Emergency Incident Management Systems. Louis N. Molino, Sr.
Command (IC). In most instances, these goals were specific in nature, and each goal had a way of measuring success, they were attainable with the resources on scene, they were relevant to the overall mission, and except for the investigation, timelines were set to ensure ongoing progress. Even the FBI response was to a certain extent commanded by the fire department. While the FBI did the investigation on their own terms, they also coordinated and sought approval from the fire department to ensure that the FBI was not in the way of rescue and recovery operations.
2.5.2 Control
Controlling an incident helps to reduce the severity and reduce the lifecycle of a crisis. The act of controlling an incident involves leading (or guiding) the response, and in most instances, the recovery. To accomplish control, responsibility must be taken for the acts and achievements of all responders. Control involves maneuvering resources toward a desired result; in this case, the desired result was to save survivors and to recovers the bodies of victims without any injuries or death of responding personnel. Controlling an incident is done so that the response and recovery can keep on a specified course. This means that there must be a constant guidance and oversight so that the response and recovery is an operation that is organized and effective rather than haphazard.
Control can also be related to the accountability of personnel, and it is highly important for the safety of personnel. When responding to an emergency or incident, personnel accountability can usually involve two factors. The first factor of accountability is the number of personnel that are entering an area that is Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH). Those commanding an incident need to make sure that they know exactly how many people are in a dangerous area, sometimes called a Hot Zone. Knowing the location of each of the first responders in a hot zone is extremely important. If conditions worsen or deteriorate, those in control need to ensure that all personnel are able to or already have evacuated the area. Essentially, the first part of accountability is to have a head count of who is in a danger zone (Tippett, 2013).
The second component of accountability is the physical location of all personnel operating on the incident scene, even those outside of the hot zone (Tippett, 2013). In the event of a catastrophic, or even potentially catastrophic, event (such as an explosion, an aftershock, a flash flood), it is critical that those controlling the incident to know the exact location of each, and every person involved in the response. By knowing where all the personnel are, it provides direction so that personnel can become a rescue priority if the unthinkable happens. If those controlling an incident know that personnel were on the second floor of a structure, they can go directly to that location, rather than wasting more time by searching the whole building.
An example of this is in order. Imagine if you will that rescue workers are working in a semicollapsed building after an earthquake. As they progress through the building, they give regular reports of their location. While still in the building, a sudden aftershock causes the building to shift, thereby blocking any attempt to exit. The rescuers are pinned down to a specific area with no chance of self‐extrication. Because control of the incident was exercised, and accountability efforts were in place, those rescuing the trapped personnel have a focus area of where in the building these individuals are trapped. They can send a Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) to their last‐known location to start the search. Without control and accountability, the Rapid Intervention Team would have no idea where to start.
When we look at the Tokyo sarin attack response for control, we must, to a certain extent, make an assumption on the control of the incident. While this statement is speculative, based on lack of communication and the lack of cooperation, it is likely that accountability in the Tokyo incident was undertaken by each individual agency, if at all. The lack of a defined overall accountability is documented by Murakami (2000), and multiple accounts from victims describe that there were no specific zones set up to protect workers from areas that were identified as Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH). This evidence also coincides with the accounts that there were numerous individuals who suffered secondary contamination. These eyewitness reports also confirm that there was no apparent accountability because anyone was allowed in the contaminated areas (Murakami, 2000). This lack of accountability put all individuals responding and in the general vicinity at risk.
In the Tokyo attack, there appeared to be no real control in place. Essentially, the right hand did not know what the left hand was doing. As has been described numerous times, each entity did what their specified job was, but there was no guidance for the overall response. Not only did each entity work autonomously, but in the case of the emergency medical response, there was no consideration of controlling where patients were transported to prevent overwhelming one or more hospitals (Murakami, 2000).
In looking at the Oklahoma City bombing, at the onset accountability was initially minimal at best, but that changed after the area was evacuated for a bomb scare. During this initial response, private citizens and some public safety officials were operating outside of the Incident Command System. It is important to note that in major and/or catastrophic incidents, it is not uncommon for untrained volunteers, off‐duty first responders, and many others, to respond to the incident to see how they may be able to help. Unless the area has been secured prior to the incident, knowing who is present, where they are located, what they are doing, and the overall safety of the individuals is often not known during the initial stages.
After the area was evacuated for a bomb scare, control was strictly implemented (including accountability measures). As time went on, more accountability measures were implemented to ensure safety and an organized response. Some of the accountability measures included putting a perimeter fence in place and adding check‐in points where an individual had to be identified before being allowed beyond the perimeter. Further accountability measures required a specific site identification card with pictures and credentialing, and a chain of command that had supervisors for each person working at the incident. Each supervisor could not have more than seven people working for them at a given time.
The incident was also controlled by priorities. Those controlling the response had an initial priority of life safety. They wanted to ensure that personnel did not become injured or killed while attempting to rescue individuals or recover bodies. This was effective because after gaining control of the incident, only relatively minor injuries and no deaths were reported. Prior to gaining control of the incident, a nurse was killed by falling debris (glass). There were reports that this nurse was climbing through debris and working outside of ICS when a piece of glass fell and killed her (Nordberg, 2010). It is very likely that had she been working within the ICS system, that she would have not been killed.
The next priority by those controlling the incident was to rescue living victims. There is a good possibility that the thought process of those in control was that they could not do anything for those that were already deceased. With this mentality, they would initially bypass the dead and put their focus on the living. While some may think this is cruel or disrespectful, if they did not bypass the dead, valuable time and resources could have been delayed when they could have been finding and responding to the living. As will be discussed in later chapters, as public safety workers, we must first focus on life safety.
As more resources arrived on scene at the Oklahoma City Bombing site, control was exercised to ensure the most effective use of these resources. Police officers who traditionally do not undertake rescues were effectively used to protect the victims' families from the media, and from others. As clergy and psychologists arrived on scene, they were sent to tend to the emotional needs of the victims' families, walking wounded, and in some cases, the severely wounded. As construction workers and equipment arrived on scene, they were controlled and given jobs based on the priority areas and their abilities. An extensive list of resources was managed and controlled throughout the entire response (The Final Report, 1996).
In comparing these two incidents, it is plain to see that having control of an incident is more conducive when an IMS method is utilized. While part of the problem with accountability in Tokyo was the lack of identification that the incidents were interconnected, it is also blatantly obvious that even after identifying this incident as a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) attack, that accountability was lacking. No perimeters were set up, personnel were not screened, and first responders