Digital Media Ethics. Charles Ess

Digital Media Ethics - Charles  Ess


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do apply to the particulars of a specific case – is an ongoing project that continues throughout one’s entire life. This is in part because it requires experience – both of successes and of failures – as these help us learn (oftentimes, the hard way) what “works” ethically and what doesn’t. The first time we try to learn a new skill or ability – say, ice-skating – we are certain to stumble and fall, perhaps catastrophically, and almost certainly more than once. Analogously, our first efforts to grapple with difficult ethical issues that require phronēsis do not always go well: we are caught in the ethical “bootstrapping” problem of needing precisely the ability to judge that will be robust enough to help only after it has been developed and honed through many years of (sometimes hard) experience.

      The good news is that – however daunting all of this might seem – the Aristotelian view (among many others) argues that the vast majority of us are already ethical beings equipped with phronesis, and thereby the foundations and abilities for taking on these challenges.

      By now, readers should have a reasonably good idea of the features of digital media that lead to specific sorts of ethical issues that we will explore more fully in subsequent chapters. I also hope that you are beginning to have a sense that, especially with regard to digital media that interconnect us globally, it is important to do so in ways that go beyond the either/or polarities that tend to dominate popular media reporting.

      This circle organization reflects a key discovery in my own teaching experience. After some years of the more usual “first, all the theories, then the applications” approach, my students made it clear that they were more likely to acquire facility with both central ethical theories and their application if we instead began with just a few theories and then applied these to specific cases. Whatever the disadvantages of initially confronting specific examples with a more limited set of theories, it also often happens that students will thereby discover precisely through these applications that their initial theories are somehow inadequate. Specifically, the first theories often do not allow them to resolve the problems in ways that closely fit their own ethical intuitions and sensibilities. This is pedagogical gold: students see on their own the need for further theory/theories, and so, as we return from specific cases to more theories (making the circle from praxis to theory), they are characteristically more interested in new theories than if we had simply worked through all of them from the outset.

      Instructors and their students who want to follow this approach can begin with the opening sections of chapter 6 on utilitarianism, deontology, and ethical relativism, absolutism, and pluralism, and then move on to chapter 2 (privacy) and, perhaps, chapter 3 (copyright and intellectual property). Chapter 3 further explores virtue ethics, Confucian ethics, and the (Southern) African framework of ubuntu: again, taking up the relevant sections in chapter 6 along with these components of chapter 3 should be helpful. These elements, along with feminist ethics and ethics of care from chapter 6 should be completed prior to chapters 4 (friendship, death online, and democracy) and 5 (pornography, sexbots, and violence). But some readers, depending on their interest in the specific topics of each chapter, may prefer to go to chapter 5 before chapter 4 (or 3, for that matter), as more concrete and specific in certain ways, before taking up chapter 4 (or 3).

      OK – enjoy!

       1 Here I use the terms “premise,” “argument,” “conclusion,” etc., in their logical sense. An understanding of the basic element of logic is essential for undertaking ethics – and many ethics texts include an introduction to logic (e.g.Tavani 2013, ch. 3, etc.). For the sake of brevity, I have chosen instead to introduce and discuss a minimal number of logical elements: analogy and questionable analogy in chapter 3; the distinction between exclusive and inclusive “or”s in chapter 5; and the basic fallacy of affirming the consequent


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