Emergency Incident Management Systems. Louis N. Molino, Sr.
mobile command centers next to the fire departments mobile command center. These agencies worked together to ensure that nothing was missed and that there was no duplication of efforts. They planned the response together, identifying resources and capabilities, and they worked together and discussed how to best cure each challenge they faced. These local resources were going beyond cooperating by providing resources, and they were collaborating by helping to identify the solutions (Final Report, 1996).
Local businesses and nonprofits collaborated as well. Heavy equipment companies collaborated among themselves and then collaborated with the Incident Commander (IC) and those planning the response. By doing this, the heavy equipment operators helped to ensure safe and effective operations. Local nonprofits went beyond cooperating and worked together with those utilizing the ICS method. Nongovernmental organizations not only helped to identify resources but also to offer solutions to completing the task at hand. These nongovernmental resources worked in concert with all other first responders.
If we look at the Family Care Center, there were multiple agencies that were working side by side rather than independently or in a way that there were clear‐cut duties (Final Report, 1996). Both ends of the spectrum worked to provide care for the surviving family members. The nonprofits, pastors, law enforcement, the funeral directors, the Red Cross, and many more worked tirelessly to meet the needs of the effected families. The mission was more important than the individual organizations involved.
We also need to realize that the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at the state level was activated in the first few minutes after the bombing. Equally impressive was that the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was fully staffed within 25 minutes. It was staffed by those with the authority to make decisions from a multitude of disciplines. The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) incorporated and worked with the local responders (the boots on the ground), and they incorporated and worked with all levels of government. The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) staff members, all from differing disciplines and agencies, collaborated and worked together to ensure that every need was met at the bombing site and surrounding area (ODCEM, n.d.). The National Guard integrated their resources and collaborated with those in charge as well. Guard members accomplished work by providing security, working in the morgue, digging through evidence with the FBI, and undertaking many other jobs where their assistance was needed. They too collaborated with those leading the effort (Smith, 2010).
The federal response and integration of resources was also a collaborative effort. The federal government did not try to take over the incident, but rather they integrated all of their resources into the response. The Task Force Teams that were deployed to the Oklahoma City bombing site worked in unity with each other and with other agencies. K‐9 teams were integrated with other rescuers, and they worked in a collaborative manner not only with these teams but also with those in charge of the incident. Military resources collaborated and worked side by side with other responding agencies and within the command structure. These resources integrated in a way that went beyond meeting the needs of the response, and they became part of the solution for the entire response.
2.5.5 Communications
Through looking at past disasters, we know that communications have always been an issue in any major or catastrophic incident. Unfortunately, communications will probably always be a weak link when managing an incident. While communication will likely be a problem for many years to come, those using IMS methods, such as ICS, should always strive to improve communications.
In a large or catastrophic incident, communications overload should be expected in most instances. In the planning stages for major incidents, state and local agencies have, and should continue to identify alternative methods for communicating. These communication mitigation measures would be best if they included methods to communicate locally and outside of the local area. It is also beneficial if communications can be established with nongovernmental agencies that may have limited knowledge about disaster communications.
In the Tokyo attack, communications between the responding agencies was essentially nonexistent. Interagency communications were fragmented at best, and in most cases, these communications were not even pursued. The various government agencies involved with the response did not cooperate or communicate with each other. According to reports from Pangi (2002), this ultimately continued throughout the duration of the incident. Each agency essentially operated within their own little bubble by failing to communicate effectively with other agencies.
While there was a breakdown in the communications equipment in the Tokyo incident, there is no mention in any of the resources about trying to mitigate this problem. One way that this could have been mitigated would have been sending someone with a radio to those hospitals to facilitate communications, or in sending runners to the hospital. In looking at the communications between EMS units and the hospitals, it was plain to see that the lack of communications was a contributing factor overwhelming the closest hospital, while most of the other hospitals had relatively few patients (Murakami, 2000).
Perhaps most disturbing part about communication in the Tokyo incident is that the hospitals that were treating patients did not learn from officials at the scene that this was a chemical attack. For three hours, St. Luke's Hospital sent researchers digging through the library trying to find answers. Additionally, doctors that did realize what was happening used the only communications method they could think of to contact hospitals, a fax machine. The confirmation that local hospitals needed did not come from a government agency, it came from the local news (Murakami, 2000).
In Oklahoma City, it was expected that there would be issues with communications during the preparedness phase while when planning for larger incidents. Those issues were in the process of being addressed, but a full resolution of identified deficiencies had not been fully implemented. Even though some mitigation measures had been implemented, this bombing was of such magnitude that it went beyond what was expected. It is likely that even if all proposed implementation measures were enacted, communications would still have been challenging (Manzi et al. 2002).
The After‐Action Report ([AAR] n.d.) from the Oklahoma City bombing found multiple communications problems that occurred from the onset. The first communications failure in Oklahoma City that was identified were with the phones. All phones, both land lines and cell phones, had issues that were described as intermittent to inoperable. For the most part, cell phones were inoperable because of the vast number of individuals attempting to make phone calls immediately following the bombing. There was also some infrastructure damage that occurred to cell phones due to the explosion, but it was not severe. Land lines were inoperable because of damage to the infrastructure caused by the bombing (ODCEM, n.d.).
When first responders arrived in the area, the only communications they had were their radios. As was expected, those with critical information, or urgently needing assistance, were overwhelming the only available radio frequencies at that time. With the amount of people being trapped or injured, these channels were immediately overwhelmed with attempted communications, and it was nearly impossible to effectively communicate (ODCEM, n.d.).
In an interview with Fire Engineering (1995), the Oklahoma City Fire Chief described how radio traffic was so heavy that he had difficulties in trying to find a break in radio traffic to give the Incident Commander (IC) situation updates. He had urgent information on the extent of the damage and where structural failures may collapse on first responders. The Chief described that even when radio silence was needed so that rescuers could listen for potential victims, it was extremely difficult to achieve (Fire Engineering, 1995).
Compounding the communications problem after the bombing, most communications between ambulances and the hospitals suffered a failure in communications, much like what occurred in Tokyo. The difference was that the Oklahoma City bombing communications issues were mainly rooted in hospital error. Because the emergency frequency had not been used in quite some time, many of the hospitals had turned the volume down or turned their radio off. In order to mitigate this problem, police officers were sent to each hospital to tell them to turn on or turn up their radios. If needed, it was planned that police or other personnel who had radios would relay information to the hospital to mitigate communication issues (Nordberg, 2010).
There