The Squeeze: Oil, Money and Greed in the 21st Century. Tom Bower

The Squeeze: Oil, Money and Greed in the 21st Century - Tom  Bower


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might have stopped Saro-Wiwa’s execution. Nevertheless, amid appeals for international sanctions, Anderson and Shell’s directors met in London to decide whether to push ahead with the plan to build an LNG plant for Nigeria’s natural gas. One month later, on 15 December 1995, 30 years after suggesting the idea, Dick van den Broek of Shell signed an agreement with the Nigerian government to build a $3.8 billion LNG plant. He had threatened that failure to sign would terminate any future agreements with the company. Shell’s directors were ecstatic. Ninety per cent of the LNG output had been pre-sold, and Shell was a 25.6 per cent shareholder. Shortly after, Shell agreed to build a giant platform offshore, in an area called Bonga. These deals aggravated suspicions about Shell’s conduct during the Saro-Wiwa affair and its promise to return to the Ogoni region if its workers’ safety was guaranteed by local communities. Many critics believed that Shell’s managers in Nigeria had refused to protest against Saro-Wiwa’s execution because of collaboration with the regime. Those censuring Shell included the World Council of Churches, whose report accused the company of polluting the Ogoni area by dumping oil into waterways and of showing ‘inertia in the face of the government’s brutality’, which included intimidation, rape, arrests, torture, shooting and looting. God, said the Council, damned Shell in Nigeria. Shell denied all the charges. Exonerating itself of any responsibility because it had withdrawn from Ogoniland in 1993, Shell derided the report for regurgitating old and previously discredited allegations, 99 per cent of which, it declared, were fabrications. But the company could not win. The criticism nevertheless prompted Herkströter to admit that Shell’s culture had ‘become inward-looking, isolated and consequently some have seen us as a “state within a state”’. Mark Moody-Stuart was among the few who became openly disturbed that the company had misjudged the situation. ‘We should have been more patient,’ he admitted, ‘and less angry and offered more. There are lessons to be learned.’ ‘Nigeria,’ lamented John Jennings, a Shell director, ‘is like a house falling down. All we can do is patch it up so it leans but doesn’t collapse.’ Watts was philosophical. ‘In oil, mistakes get buried in the mists of time.’ In June 2009, Shell would pay $15.5 million in compensation to settle a lawsuit with Saro-Wiwa’s family, while admitting no wrongdoing.

      Few Nigerians had attended Watts’s farewell party from Nigeria in 1994, but Shell’s directors were relieved that the company’s investments in the country were secure. General Abacha had been persuaded that without Western expertise, Nigeria’s oil production and income would diminish. Unlike Venezuela and Indonesia, Nigeria had no intention of expelling the oil majors. Both sides agreed they needed stability. In view of the continuing violence targeted against the president, Brian Anderson accepted the permanent protection of Nigerian soldiers for Shell’s employees. The corporation’s archives for 1995, Shell’s annus horribilis, were sealed. Reviving the company had become critical to its future prosperity.

      Shareholders were demanding improved profits. Years of cautious under-investment, Herkströter realised, were no longer sustainable. The company had been bruised like the other oil majors by the fall of oil prices, and its poor financial performance had been undermined by choosing only ultra-safe investments and its failure, other than in the Gulf of Mexico, to find ‘elephants’. To improve value per share, Herkströter decided to stop the company befriending presidents and kings, and to focus on reform of its financial controls. Localness, previously Shell’s strength, was to be curbed. Fiefdoms were abolished. One third of the headquarters staff were made redundant, and the power of the resident chairman in each country was reduced in favour of Exxon’s method of governance through central control. The survivors were ordered to stop playing politics and start earning money. But Herkströter’s headlines did not translate into action: little happened other than a costly joint venture in America with Texaco and Saudi Aramco (the Arabian-American Oil Company) which would prove disastrous. To prevent the balance of power tilting towards the British directors, Herkströter marshalled the Dutch directors to reject Mark Moody-Stuart’s proposed purchase of British Gas (BG), a substantial oil exploration and production company, for £4 billion. Moody-Stuart was ‘very upset’, observed Phil Watts. In 2008 BG would be worth about £35 billion.

