The Franco-German War of 1870-71. Graf von Helmuth Moltke
height in front of Flavigny, whence the French presently retired.
On the assumption that the French were already prosecuting the retreat, the 6th Division had been ordered forward towards Etain by way of Mars la Tour, to bar the enemy also from the northern road to Verdun. When it reached the height of Tronville, whence could be seen how things really stood, the brigades wheeled to the right in the direction of Vionville and Flavigny. The artillery going on in advance, formed a formidable line of batteries, the fire of which prepared the way for a farther advance, and by half-past eleven the 11th Brigade had taken possession of Vionville in spite of heavy losses. From thence, and from the south, in conjunction with the 10th Brigade, an attack was then directed on Flavigny, which had been set on fire by shell-fire. The different detachments were hereabouts very much mixed, but by skilfully taking advantage of every fold of the ground, the individual regimental officers succeeded in getting their men steadily forward, in spite of the heavy fire of the hostile infantry and artillery. Flavigny was taken by assault, and one cannon and a number of prisoners fell into the hands of the brave Brandenburgers.
Vionville, Flavigny and the northern end of the forest of St. Arnould constituted the points of support of the Prussian front now facing to the east; but this front was more than four miles long, and the whole infantry and artillery were engaged up to the hilt all in one line. The second line consisted only of the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions and half of the 37th Brigade near Tronville.
The position of the French was one of great advantage. Their left flank leaned on Metz, their right was protected by formidable batteries on the old Roman road and a strong force of cavalry; and so they could await with confidence a frontal attack on the part of a venturesome enemy.
The possibility of continuing the march to Verdun on this day, under the protection of a strong covering rearguard, was, no doubt, out of the question. Supposing the Marshal earnest above everything to effect his retreat, he could do so only by fighting hard for his right of way, and by so freeing himself from the enemy blocking his path.
It is not easy to discern, from a purely military standpoint, why this course was not resorted to. There was the full certainty that only part, and probably only a small part, of the German host could as yet have reached the left side of the Moselle, and when in the course of the day the Divisions detained about Metz arrived, the French had greatly the superiority in strength. But it seems that the Marshal's chief solicitude was lest he should be forced to relinquish his touch of Metz; and he gave almost his whole attention to his left wing. Constantly sending fresh reinforcements thither, he massed the whole Guard Corps and part of the VIth Corps opposite the Bois des Ognons, whence an attack was exceptionally improbable. One is tempted to assume that political reasons alone thus early actuated Bazaine in his resolve to cling to Metz.
Meanwhile the Prussians slowly but surely made their way beyond Flavigny and Vionville, and, assisted by a heavy fire from the artillery, compelled the right wing of the IInd French Corps to retire on Rezonville, a movement which became a flight when the French Generals Bataille and Valazé were killed.
To regain the lost ground the French Guard Cuirassier Regiment threw itself resolutely on the pursuers. But its attack was cut short by the rapid fire of two companies of the 52nd Regiment drawn up in line, which reserved their fire till the enemy were within 250 paces. The horsemen sweeping right and left rushed into the fire of more infantry behind; 243 horses strewed the field, and only the remnants of the regiment wheeled about in swift flight, pursued by two Hussar regiments which had dashed forward from Flavigny. A French battery in front of Rezonville had hardly time to discharge a few shots before it was surrounded. For want of teams the Prussians could not, indeed, carry off the captured guns; but the Commander-in-Chief of the French army, who had himself brought them up, was for several minutes in imminent danger of being taken prisoner.
The 6th Prussian Cavalry Division had also been ordered to the front. After passing through the line of artillery and deploying as well as the limited space permitted, it found itself face to face with fresh and completely formed troops. Marshal Bazaine had taken the precaution of substituting for the routed bodies of the IInd Corps the Guard Grenadier Division, which he had at last prevailed on himself to bring up from his unengaged left wing, but not without filling the vacancy by a Division of the IIIrd Corps. Thus the Prussian cavalry was received with such an overwhelming musketry and artillery fire that it halted, and deliberately retired, its retreat being covered by two squadrons of Uhlans, which time after time showed a front against the enemy. The cavalry had not actually engaged, but its advance had gained time and opportunity for the artillery to move further forward in one line from the spur of the wood to Flavigny.
It was now two o'clock. So far General von Alvensleben had deceived the enemy with regard to the slenderness of his force by acting incessantly on the offensive. But the battle was now at a standstill, the battalions were visibly thinned, their strength was sapped by four hours of hard fighting, and the ammunition of the infantry was almost exhausted. Not a battalion, not a battery remained in reserve behind the fighting line standing there in the fire. It was now required to conserve the success won with so much blood by acting thenceforth on the defensive.
The left wing was in especial danger, being under the fire of the powerful artillery deployed on the Roman road. Their greatly superior numbers enabled the French to extend farther and farther to the right, threatening thus completely to envelop the Prussian flank.
Marshal Canrobert, in the French centre, had discerned the right moment to press forward against Vionville with all his might. At this critical instant there was on the German side only a small detachment of the 5th Cavalry Division available to check this effort. Two brigades had necessarily been sent to strengthen the left flank, and of the 12th Brigade remaining in rear of Vionville two squadrons had been detached to the Tronville copses. The two regiments ordered to undertake the task of charging the advancing enemy—the Magdeburg Cuirassiers and the Altmark Uhlans—were consequently each but three squadrons strong, in all 800 horses.
General von Bredow, commanding the 12th Cavalry Brigade, first traversed in column the shallow hollow sinking down from Vionville, then wheeled to the right and mounted the slope to the eastward, both his regiments on one front. Received immediately with heavy artillery and infantry fire, he threw himself on the hostile ranks. The first line is ridden over, the line of guns is broken through, gunners and teams are put to the sword. The second French line is powerless to resist this vigorous onslaught, and even the more distant batteries limbered up to drive away.
But the rapture of victory and the impetuosity of the charge carried the handful of troopers too far, and after a gallop of 3000 paces they found themselves surrounded by the French cavalry, which attacked them from all sides. There was no scope for a second charge, and so after several encounters with the French horse the brigade was forced to cut its way back through the French infantry, whose bullets accompanied it home. Only one-half of the command returned to Flavigny, where it was reorganized into two squadrons. The devoted self-sacrifice of the two heroic regiments effected the result, that the French entirely discontinued their attack on Vionville.
At three o'clock four of their Divisions advanced towards the Tronville copses. Barby's cavalry brigade (11th), watching the western verge, had to retire before the enemy's fire, and the German infantry occupying the wood also had to yield to a strength so superior; the batteries which were in action between Vionville and the copses were assailed in rear from the west through the glades of the copses, and were likewise forced to retire. But not until the lapse of an hour did the French succeed in overcoming the obstinate resistance of four staunch battalions.
At the subsequent roll-call near Tronville, it was ascertained that the 24th Regiment had lost 1000 men and 52 officers, and that the 2nd Battalion of the 20th Regiment had lost all its officers. The 37th demi-Brigade, which of its own accord had been fighting valiantly in support since noon, took possession of the village of Tronville and prepared it for an obstinate defence.
It was not till after three that the IIIrd Corps, which had been fighting for seven[9] hours almost single-handed, received effective assistance.
While the Xth Corps was on the march through Thiaucourt, its advanced