and our own. The French would replace us in a flash.’ The company’s huge investment needed to be protected, not least because after years of frustration there was still hope that the Nigerian government would agree to build a plant to liquefy and ship the country’s vast deposits of natural gas in tankers as LNG (liquefied natural gas). Shell was the master of the complicated technology necessary to freeze natural gas to minus 160°C, at which temperature it became liquid gas, which could be shipped around the world. Six hundred cubic metres of natural gas could be condensed into one cubic metre of LNG. The profits would be huge. Only a minority of British directors understood that Shell’s investment in Nigeria was becoming disproportionate to the profits. The capital, they believed, could have been better spent elsewhere. That British minority believed that standing aside from Nigeria’s political battles had been mistaken, and that Shell should have taken more interest in the delta’s environment years earlier. Yet in the midst of the storm, changing course had become too difficult. There was no alternative but to support the wrong decision. ‘I never doubted that Shell would stay the course,’ said Watts. ‘We resiled from protest,’ observed a Dutch director. ‘Shell should not be blamed for an unjust government.’ ‘Shell doesn’t get involved in politics,’ announced a spokesman. Questions were referred to the British, Dutch and American governments, which equally failed to make any forceful protest and opposed sanctions, although Nigeria exported 40 per cent of its oil to the US. At the very last moment Shell and the three governments did protest to General Abacha, but on 10 November 1995 Ken Saro-Wiwa and his eight fellow defendants were executed. Greenpeace blamed Shell’s silence for the deaths. ‘It is not for commercial organisations like Shell,’ replied a company spokesman, ‘to interfere in the legal process of a sovereign


Скачать книгу