The New Latin America. Manuel Castells
and political challenges attending neoliberal globalization led to openings in the political systems of many countries (Calderón, 2008). In Venezuela, this resulted in the taking of institutional power by new political actors through elections. These new actors launched the Bolivarian Revolution after the election of 1998, and they were then strengthened by a series of electoral victories for Hugo Chávez and his followers. Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Bolivia elected governments that challenged the Washington Consensus with left-wing strategies for autonomous nationalist development. Costa Rica continued its policies of social democratic pacifism and modernization and preserved its tropical welfare state. Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay clearly positioned themselves against global financial capitalism even while they were integrated into global competition. On the other hand, in Colombia, the civil war and the paramilitary state led by Álvaro Uribe prevented political change for a time, although this type of change did take place at the municipal level, especially in Medellín and Bogotá. Peru maintained the neoliberal model promoted by Alberto Fujimori in partnership with various political coalitions. And in Mexico, the infiltration of the state by drug cartels created a context of particularly violent confrontation both within and between the cartels and the state apparatuses; estimates suggest that more than 235,000 lives were lost between 2006 and 2016, leading to a dire situation in one of Latin America’s major countries.2
The Chilean model of neoliberalism was a special case. We note that, importantly, there were two models of development in Chile, whose democratic model was neoliberal at the level of the economy but not at the level of the state. In his book about development in Chile, Castells (2005) draws an empirical distinction between these two models of development in Chile: the neoliberal, authoritarian, and exclusionary model that prevailed under Pinochet’s dictatorship (1973–89), and the liberal, democratic, and inclusive model that first took effect in 1990 under the transitional governments of the Concertación and reached its fullest expression during the administration of Ricardo Lagos between 2000 and 2006. The data and analyses presented in Castells (2005) demonstrate that, when one compares the two periods, the democratic model was much more efficient in terms of economic growth, limited inflation, indicators of human development, macroeconomic stability, productivity, and international competitiveness. At the same time, human rights were affirmed, and democracy was reinstated, though with some limitations inherited from the dictatorship. Poverty and extreme poverty were significantly reduced. Although inequality in the distribution of incomes remains high in Chile when the country’s economy is compared with that of Argentina or Uruguay, for example, a decrease in this tendency can also be observed. In 2016, the Gini coefficient for Chile was 0.453, whereas at the beginning of the 1990s it was over 0.500.
On the other hand, free market policies, at both the domestic and the international levels, were central to Chile’s strategy for development, and widespread liberalization continued, in keeping with a forceful strategy that prioritized exports. Thus, copper mines (the source of “Chile’s salary”), which had been nationalized by Allende, remained in the public sector, since Pinochet did not reverse Allende’s nationalization, choosing instead to retain direct control over Chile’s main source of wealth and to use this control for the predatory accumulation of a personal fortune. In general, it seems to us demonstrably true that the strictly neoliberal model in Chile ended in 1990, but some of its economic traits continued to mark Chile’s successful development, because businesses, a democratically controlled state, and a legitimate government defused social resistance and the kind of political challenges that the neoliberal model faced in other countries. This was because Chile was able to sustain economic growth and to increase its productivity and competitiveness during the post-dictatorship years. The process of modernization nevertheless generated a certain discontent in the population, which, as the report on human development released by the United Nations Development Programme in 1998 noted, even began to question the value of modernization itself. This discontent also had political and subjective effects associated with inefficiency and widespread political corruption.
Another sui generis case is the Peruvian one. Here the neoliberal model was consistent and lasting, and it has prevailed economically throughout the first decades of the twenty-first century. It was based on an economic policy initiated by Fujimori, which coexisted with various other political projects, like the neo-developmentalist project of Alan García or the indigenist projects of Ollanta Humala. Here, as in Chile, poverty was reduced, in the Peruvian case from 55 percent in 2001 to 31 percent in 2010. But chronic social inequality persisted (Araníbar et al., 2013: 293). Real salaries rose from $101 (in US dollars) in 2001 to $110 in 2010, that is, at a rate much lower than the Latin American average, which went from $101 to $158 in the same period (Araníbar et al., 2013: 302). Moreover, the Peruvian context remains characterized by social conflict, especially in the south of the county. Interestingly, according to public opinion polls, citizens express widespread dissatisfaction with the functioning of the economy as well as with the state of Peruvian democracy (Araníbar et al., 2013).
Social Resistance and Political Change as Sources of Neo-Developmentalism
Revolts against social exclusion and demands for multiculturalism and dignity are at the root of the political processes that took place in Venezuela, led by Chávez, in Ecuador led by Rafael Correa, and in Bolivia led by Evo Morales. Moreover, the four consecutive electoral victories won by the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT, or Workers’ Party) in Brazil, under the charismatic leadership of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva changed the balance of political power in the region. Building on the stability of the macroeconomic and modernizing policies of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (despite profound differences between Lula and Cardoso), the PT was in the vanguard of the process as it sought to further stabilize a new developmentalist state. The Brazilian emphasis on investment in productive infrastructure, together with an increase in public spending and a set of redistributive policies, was at the origin of neo-developmentalism in Latin America.
Argentina underwent a similar process under Kirchnerism, combining socio-political mobilization from the Peronist movement with a state that played a dominant role, which came to prevail over multinational corporations and to exercise control over financial markets as well as over Argentina’s economy more generally. Uruguay joined this effort under the leadership of President Mujica, a former Tupamaro militant who fully embraced democracy, affirming dignity and welfare and becoming one of the most respected political figures on the international stage.
Thus, Latin America laid the political foundations for a strategy of development organized by the state, based on the extraction of natural resources for export and the creation of productive infrastructures that would generate funds for the sort of public social spending that could improve living conditions for the population. Statism, productivism, and social welfare were expanded in a process of combined interaction that lent support to neo-populist movements and parties on the left and gave rise to a twenty-first century version of left politics. The success of this strategy, however, depended in large part on charismatic leaders and on the favorable new conditions of the world economy. In this way, a system of corporate patronage and domination was established that would later undergo a general crisis.
Charismatic Leaders, State, and Society
The idea of a return to the people, defined as the subject of history and identified with the nation and the state, was fundamental for the construction of the neo-developmentalist strategies that arose in new global and regional contexts. The state and the charismatic leader combine in the popular imagination, becoming fundamental referents for policies that seek both social integration and development, as well as for confrontations with traditional powers and national conservative elites. At the same time, there was widespread and realistic political resistance to negotiations and agreements with transnational corporations and neoliberal states, especially developed countries and China.
As Cardoso and Enzo Faletto argued, considering the role of leaders in politics: “We know that the course of history depends largely on the daring of those who propose to act in terms of historically viable goals” (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: 176; translation slightly modified). Even more than other leaders, charismatic neo-developmentalist leaders