LUTHER (Vol. 1-6). Grisar Hartmann
no part in this. The pious always think with regard to their good works: “Quis scit, si gratia Dei hæc mecum faciat? Quis det mihi scire, quod bona intentio mea ex Deo sit? Quomodo scio, quod id quod feci, meum, seu quod in me est, Deo placeat?” (p. 323). (Cp. the celebrated question: How can I find a gracious God?) “Away therefore,” he says, “with the proud self-righteous who think themselves sure of their works!” (p. 221). Fear, humility, despair is according to him the only fitting state in which to appear before God: “Him who despairs of himself, the Lord accepts” (p. 223)—that is to say, if He has not destined him for hell!
[552] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 221; see above, p. 211, note 4.
[553] From passage cited above, p. 114, n. 1.
[554] “Schol. Rom.,” 214. Cp. his explanation of the 4th Heidelberg Thesis, that in a Christian “desperatio” ( “mortificatio”) and “vivificatio” are united; also Theses 18 and 24, that “conteri lege” is for everyone a necessity of the spiritual life. “Werke,” Weim. ed., 1, p. 356 f., 361, 364.
[555] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 219.
[556] Ibid., p. 230.
[557] Ibid., p. 105.
[558] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 84.
[559] Ibid., p. 83.
[560] Ibid., p. 89.
[561] Ibid., p. 86 f.
[562] Ibid., p. 39.
[563] Ficker refers to “Schol. Rom.,” p. 23 ff., 108 ff., 111 seq., 114, 167, 185, 187, 199, 244, 283, 287, 322 f.
[564] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 322.
[565] Ibid., p. lxxvi.
[566] Ibid., p. 14.
[567] See below, chapter x.
[568] “Werke,” Weim. ed., 3, p. 651; 4, p. 228.
[569] Denifle, 1¹, p. 444.
[570] Ibid., p. 605 ff., with his testimonies.
[571] Ibid., p. 599.
[572] Cp. above, p. 218, and “Schol. Rom.,” p. 105 ff.: “(sancti) iustitiam a Deo secundum misericordiam ipsius implorant, eo ipso semper quoque iusti a Deo reputantur.”
[573] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 219. This remarkable passage, which is a proof of his pseudo-mysticism, runs: “Omnis nostra affirmatio boni cuiuscunque sub negatione eiusdem [abscondita est] ut fides locum habeat in Deo, qui est negativa essentia [!] et bonitas et sapientia et iustitia nec potest possideri aut attingi nisi negatis omnibus affirmativis nostris.”
[574] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 206. Cp. Denifle, 1¹, p. 600.
[575] In Gal., 1, p. 14. We can understand that Protestant theologians should wish to find in Luther’s Commentary on Romans the foundation of the later so-called “Reformed Confession.” O. Scheel, the first among them to treat in a detailed manner of the Commentary edited by Ficker (“Die Entwicklung Luthers” [”Schriften des Vereins für Reformationsgesch., No. 100”], p. 174 ff.), has brought together a number of passages from this work concerning the doctrine of justification, which do not quite agree with the purely outward character of justification according to Luther, dwelt upon above, and which appear to presuppose an inward renewal. In the Commentary assertions are not wanting which contradict the ideas we have pointed out as running through the work; this is due to the fact that the author repeatedly reverts either to true Catholic views or to nominalistic ideas. It is not surprising that contradictions should occur very frequently at the commencement of his career, and that they also do so at a later period is undeniable. (Cp. O. Scheel’s samples of Luther’s Bible-teaching in our volume iv., xxviii., 1 and 2.)
Scheel himself says with reference to the doctrine of justification in the Commentary: “Luther was unable to give to his new conception of Christianity any thorough dogmatic sequence (p. 182); “these statements (on Rom. iii.) are devoid of doctrinal clearness” (p. 183). According to him it cannot be said “that Luther has arrived at any clear presentment of his reforming ideas in his Commentary on Romans” (p. 186). In the teaching of the Commentary re Concupiscence Scheel claims, it is true, to find “that deeply religious and moral conception of a reformed Christianity which is peculiar to Luther” (p. 188), but, nevertheless, remarks that Luther has not found “a quite uniform definition” for “the meaning which he connects with Concupiscence. Even the suppression of the guilt and the non-imputing of original sin might, in view of Luther’s new religious and voluntarist views, be regarded as insufficient; for insufficient importance attributed to the connection between sin and guilt leads finally to an impersonal estimate of sin” (pp. 188, 189). He stopped short at a definition “in which we miss the severely voluntarist connection between sin and guilt” (p. 190). The author therefore speaks of Luther’s view of sin as “insufficient” (p. 191).
With regard to grace, he continues: “Luther’s statements as to grace are also not altogether without ambiguity” (ibid.), “he employs the customary designations for the action of grace, without reflecting that they do not correspond with his ethical and psychological views of grace” (p. 192). “Man’s passivity in the process of salvation which he vindicates, and which, according to the Reformed Confession, was surely to be taken religiously, being only intended to deny the existence of any claim to merit, he defends so ponderously that all the psychological spontaneity of his voluntarism disappears and Quietist mysticism has to supply him with the colours necessary for depicting the appropriation of grace” (ibid.).
Concerning the question of assurance of salvation in the Commentary on Romans, Scheel, indeed, admits that “Luther had not yet arrived at any definite certainty of salvation” (p. 195), and that his statements are not “in touch with the saving faith of the Reformation” (ibid.); he finds, however, in the fear which Luther demands, “an element for overcoming the uncertainty with regard to salvation” (p. 198), indeed, he even thinks (p. 199) that “he had practically arrived at a certainty of salvation.” So much may be