      Herkströter was equally inept in his attempts to restore Shell’s reputation. ‘We are now being asked to solve political crises in developing countries,’ he said in October 1996, ‘to export Western ethics to those countries and attend to a multitude of other problems. The fact is we simply do not have the authority to carry out these tasks. And I am not sure we should have that authority.’ That opinion was opposed by Mark Moody-Stuart and Phil Watts.

      Primed by his experiences with Brent Spar and Nigeria, Watts put together a list of tasks under the heading ‘Reputation Management’. For Watts, Brent Spar had been ‘a life-changing experience … We had done a technically excellent job but we had all missed the big trick. A time bomb was ticking – we missed it and we all thought we were doing our best … We never dreamt we would get that much attention.’ But if Brent Spar was Watt’s ‘big wake-up call’, he found that Nigeria ‘keeps us awake all the time’. By April 1996 he had compiled a list of initiatives, including ‘Ethics, Human Rights, Political Involvement, and the key items for the review of the Business Principles’. The ‘stewardship over Shell’s reputation’ was Watts’s priority.

      Greenpeace’s campaign against the oil companies had focused on Shell’s exploration in the West Shetland islands. Ignoring the environmental lobby, Herkströter realised, was pointless. The initiative, he noted, had been seized by BP’s John Browne. Spotting the tide of opinion, Browne had, amid fanfare, delivered a speech at Stanford University urging the world to ‘begin to take precautionary action now’ to protect the environment. Shell’s directors agreed to embrace the same ideology. The corporation crafted public statements promoting its intention to be more open, to acknowledge human rights and to protect the environment by including renewable energy projects in its core business plan. In the future, said Herkströter, Shell would engage with Greenpeace to discuss the reduction of greenhouse gases in coal gasification and biofuels. Satisfied that he had fulfilled the public relations requirements, Herkströter approved the purchase of one fifth of Canada’s Athabasca tar sands for C$27 million, a relative pittance. The total estimated reserves were 1,701 billion barrels of oil. Shell anticipated extracting 179 billion barrels. Exploitation of the tar sands was uneconomic while oil was at $15 a barrel, but would be profitable once the price hit $40, although the process offended Shell’s newfound commitment to protect the environment. The tar’s extraction would require the felling of 54,000 square miles of forest, an area the size of New York state, and as a consequence wildlife would be killed and water polluted. Huge amounts of power would be required to create the steam or hot water needed to separate the bitumen from the clay, and more power and chemicals were required to separate the light petroleum from the bitumen. The whole process created three times more carbon than conventional oil operations. In The Hague, the purchase was mentioned as manifesting Shell’s ability to play both sides of the argument.

      At the end of 1997, Herkströter retired. Mark Moody-Stuart, his successor, was dissatisfied with his inheritance. Appointed as ‘Mr Continuity’, Moody-Stuart, a Cambridge geologist and a Quaker who loved sailing, regarded his predecessor’s changes as timely but ineffectual. Few of the reforms had materialised. ‘Shell needs drastic remedial measures,’ he said, while fearing that the majority of Dutch directors would resist even the appointment of senior directors from outside the corporation. Shell had already missed out on two important investments. Approached by the governments of Angola and Azerbaijan to develop their oil, the company had refused requests for preliminary cash bonuses, and the opportunities were seized by BP and Exxon. Under Herkströter, Moody-Stuart lamented, Shell had even ignored the middle way. Adrift and unacclimatised to the new world, Shell had allowed its long-nurtured relationships with the governments of Oman, Nigeria and Brunei to deteriorate, and earnings were falling. In 1998 the company’s profits were $5.146 billion, compared to $8.031 billion in 1997. ‘There will be a coming crisis if we don’t change,’ warned Moody-Stuart. ‘Change is a pearl beyond price.’ The obstacles were Shell’s fragmented culture, divided management and


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