The Negro in Chicago: A Study of Race Relations and a Race Riot. Chicago Commission on Race Relations
IN WAGONS
THE MILITIA AND NEGROES ON FRIENDLY TERMS
The militia discipline was of the best. Not a single case of breach of discipline was reported to the regimental commanders. No guardhouse was necessary during the riot, a remarkable commentary on troop conduct.
The militia had been given special drills in the suppression of riots and insurrections for a year and a half previous to this occasion, and were, in the estimation of their commanding officer, "probably better prepared for riot drill than any troops ever put on duty in the state."
The activities of the militia did not begin as early as many citizens wished. Though troops began to mobilize in the armories on Monday night, July 28, they were not called to actual duty on the streets until 10:30 P.m., Wednesday, July 30. When called to active duty they were distributed in the areas of conflict. Between 5,000 and 6,000 troops were called out. This number was made up entirely of white troops from the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Infantry, Illinois National Guard, and from the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Reserve Militia regiments of the militia. Colored troops who had composed the Eighth Regiment were not reorganized at that time, and therefore none participated.
Distribution of troops was determined not by the militia command but by the police, because the city was not under martial law, the civil authority being merely insufficient, not broken. The Third Infantry covered the territory from Thirty-first to Thirty-eighth streets and from State to Halsted streets; Eleventh Infantry from Thirty-ninth to Forty-seventh streets, and from State to Halsted streets; Tenth Infantry from Forty-eighth to Fifty-fifth streets (later extended to Sixty-third Street by details from the First Infantry), and from Cottage Grove to Stewart avenues. The First, Fourth, and Ninth Infantry were held in reserve. Detachments responded to calls from the chief of police in districts outside these areas. Headquarters for the commanding general and his chief of staff were in the Congress Hotel at the northern boundary of the riot zone.
The orders under which the militia operated did not have the authority of martial law. The purpose of the orders was to effect a thorough co-operation with the police only, and not to take over any duties other than the preservation of law and order. Except in this respect, civilian routine remained undisturbed. The method of co-operation put the commanding officer of a regiment in absolute control, within the limits above described, in his district. The police reduced their number to normal requirements by removing their reserves as soon as the militia moved in. The patrolmen then went about on ordinary duties in the districts. Persons arrested by the militia were turned over to the police.
Responsibility for the preservation of law and order rested on the regimental commanders. Careful instructions were given troops for preventing violence: they were to act as soldiers in a gentlemanly manner; they were furnished with arms to enable them to perform their duties; they were to use the arms only when necessary; they were to use bayonet and butt in preference to firing, but if the situation demanded shooting, they were not to hesitate to deliver an effective fire. Above all, the formation of mobs was to be prevented.
The manner in which the militia was received by various elements in the communities where stationed is illuminating. Police officers were glad that the troops came to relieve them. Two policemen on duty with a patrol exclaimed, when they heard the militia had come in force, "Thank God! We can't stand up under this much longer!" The police at Cottage Grove Avenue said, "We are tickled to death to see you fellows come in; you have never looked so good to us before!" A regimental commander said his organization was "welcomed into the zone, of course, by everybody, and I'd say especially by the colored people." A similar report came from another regimental commander.
But there was some show of hostility to the troops. Hoodlums fired on some detachments when they first came in, and Colonel Bolte reported a hatred for the troops by "the Hamburg Athletic Club, the Ragen's, and the Emeralds, and a whole bunch of them over there who didn't like to be controlled!" Volunteer ex-service men with no legal status, but who aided the police at the time, and deputy sheriffs with overseas training ridiculed the militia with such taunts as, "Tin soldiers!" The effect of this attitude on the populace necessitated the arrest of some disturbers and the removal of unauthorized persons from the streets.
It is a singular fact that militia activities were principally against gangs of hoodlums, and the majority of these gangs were composed of white youths. Said one commander, "Rowdies of the white population tried to get through the lines and had to be arrested." "At one time a heavy truck or two loaded with white gangsters attempted to break through the militia but was checked." Plenty of trouble "with the Ragen's and other similar organizations" was reported by yet another commander.
The militia unquestionably prevented mob formations, raids, and "sniping." They checked marauders still in search of prey. In many cases they prevented the initial moves of lawlessness by taking stations at critical points long before raiders arrived.
There was a marked contrast between the militia and the police. The troops were under definite orders; commanders had absolute control of their forces and knew at all times where and how many effectives were available. Precision and promptness of movement was the rule. Reserves were always at hand. Discipline was always good. Only one person, a white man, was killed by the troops. Whatever other restraining causes contributed, it is certain that the riot was not revived after the troops were posted.
Most of the troops were withdrawn on August 8.
Volunteers.—Many Negro ex-service men, formerly members of the old Eighth Regiment (Negro) of the Illinois National Guard, donned their uniforms, armed, and offered their services to the police and militia. The militia on duty found that these Negro volunteers had no authority or military status and consequently ordered them to disband, which they did.
Before the troops were called out, however, a determined effort was made by one Britton, white police reserve, to organize ex-soldiers for volunteer service. He said as many as thirty-five joined him. They were denied permits to carry weapons but are reported to have done so. It was these men who used an automobile, driven with the mufflers open, to clear the streets.
Evidence of the use of liquor was noticed among these men during their active period. Some were involved in the killing of Samuel Banks, Negro; some in the robbery of a restaurant and in misdeeds of a minor character. Following the implication of individuals among them in these crimes, numbers of the ex-soldiers were arrested by the police, but were released by order of Chief Garrity on account of the assistance many of them had rendered the department and because of representations of business men who felt that the arrests were unjust.
Deputy sheriffs.—In addition to police, militiamen, and volunteers, another group composed of specially recruited deputy sheriffs, appeared in the riot zone as preservers of the peace. They were sworn in by Sheriff Peters, of Cook County, after citizens had appealed to him, he said, to quell the riot. In regard to their formation, numbers, orders, and duties, the sheriff had this to say:
I advertised for ex-service men to serve as deputy sheriffs. A thousand or more applied. They were all men who had returned from the war and were out of work. I hired 500 of them, kept them in the army uniforms, and instructed them to shoot to kill any disturbers or rioters. The presence of these men and the show of authority thereby made was effective, and the riot was quelled.
Fifteen thousand dollars was spent on this force.
It appears that these deputies came on the scene toward the end of the riot week and at once fell into disfavor with the militia, whom they ridiculed as "tin soldiers" in much the same manner as did the volunteers. Two regimental commanders of militia said the special deputies "did not behave in a very pleasant manner" and "in the majority of instances were no good." The sheriff was notified to call them in and they soon disappeared. There is no record of organized methods of procedure or of their activities.
Restoration of order.—Long before actual hostilities ceased, and even before the arrival of the militia, various agencies, in addition to the police, were at work trying to hold lawlessness in check and restore order. Efforts of citizens of both races helped greatly in bringing about peace. As long as