LUTHER (Vol. 1-6). Grisar Hartmann
target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="#ulink_9430f3a1-82e5-5aa2-841c-918f5868b1cf">[504] “Schol. Rom.,” pp. 11, 45, 84, 94.
[505] The reader should notice his exaggerations regarding the teachers of whose nominalistic tendency he disapproves: “docent, quod lex opere tantum sit implenda, etiam sine impletione cordis.... Nec ipsi minimo saltem cordis conatu eadem aggrediuntur, sed solummodo externo opere.” Ibid., p. 45.
[506] Ibid., p. 332.
[507] The passage here referred to in St. Aug. is in “Contra Iulianum,” 1. 8, c. 8; Migne, P. L. xliv., p. 689. Augustine there when he speaks of “servum potius quam liberum arbitrium” does so in another sense, though Luther saw fit to borrow the expression for the title of his own later work of 1525: “De servo arbitrio.”
[508] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 209.
[509] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 322.
[510] Ibid., p. 323. In connection with the proposition at the commencement of this division: “Man can of himself do nothing,” Luther attacks the mediæval theological axiom: “Facienti quod est in se, Deus non denegat gratiam” (in his Commentary on the Psalms, Weim. ed., 4, p. 262, he already gives it as: “Deus infallibiliter dat gratiam”). In order to make the matter clear we may state in advance that, according to Catholic doctrine, we cannot with the powers of nature merit grace either “de condigno” or “de congruo”; grace excludes any natural acquiring of the same; man is only able to dispose himself negatively for the acquisition of grace, not positively, i.e. not in such a way as to demand grace as a right. “Homo non movet se ipsum ad hoc, quod adipiscatur divinum auxilium, quod supra ipsum est, sed potius ad hoc adipiscendum a Deo movetur.” Thom., “Summa contra gent.,” 3, c. 149. In accordance with this, true Scholasticism did not and could not wish to express by the proposition “Facienti quod est in se,” etc., any real meriting of grace by our natural powers. Luther’s attacks, which presuppose this, were therefore of no avail against the true theology of the Middle Ages. The natural acts recognised by theology as good are generally unimportant, have no supernatural merit, and cannot positively qualify for grace in the sense of “Facienti, etc.” The axiom implies rather that whoever does his part, roused and moved thereto by actual grace, will arrive at saving grace and reach heaven; it presupposes a negative preparation; God in His mercy does not refuse His grace to whoever does his part. It was therefore presumed that the actual grace of God was at work in every good work which man performed, inviting to, co-operating with, and furthering it. Cp. Denifle-Weiss, 1², p. 577 ff. The mediæval theological work most widely known in Luther’s time, the “Compendium theologicæ veritatis,” says expressly: “Without grace no one is able to do his part so as to prepare himself for salvation” (l. 5, c. 11). We find there no trace of the Pelagianism with which Luther so bitterly reproached the whole theology of the Middle Ages. (See Denifle-Weiss, 1², p. 576, n. 5). “Is mere co-operation with grace Pelagian?” Denifle asks (p. 577). And what authorised Luther to say in the Schmalkald Articles (Müller-Kolde, “Die symbolischen Bücher der evangel. luther. Kirche,” 1907, p. 311) that the teaching “si faciat homo quantum in se est, Deum largiri ei certo suam gratiam” was a portentum, a heathenish dogma from which it followed that Christ had died in vain?
Luther himself had previously, in his Commentary on the Psalms (Weim. ed., 4, p. 262), written, that God gives His grace without fail to him who does his part, and yet he thereby assumed, with the whole of theology, that grace and glory were not on that account merited, but given us without any desert on our part. (Denifle-Weiss, 1², p. 441.) The passage reads: “Hinc recte doctores, quod homini facienti quod est in se, Deus infallibiliter dat gratiam, et licet non de condigno sese possit ad gratiam præparare, quia est incomparabilis, tamen bene de congruo, propter promissionem istam Dei et pactum misericordiæ. “ Denifle here remarks aptly: “We must not overlook the fact, that Luther here formulates the proposition ‘Facienti,’ etc., in the nominalistic sense.” What is more important is that Luther, immediately before, had rightly excluded all supernatural merit from natural action ( “non ex meritis, sed ex mera promissione miserentis Dei “).
The Nominalists of Occam’s school went much further in allowing a natural preparation for grace (though not a meriting) than the recognised representatives of Scholasticism. Denifle-Weiss, 1², p. 586: “The preparation for saving grace takes place, according to the Occamists, by purely natural acts under the general concurrence of God; particular concurrence is, according to them and speaking generally, the saving grace itself, whereas, according to Scholasticism proper, special concurrence, i.e. actual grace, intervenes between the natural and the supernatural, i.e. saving grace, and is necessary for man’s preparation for the reception of the latter; the general concurrence on the other hand is represented as insufficient because it belongs to the natural order. (See above, pp. 141 ff.) Nevertheless, the Nominalists, as A. Weiss points out (Denifle, 1², p. 578, n. 2), came to expound their theory quite satisfactorily. See Altenstaig, “Lexicon theolog.,” Venet., 1583, fol. 163, s.v. Facere quod in se est. Still, Denifle is right when he says (p. 441) that the reproach of Pelagianism later on urged against them by Luther did to some extent apply to the Occamists.
The deeper ground, however, which led Luther in the above passages of the Commentary on Romans to attack the “Facienti,” etc., was that, in his antagonism against the good works of the self-righteous, he had, with the assistance of pseudo-mysticism, reached a point where he denied that any vital act on the part of man had any potency for the working out of salvation. In the work of salvation he allows of no power of choice: “The fulfilling of the law by our own efforts is absolutely impossible “; “free will is altogether in sin and cannot choose what is good in God’s sight.” See vol. ii., xiv. 3. Cp. W. Braun, “Die Bedeutung der Concupiscenz bei Luther,” pp. 215, 217, 219, 221.
Protestant theologians could, moreover, have found the axiom “Facienti,” etc., duly explained in the Catholic sense, with its biblical and patristic supports, even in the ordinary Catholic handbooks of theology, which would have obviated much misapprehension; cp., for instance, H. Hurter, “Theologiæ specialis pars altera,“¹¹ Innsbruck, 1903 (Compendium 3), p. 65 seq., 72 seq.
[511] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 183.
[512] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 183 f.
[513] Cp. ibid., pp. 114, 185, 187, 244.
[514] Ibid., p. 108.
[515] “Schol. Rom.,” p. 108 f. Cp. p. 178, where he complains that they had reached the “nocentissima fraus, ut baptizati vel absoluti, statim se sine omni peccato arbitrantes, securi fierent de adepta iustitia et manibus remissis quieti, nullius sc. conscii peccati, quod gemitu et lachrymis lugendo et laborando expugnarent atque expurgarent. Igitur peccatum est in spirituali homine relictum,” etc. It is clear that the continuance cf the “fomes peccati” is confused with the continuance of sin and the languor which is frequently due to weakness after the extirpation of sin, with a languor which must necessarily set in. The “grace which is given” he sometimes looks upon as actual, sometimes as saving grace. To follow him through all his erroneous notions would be endless.