The Franco-German War of 1870-71. Graf von Helmuth Moltke
places, small indeed, but too strong to be taken by storm, which command the highways in the mountains. Bitsch had to be avoided by a fatiguing circuit, Lichtenberg was captured by surprise, Lützelstein had been abandoned by its garrison, the investment of Pfalzburg was handed over to the approaching VIth Corps, and Marsal capitulated after a short resistance.
The German left wing had no enemy before it, and could be brought into closer connection with the centre. To bring the three armies abreast of each other a wheel to the right was requisite. The advance of the Ist and IInd Armies had, however, to be delayed, as the IIIrd did not reach the Saar until August 12th. The whole movement was so arranged that the IIIrd Army was to use the roads by Saarunion and Dieuze, and to southward; the IInd those by St. Avold and Nomény and to southward; the Ist those by Saarlouis and Les Etangs, the last also taking the direction of Metz.
The cavalry Divisions which were reconnoitring far to the front, reported the enemy as retreating all along the line. They ranged close up to Metz, and across the Moselle both above and below the place, forcing the detachments of Canrobert's Corps, which had again been ordered up from Châlons, to return thither. All their information indicated that very large masses were encamped in front of Metz. From this it might equally be inferred that the enemy intended to retreat further, or, with his whole force concentrated, to strike hard at the right wing of the German Army, at the moment when the impending crossing of the Moselle should make its severance from the left wing unavoidable.
The chief Head-quarter restricted itself in ordinary course to issuing general directions, the execution of which was left in detail to the army commanders; but in this instance it was deemed necessary in the momentary circumstances to regulate the movements of each separate corps by specific orders. On August 11th the Head-quarter of his Majesty was therefore transferred to St. Avold, in the front line, and midway between the Ist and IInd Armies, so as, by being in the immediate vicinity, to be able to exercise timely authority to either hand. The three Corps of the Ist Army advanced towards the German Nied on August 12th, only to find that the French had evacuated that position. Three Corps of the IInd Army on the left of the Ist also moved forward in prolongation of the same front by Faulquemont and Morhange, while two others followed.
On the next day the IInd Army reached the Seille, without encountering the enemy, and occupied Pont à Mousson with infantry.
The strangely inactive attitude of the French made it seem quite probable that they might not make any stand in front of Metz, a probability strengthened by the reports of the German cavalry, which was scouting as far as Toul and on to the Verdun road. But there always loomed the possibility that the enemy would throw himself with 200 battalions on the Ist Army, now in his immediate front. The two Corps forming the right wing of the IInd Army were therefore ordered to halt for the present, a little to the south of Metz, ready to deliver a shattering blow on the flank of any such attack. If the enemy preferred to assail these Corps, then would devolve on the Ist Army on its part the prompt assumption of the offensive.
Meanwhile the other Corps of the IInd Army were pursuing the march towards the Moselle farther to the southward; if the enemy should attack them with superior forces after they had crossed the river, it would be possible for them, in case of need, to fall back on the IIIrd Army.
So much caution was not universally deemed essential; it was argued that the French seemed already committed to full retreat, they ought not to be allowed to get away without punishment, and it followed that the German Army should strike without delay. The French had, indeed, already committed themselves to a further retreat; but when in the afternoon (of the 14th) the VIIth Corps discerned their retrograde movement, a fight began on the hither side of the Moselle, which, by the voluntary intervention of the nearest bodies of troops, developed into a battle in the course of the evening.
Battle of Colombey—Nouilly.
(August 14th.)
The Commandant of Metz had declared his inability to hold that place for a fortnight, if left to his own resources; but the chosen and intrenched position on the Nied, taken up to cover the fortress, had been found locally defective, and the French Head-quarter hoped to find a more favourable defensive position in the vicinity of Verdun.
Military necessity outweighed even a politic regard for public opinion, and the Emperor, although he had transferred the command-in-chief to Marshal Bazaine, still remained with the army, for it would have been impossible for him to return to Paris in existing circumstances.
Very early in the morning of the 14th August the multitudinous trains were being withdrawn through the city, and towards noon the IInd, IVth, and VIth Corps got in motion, while the IIIrd Corps remained in position behind the deep valley of the Colombey brook, to cover the retirement.
When, at four in the afternoon, the break-up of the enemy was perceived, General von der Goltz (commanding 26th Infantry Brigade) with the advanced guard of the VIIth Corps struck him in the act, and wrenched from him Colombey and the Château d'Aubigny on his right flank. But, at the first cannon sound, the French columns immediately turned about, fully equipped for fighting, and eager, after their many previous disasters, to break the spell by a desperate effort. Castagny's Division threw itself in greatly superior force upon the weak German detachment in the isolated position of Colombey, which held its own only by the utmost exertion.
Already the advanced guard of the Ist Army Corps was approaching by both the high-roads from Saarbrücken and Saarlouis; and its batteries having pushed on ahead, at once took part in the engagement. Passing through Lauvallier, the infantry followed close, climbed the eastern slope of the plateau of Bellecroix, and farther to the right drove the enemy out of the wood east of Mey. But the presence at this point of the main body of the French IIIrd Corps gave pause to the German offensive for the time.
The 13th, 1st, and 2nd Divisions had meanwhile followed their respective advanced guards, the two latter having been held in full readiness by General von Manteuffel ever since his outposts had reported that the enemy was moving. General von Zastrow, too, arrived on the field, and took over the command of the left wing. Soon sixty field-pieces were in action against the enemy. General von Osten-Sacken hurried forward the 25th Brigade through the hollow of Coincy, and climbed on to the edge of the upland. The clump of fir-trees on the road to Bellecroix was taken by storm, was surrounded on three sides, was lost again in a bloody conflict, and was once more recaptured. Soon afterwards two batteries succeeded in establishing themselves above Planchette, whose fire drove the French back as far as Borny; yet still the conflict raged on both sides with the utmost fury.
But now there threatened the German right the danger of being out-flanked. General Ladmirault, on learning that Grenier's Division had been driven out of Mey, immediately set out to its support with his other two Divisions, retook the village, and pressed farther forward by the Bouzonville road. General von Manteuffel had meanwhile given the necessary orders for holding, at all hazards, the deep-cut trough of the Vallières brook which covered the flank. The 1st Brigade was posted behind Noisseville as general reserve, the 4th, and part of the artillery of the Ist Corps, marched by the Bouzonville road to confront General Ladmirault near Poix, while the remaining batteries from the southern slopes to the eastward of Nouilly enfiladed his advance. On the left, Glümer's Division (13th) had all this time been holding its ground at Colombey, and now, at seven o'clock in the evening, Woyna's Brigade came to its assistance, and took possession of the copses westward of Colombey. A very welcome reinforcement now arrived from the IInd Army remaining halted on the Seille.
The 18th Infantry Division, after a heavy march, had bivouacked near Buchy in the afternoon, but when General von Wrangel (its commander) was informed that fighting was audible from the locality of the Ist Army, he promptly set his Division in motion in that direction. He drove the enemy out of Peltre, and then in conjunction with Woyna's Brigade occupied Grigy, somewhat in rear of the French position in front of Borny.
On the right wing of the fighting line, the 2nd Division had also pushed on towards Mey, by way of Nouilly and through the adjacent vineyards; and, as darkness was setting