The Red Army in Austria. Группа авторов
and among Austrian émigrés for a long time no such clear concept for the future of Austria had existed. During a discussion with Maiskii on November 27, 1941, the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, made no differentiation between the status of Bavaria, Austria, and Wurttemberg when determining the future framework of peace, according to Maiskii.4 Against the backdrop of the Anglo-American talks in March 1943, the Soviet Ambassador in the United States, Maksim Litvinov, submitted a report to Moscow on the different ideas on the future of Austria proposed during these negotiations. The ideas ranged from the reestablishment of Austrian statehood via “unification with Czechoslovakia”5 to a restoration of the Habsburg monarchy. Litvinov painted a particularly ambivalent picture of the position of the United States. If, according to the words of the British Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, “the President ([Franklin D.] Roosevelt) and [Cordell] Hull (US Secretary of State) [. . .] [had] shown no interest in a resurrection of the Habsburg monarchy,” the Soviet Ambassador had received entirely contradictory information from his Italian dialogue partner, Carlo Graf Sforza: “The flirting of the USA with Otto Habsburg has its origins in the White House, and [. . .] the President is under the influence of different monarchist circles residing in the USA and in Italy.”6
A letter written by Litvinov, who had just returned from the United States, on the eve of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the three victorious powers, contained a similar analysis of the plans for Austria with balanced arguments for the resurrection of an independent Austria. Litvinov stated that plans were circulating in the West for the establishment of various federations—an Austrian-Hungarian federation (a variation which, according to Litvinov, was brought into play by Eden), a southern German one, a central European one, and an eastern European one. Among Austrian émigrés, there were “persons who are prepared to leave Austria in a democratic Germany,” while alongside them also advocates of a “federal solution” (in this context, the “former Austrian envoy to London, Kunz” was named). As Litvinov pointed out, “the opponents of an independent Austrian state [would] invoke above all the inability of such a state to survive. But at least Austria existed for 20 years as an independent state and its population hardly lived under worse conditions or greater hardship than the populations of Austria’s neighbours, the Balkan states.”
Litvinov brings an additional argument against the Austro-sceptics into play: in the war years, the economic potential of Austria grew sharply; oil production reached 0.5 million tons and steel production was doubled following the launch of the “Hermann Göring Works.”
In concluding the Austria-related part of his letter, Litvinov even suggests that the possibility of an expansion of the territory of a future Austrian state be considered: “Austria can make a justifiable claim for the incorporation of a small part of German territory, the districts of Passau and Berchtesgaden. One might also return South Tyrol, which was taken by Italy, to Austria, though that is connected with the question of the treatment of Italy.”7
The last named idea was admittedly not implemented, but Litvinov’s remarks otherwise reflected the basic stance of the three powers and the resurrection of an independent Austria was defined as one of the aims of the anti-Hitler coalition in the “Declaration on Austria” agreed on November 1, 1943, at the Moscow Conference. This aim was ultimately realized.
The question of fixing the occupation zones in Austria deserves particular attention. This was discussed in the “European Advisory Commission” (EAC), whereby the position of the Soviet Union in this three-power organ had been formulated within the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR on the basis of the recommendation of the “Commission for Cease-fire Matters,” established in accordance with the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party from September 4, 1943. Marshal Kliment Voroshilov was appointed head of the Commission, for which reason it was for the most part dubbed the “Voroshilov Commission.”
In a first variation of a draft of the summary “Conditions of Surrender for Germany” from February 4, 1944, the demarcation line “between the armed forces of the USSR on the one hand and the armed forces of the United Kingdom and the USA on the other hand” was fixed as follows (Article 16):
From Heiligenhafen (not Soviet) along the western coast of the Bay of Mecklenburg to the city of Lübeck (not Soviet), further along the western border of Mecklenburg as far as the River Elbe and further upstream as far as the administrative border of the Prussian province of the Altmark, then further to the western border of Anhalt, further along the western administrative border of the Prussian province of Saxony and Thuringia as far as the intersection of their border with the Bavarian [border] and further in an easterly direction along the northern border of Bavaria as far as the Czechoslovakian border at the village of Hof, further along the western, south-western and southern border of Czechoslovakia as far as the city of Bratislava and then from this city the course of the Danube downstream to the city of Silistra and further eastwards along the Romanian-Bulgarian border as far as the Black Sea coast.
The “disarming of the German troops, the troops of other Axis powers and of the so-called ‘volunteers’” in the territories east of this line would be incumbent on the armed forces of the USSR, in the territories west of this line the troops of the Western powers.8 A glance at the map is sufficient to come to the conclusion that this planned line excluded a military presence on the part of the USSR not only in Austria but also in the western part of Hungary.
In a second variation of this draft (from February 8, 1944), the term “occupation zones” (Article 15) appears for the first time, whose borders were only fixed, however, as far as the intersection of the Bavarian and Czechoslovakian borders. Their further course across the borders of Germany remained open.9
Only in a third variation of the draft, which Molotov sent to Stalin on February 12, 1944, to be signed, was Austria addressed, for which the same status was envisaged as for Berlin—the status of a “common zone.”10 In this context, Article 15 was supplemented with point “d,” according to which the “territory of Austria is to be occupied jointly by the troops of the USSR, the United Kingdom and the USA.” Stalin signalled his agreement to this variation in his resolution “To Molotov. Stalin.”
In his telegram of February 12, 1944, to the Soviet delegate in the EAC, Fedor Gusev, Molotov mentioned that the proposed status for Berlin and Austria was to be regarded as an “exception” to the rule because “each zone will only be occupied by troops of that particular one of the three powers [. . .] to whom the respective zone is allocated.”11 It is understandable why so much importance was attached to this rule on the Soviet side and why the British draft, according to which in each zone the presence of troops from the other Allied countries was also allowed, was regarded as unacceptable: the variation of a “mixed occupation” carried with it the danger of an uncontrolled growth in contact between members of the armed forces of “East” and “West” and, accordingly, would potentially have paved the way for that which was designated “ideological diversion” in Soviet jargon. It is more difficult to understand why an exception to this rule was considered permissible in the cases of Berlin and Austria.
Incidentally, both in Berlin and in Austria, the principle of territorial demarcation was soon being spread between the occupation contingents. In the case of Berlin, it was a matter of two sectors; with regard to Austria, of two zones. In the following, the relevant article (Article 2) of the draft of the “Voroshilov Commission” from April 17, 1944, is quoted in full:
For the occupation of Austria, the following zones will be established:
a) The territory of Austria east of the line starting at the border city of Retz in a south-westerly direction as far as the city of Horn and further south in the direction of the city of Krems, from where it runs in an easterly direction along the right shore of the Danube as far as the city of Tulln and further in a southerly direction via the cities of Hainfeld, Mürzsteg, Turnau, Bruck, Leoben and further along the Rivers Mur and Lavant as far as the southern border of Austria, will be occupied by troops from the USSR with the exception of the special occupation arrangement noted under point “d”;
b) the territory west of the