The Negro in Chicago: A Study of Race Relations and a Race Riot. Chicago Commission on Race Relations

      SEARCHING NEGROES FOR ARMS IN POLICE STATION

      A report on 229 Negroes and whites accused of various criminal activities disclosed the fact that 154 were Negroes and seventy-five were whites. The state's attorney reported eighty-one indictments against Negroes and forty-seven against whites after all riot cases were cleared up. These figures show that twice as many Negroes appeared as defendants and twice as many were indicted as whites.

      At first glance these figures indicate greater riot activity on the part of Negroes, and therefore one would expect to find twice as many whites injured as Negroes. But out of a total of 520 injured persons whose race was definitely reported, 342 were Negroes and 178 whites. The fact that twice as many Negroes appeared as defendants and twice as many were injured as whites suggests the conclusion that whites were not apprehended as readily as Negroes.

      Herman M. Adler, state criminologist of Illinois, testifying before the Commission, expressed the belief that the police showed much more readiness to arrest Negroes than whites because the officers thought they were "taking fewer chances if they 'soaked' a colored man."

      Negro distrust of police and courts seems to have been confirmed by the action of the state's attorney's office in bringing only Negro riot cases before the grand jury. This body, however, took a stand for fair play and justice for both sides, and though its action may have been novel, it was effective. In its final report, the grand jury said:

      This jury has no apology to offer for its attitude with reference to requesting the state's attorney to supply it with information of crimes perpetrated by whites against blacks before considering further evidence against blacks. This attitude gave rise to the reports in the press that this grand jury "had gone on a strike." As a matter of fact, its position was merely a suspension of hearing further cases of crimes committed by blacks against whites until the state's attorney submitted evidence concerning the various crimes committed by whites against blacks. The reason for this attitude arose from a sense of justice on the part of this jury. It is the opinion of this jury that the colored people suffered more at the hands of the white hoodlums than the white people suffered at the hands of the black hoodlums. Notwithstanding this fact, the cases presented to this jury against the blacks far outnumber those against the whites.

      State's Attorney Hoyne justified this action by saying that the Police Department brought in Negroes only, and until they arrested whites, he was limited to proceedings against Negroes.

      The coroner's jury on November 3, 1919, reported as follows:

      Our attention was called strikingly to the fact that at the time of race rioting, the arrests made for rioting by the police of colored rioters were far in excess of the arrests made of white rioters. The failure of the police to arrest impartially, at the time of rioting, whether from insufficient effort or otherwise, was a mistake and had a tendency to further incite and aggravate the colored population.

      This seeming discrimination in arrests naturally deepened Negro distrust and lack of confidence in the police. Testimony was taken by the Commission on the plans and action of the Police Department during the riot period, since the Commission felt that the distribution of forces and the methods used by the department to meet such an emergency were matters of first importance.

      Chief of Police Garrity testified that there were 3,500 policemen in the department at the time of the riot, and that he had "practically every policeman in the city of Chicago down there," indicating Thirty-fifth Street and Rhodes Avenue as "practically in the heart of the district where the most trouble was." The widest distribution from that center, he said, was over an area bounded by Lake Michigan, Ashland Avenue, Van Buren Street, and Sixty-ninth Street.

      The heaviest concentration of police, however, was in the "Black Belt." The Stanton Avenue Police Station at Thirty-fifth Street and Rhodes Avenue is at about the center of the most congested Negro residential area. Asked how many policemen were assigned to that vicinity (the area from Twenty-second to Thirty-ninth streets), Chief Garrity said, "We had in the neighborhood of 2,800 men in that territory." Later the chief said only "the necessary sergeants and one or two men at each station were held back for emergency calls" in all other parts of the city. This means that four-fifths of the total police force was concentrated there.

      Although there is no direct testimony as to the existence of flying squadrons of police, yet such bodies appear to have been operating. Probably the most important of these was the patrol under Police Captain Mullen, who said that his territory extended from Twenty-second to Thirty-ninth streets and from the lake to the Rock Island tracks, or roughly the "Black Belt." Chief Deputy Alcock[9] sent eighty-eight policemen into this district on Sunday afternoon, twenty-five more at midnight, and fifty more on Monday morning.

      In describing the disposition of police details, Chief Garrity said: "They were routed by him [Alcock] according to conditions existing in different districts. Some districts might have a hundred men in the block and in the next block there might be only ten, according to what conditions were." Forces were moved from one point of disturbance to another by means of patrol wagons on request of local commanders.

      The 2,800 policemen in the "Black Belt" were under the command of Chief Deputy Alcock with headquarters in the Stanton Avenue Station. He "used his discretion in the number of men assigned to the different points and the handling of them in the different territories."

      Riot orders were given by Chief Garrity as follows: "Wherever possible suppress the riot and restore peace"; "the second day I ordered a dead line on Wentworth Avenue and Twenty-second Street to, I think, Sixty-third Street"; "instructions were that 'you will allow no colored people to go across to the west and no white people to go across to the east.'" Cabarets, saloons, and public places were ordered closed, and all large gatherings of either whites or Negroes were prohibited from Van Buren to Sixty-ninth streets and from Ashland Avenue to the lake. The chief added, "Closing clubrooms and everything in the district west of Wentworth Avenue as well as east of it." A general policy was adopted of search and seizure of persons suspected of carrying weapons on the street, and of houses from which firing came. Captain Mullen testified before the coroner's jury at the Eugene Williams inquest that on July 29 Chief Deputy Alcock lined up the policemen in front of the Stanton Avenue Station and gave them their orders. They were told to "preserve the peace; that was all."

      Police records of clashes were incomplete and often inaccurate. This was in part due, and naturally so, to the stress of the moment. In many cases the station lists of injured were far from complete and in few instances were the names of witnesses given. Even the dates and hours of clashes were loosely recorded. Persons arrested were frequently not booked at all, while on the other hand it was not uncommon to find innocent persons charged with serious offenses. Henry Scholz, policeman of the Twenty-sixth Precinct, threw much light on police records while being examined in connection with certain automobile arrests:

      They were all discharged, booked for "disorderly," because we couldn't find the guns in the mix-up. It was the first or second day down there and they were bringing them in right and left, and I suppose in the mix-up they mislaid the guns, or put them away somewhere, or booked them to someone else. We held them about a week trying to find the guns and trying to find the officers that got the guns.

      It is important to know how the distribution and routing of police affected the general riot situation. As already shown four-fifths of the police forces were concentrated in the "Black Belt." This undoubtedly both weakened police forces elsewhere and also prevented or delayed reinforcements in outside districts. Only 34 per cent of the total number of reported injuries occurred in the area of concentration. Negro hatred of the police is worth mentioning again here, especially since many of the deaths and injuries occurred during clashes between white policemen and Negro mobs.

      That other districts where danger existed were poorly protected is shown by the fact that fatal clashes occurred there without interruption by the police. The most conspicuous case is noted in the "Loop" atrocities on July 29, where two Negroes, Hardwick and Williams, were